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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, petrochemicals products from Saudi Arabia have been the subject of 
anti-dumping (AD) cases in several countries. This has raised questions about 
whether Saudi Arabia’s domestic laws and regulations relating to AD and anti-
subsidy are, (1) effective, and (2) compatible with Saudi Arabia’s international legal 
obligations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This thesis examines the 
compatibility of Saudi Arabia’s domestic laws concerning AD, with international 
trade law, under the WTO agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement (AD 
Agreement)). It critically analyses cases filed against Saudi Arabia’s petrochemicals 
products in a number of countries; including India, China, and Turkey, and in the 
European Union. 
 
It is observed that the high number of AD cases filed against Saudi Arabia’s 
petrochemicals products around the world reflect a need to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic laws, and the regulations applicable to dumping. Arguably, some aspects of 
the WTO AD Agreement are in need of reconsideration by the contracting parties in 
view of the modern context of trade between contracting parties. Aspects to be re-
examined include, for example, dispute resolution procedures. In this respect, this 
thesis argues that some parts of the WTO AD Agreement should be subject to further 
negotiations between the WTO contracting parties, with a view to making 
appropriate amendments.  
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Finally, this research will present recommendations for the Saudi Arabian 
economic system, suggest amendments relating to AD and anti-subsidy provisions 
under the WTO and finally offer recommendations for the dispute resolution 
mechanism under the DSU. This will help to improve and develop an effective AD 
legal regime under the WTO agreement, which would be applicable in the context of 
the changing circumstances of global international trade. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background 
On 11 December 2005, Saudi Arabia became the 149
th
 member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO),
1
 having overcome a series of hurdles, navigated over a ten-
year period.
2
 The challenges Saudi Arabia overcame to fulfil membership 
requirements necessitated changes to its judicial and legislation system; however, 
membership led to a qualitative leap in Saudi Arabia’s economic system. An 
example of the legal changes made included the formation of new anti-dumping 
(AD) and competition laws.
3
 Although Saudi Arabia agreed to sign the Marrakesh 
Agreement of Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO agreement)
4
 
following negotiation, it placed many reservations on the terms of its membership, as 
detailed below:
5
 
 A ban on the import of alcohol, pork and all other products prohibited under 
Islamic law; 
 A condition that a minimum of 75% of the labour capacity in both Saudi 
Arabian and foreign companies should be Saudi nationals; 
                                                 
1
World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014.  
2
 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at http://www.mci.gov.sa/, accessed 1 June 2014. 
3
 Competition Law issued by a Royal Decree number 138 date 22 June, 2004. The Anti-Dumping law 
was adopted later from the GCC, by Royal Decree number 30/M date 14 June, 2006. For more 
information about Saudi Regulations, see the website for the Bureau of Experts at the Council of 
Ministers available at <http://boe.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
4
 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
5
 Abdul-Aziz M Aljarallah, Analysing the Impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the 
Sustainability of Competitiveness of the Petrochemical Industry in Saudi Arabia, (PhD thesis, 
Durham University 2010) 52. Also, see the World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm>, accessed on 1 June 2014.  
2 
 
 A condition that that Saudi oil products6 would not be covered by the WTO 
agreement; 
 A condition that the government of Saudi Arabia would collect income tax from 
foreign companies and Zakat from Saudi companies; 
 Bound tariffs were to be higher than the existing rates for similar products; 
 Bound tariffs were to be phased in by 2008, 2010 or possibly 2015, depending 
on circumstances; 
 10 years of subsidies would be granted to the agriculture sector; 
 Some domestic subsidies would continue, such as fuel and electricity; 
 A condition that foreign investment must be approved by the Saudi General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA);
7
 and 
 A provision permitting only Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
citizens to invest directly in Saudi real estate and shares.
8
 
 
Saudi Arabia possesses the largest oil reserves in the world, comprising 25% of the 
world’s total oil reserves; currently this equates to a proven 265,405.0 billion 
barrels.
9
 Consequently, Saudi Arabia is a founding and significant member of the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) founded in 1960.10 In 
addition, Saudi Arabia’s natural resources include 287,822 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, which constitute about 25% of the world’s total gas reserves (based on 
                                                 
6
 Oil products are different then petrochemicals products that under investigation. The oil products are 
an oil crude and petrochemicals products are chemicals obtain from oil and gas. 
7
 The Saudi General Investment Authority (SAGIA) was established by Royal Decree number (2) date 
10 April 2000, available at <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
8
 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a cooperative union between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman, available at <www.gcc-sa.org> accessed 1 June 
2014. 
9
 The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. Available at <http://www.mopm.gov.sa/> accessed 
1 June 2014. 
10
 OPEC official website, available at (http://www.opec.org/), accessed 1 June 2014. 
3 
 
2011 statistics).
11
 The Saudi government prohibits private company investment in oil 
products.
12
 The government extracts the oil under the auspices of the nationally 
owned, Saudi Aramco, the largest oil company in the world.
13
  
The establishment of oil as intrinsic to the Saudi economy was furthered by 
government investments in hydrocarbons, through the establishment of 
petrochemical industries. Royal Decree (Number M/66 date 6/9/1976) in 1976 
established the ‘Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation’ (SABIC),14 which 
holds stocks on the Saudi stock exchange. The Saudi government owns 70% of the 
company’s capital, equating to a total value of 30 billion Saudi Riyals, with the 
remainder of its capital held by Saudi citizens and other GCC members.
15
 Like 
SABIC, the majority of Saudi Arabian petrochemical companies have issued stocks 
on the stock exchange, and remain either fully or partly owned by the Saudi 
government. Impressively, SABIC is the second largest petrochemicals company in 
the world, and the largest non-oil company in the Middle East.
16
 
As a result of its 70% share in SABIC holdings, the Saudi Arabian 
government has the authority to appoint members of the Board of Directors through 
issuance of a Royal Decree.
17
 Thus, other private petrochemical industries do not 
have SABIC’s renowned capacity for production, and are unable to compete with it, 
whether in terms of the type of products or the quantity and quality of products. 
Petrochemicals industries in the Kingdom are classified into three categories:  
                                                 
11
 The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. Available at <http://www.mopm.gov.sa/> accessed 
1 June 2014. 
12
 Petroleum exploration and Petroleum producing. See Article 3 of the Saudi Foreign Investment 
Law. 
13
 Saudi Aramco, available at http://www.saudiaramco.com/, accessed 1 June 2014. 
14
 See the SABIC website, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
15
 See the SABIC website, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
16
 SABIC Annual Report 2012, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
17
 SABIC, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. Also, see the World Trade 
Organisation’s report (Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat about Saudi Arabia) number 
WT/TPR/S/256 date 21
st
 of December, 2011. 
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 Small petrochemical companies;  
 Petrochemicals companies that work in the development and 
marketing of the petrochemicals; and 
 Large petrochemical companies, in which SABIC or Saudi Aramco 
have shareholdings. 
The first of these categories, small petrochemical companies, have a very 
limited capability to produce petrochemicals products, and only manage to produce 
within a limited range. These companies are: the National Industrialisation 
Company,
18
 the Nama Chemicals Company
19
 and the Saudi International 
Petrochemical Company (Sipchem).
20
 In combination with other national and 
international companies, these companies are private sector owned. However, their 
capacity cannot compare with that of SABIC to produce petrochemicals products.  
The second category consists of those companies that specialise in 
developing, managing, operating and building petrochemical industries and 
companies. The Sahara Petrochemicals Company is such a company;
21
 however, it 
does not have a role in the industrialisation of petrochemicals.  
The third category is the most important, and includes the following five 
companies: Yanbu National Petroleum,
22
 the Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical 
Company,
23
 the Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO),
24
 Saudi Kayan,
25
 and 
                                                 
18
 The National Industrialization Company, available at <http://www.tasnee.com/> accessed 1 June 
2014. 
19
 The Nama Chemicals Company, available at <http://www.nama.com.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
20
 The Saudi International Petrochemical Company (Sipchem), available at 
<http://www.sipchem.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
21
 The Sahara Petrochemicals Company, available at <http://www.saharapcc.com/> accessed 1 June 
2014. 
22
 Yanbu National Petroleum, available at <http://www.yansab.com.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
23
 The Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Company (Petrorabigh), available at 
http://www.petrorabigh.com/, accessed 1 June 2014. 
24
 The Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO), available at <http://www.safco.com.sa/en/> 
accessed 1 June 2014. 
25
 Saudi Kayan, available at <http://www.saudikayan.com.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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finally Sadara.
26
 All these companies are owned by either ARAMCO or SABIC, 
thereby distinguishing their importance in the market. This limits the freedom of 
competition between them and other small petrochemical companies. Saudi 
petrochemicals products have been subject to negative export experiences, because 
of international AD and anti-subsidy laws; they are protected from these when 
operating domestically by lack of competition from within the sector.  
SABIC has embarked internationally on partnerships with several major 
petrochemicals companies around the world. Currently it has part shares in, or owns 
outright, approximately 64 companies in the petrochemicals industry.
27
 For example, 
SABIC owns Asia Pacific Pte Ltd in Asia, which occupies a significant position as 
an export company, distributing petrochemicals products throughout China, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.
28
 It 
also owns three petrochemicals companies in Europe: Geleen (the Netherlands), 
Teesside (the United Kingdom) and Gelsenkirchen (Germany).
29
 
The above summary of ARAMCO, SABIC and the remainder of the 
petrochemicals sector demonstrate a direct relationship between access to large 
reserves of oil and natural gas and the ability to offer low prices on petrochemicals 
products. Thus, the fact that the Saudi Aramco Company for the extraction of oil and 
natural gas is wholly owned by the Saudi government (which also owns 70% of the 
remaining Saudi’s petrochemical companies), confers unfair competitive advantage 
on Saudi products in the international markets. There is a strong argument in favour 
of mitigating this by applying AD duty to Saudi petrochemicals products, when its 
petrochemicals products are exported to the international market. Such arguments 
                                                 
26
 Sadara, available at <http://www.sadara.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
27
 SABIC, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
28
 SABIC, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
29
 SABIC, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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are based on the company’s ability to sell petroleum raw materials at a lower price 
than the prevailing international market level, as will be shown later in this research.  
Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been examining how best to 
diversify its sources of national revenue to decrease its dependency on the oil 
industry. There are two main reasons for this:
30
 
1- Oil is a product that will eventually run out, being a non-renewable 
resource; and 
2- Fluctuations in oil price and speculation in the financial stock markets have 
affected the stability of oil prices. 
 
Thus, Saudi Arabia has issued a plan for the industrial sector that includes the 
petrochemicals industry: “Towards a competitive industry and an economy based on 
knowledge” (this is Saudi Royal Decree No. 35, dated 3rd of February, 2009 and is a 
National Industrial Strategy detailing objectives for 2020).
31
 The main aim of this 
strategic plan was to raise the industry's contribution to national revenue by 20% by 
2020 (currently it is 11.1%),
32
 and to attain a privileged position on the global 
industrial map. 
Moreover, part of this plan included a package of industrial legislative 
changes including a review of all legislation related to the industrial sector and trade, 
which must be completed in a short period of time (during the first five-year plan for 
the implementation of the strategy).
33
 This transformation will involve the evaluation 
                                                 
30
 Eid Al-Juhani, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after one hundred years, (Dara King Abdul-Aziz, 
1999) v 14, 257. 
31
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
32
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
33
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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and proposal of new laws, such as company law, tax incentive laws, anti-monopoly 
laws, and laws to protect domestic technology, as well as a foreign investment law.
34
 
Crucially, the strategy also highlights the importance and necessity of reviewing AD 
law in Saudi Arabia. 
1.2 Statement of problem  
In recent years, SABIC has faced a number of legal allegations related to AD laws, 
and following export of its products abroad. These allegations have also affected 
other Saudi petrochemicals companies. Legal cases have been brought against 
SABIC in China, India, Turkey, and the USA, as well as elsewhere in the Middle 
East, in developing countries, and in the European Union.
35
 These AD laws provide 
opportunities for unfair competition in the petrochemicals market.  
 For example, in the case of India, at the beginning of 2009, the Indian government 
applied AD duty to Saudi petrochemicals products.
36
 This duty required exporters to 
pay an additional $440 per tonne of product, over a period of six months. This period 
began 15 June 2009 and ran until 29 January 2010.
37
 However, following 
negotiations between the Saudi Arabian government and India, India terminated the 
case and cancelled the AD duty.
38
 In addition, the European Union and Turkey also 
terminated AD cases raised against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products.
39
 
                                                 
34
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
35
 The World Bank Global Anti-dumping Database, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
74930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
36
 See the case number 14/5/2009-DGAD under the Indian anti-dumping authority, available at 
<http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2> accessed 1 June 2014 
37
 See the case number 14/5/2009-DGAD under the Indian anti-dumping authority, available at 
<http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2> accessed 1 June 2014 
38
 See the case number 14/5/2009-DGAD under the Indian anti-dumping authority, available at 
<http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2> accessed 1 June 2014 
39
 The Indian case number 14/5/2009-DGAD under the Indian anti-dumping authority, available at 
<http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2> accessed 1 June 2014. The EU case 
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Despite their dissolution, these cases suggest there is a risk of similar cases arising in 
the near future. This prompts the question: why are those products produced by the 
Saudi petrochemicals industries repeatedly the subject of AD related legal actions?  
This situation also affects Saudi industrial strategy, as the Saudi government 
has advanced a 10-year plan to expand the petrochemicals’ sector in particular and 
the entire industrial sector in general.
40
 This plan aims to increase employment 
opportunities, and to diversify Saudi Arabia’s sources of national income.41 
However, those cases brought against Saudi petrochemicals products have the 
potential to impede the saleability of these products abroad, thereby negatively 
affecting implementation of the plan. In addition, limits on Saudi petrochemicals 
exports could affect the Saudi economy, both directly and indirectly. 
The grounds for the AD cases brought against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals 
products
42
 were unfair competition, based on the relatively lower prices of Saudi 
Arabian products compared to normal international market prices. The low prices 
arise from the fact that the Saudi government subsidises fuel, gas and electricity.
43
 In 
addition, the petrochemicals sector has access to cheap raw materials from the 
government owned Saudi Aramco. These raw materials costs are not similar to 
standard international prices. Moreover, there is no effective competitive mechanism 
                                                                                                                                          
number 2011/c 49/10, see Official Journal of the European Union law, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:049:SOM:EN:HTML> accessed 1 June 2014. The Turkish 
case number 2008/40, see The Turkish Ministry of Economic, available at 
<http://www.economy.gov.tr/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
40
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014 
41
 The National Industrial Strategic for Industry 2020 Saudi Industrial Development Funds, available 
at <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/> accessed 1 June 2014 
42
 The World Bank Global Anti-dumping Database, available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22574
930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed 1 June 2014 
43
 Trade Policy Review, prepared by the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Report no. 
WT/TPR/256, 21 December 2011, vii . Also, see the report by Reuters Arabic news, available at 
<http://ara.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idARACAE9B2FFP20131110> accessed 1 June 2014 
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inside Saudi Arabia’s domestic market, as all petrochemicals products are either 
produced by SABIC or by companies partly owned by SABIC.  
This research shows that a high number of cases have involved 
petrochemicals products, and that these have increased to over 20% of all AD cases 
around the world.
44
 This increase represents a concern, and is the motivation for this 
study, as it has many legal causes. The absence of a legal guarantee between 
conflicting parties in disputes relating to AD and anti-subsidy laws at the national 
level is a notable problem. Additionally, there is a legal gap concerning the 
application of AD law to limit exported products; applying AD duty to exported 
products can trigger price increases among similar domestic industries. Moreover, 
AD and anti-subsidy laws have been used as a weapon to keep exported products out 
of the market, rather than using AD and anti-subsidy laws to protect domestic 
products from unfair competition. In addition, conflicting parties citing AD and anti-
subsidy under the WTO agreement have refused to apply different approaches to 
resolve legal matters such as mediation and arbitration. Conflicting parties rarely use 
the alternative dispute resolution methods available, although these could be the best 
way to reduce the huge number of AD cases worldwide; especially those brought 
against petrochemicals products. Good faith must be apparent in the relationship 
between the WTO contracting parties, in order to reduce conflict regarding 
agreements between parties. 
This research will only refer to three cases brought against Saudi 
Petrochemicals products; these are the cases filed by India, Turkey and the EU.
45
 It 
                                                 
44
 The World Bank Global Anti-dumping Database, available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22574
930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed 1 June 2014 
45
 Indian case number 14/5/2009-DGAD under the Indian anti-dumping authority, available at 
<http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2> accessed 1 June 2014. The EU case 
number 2011/c 49/10, see Official Journal of the European Union law, available at <http://eur-
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was a challenge for the researcher to identify the most relevant and useful cases for 
analysis, from the 33 cases that have been brought against Saudi Arabia.
46
 The 
researcher established the following inclusion criteria to narrow the options:  
1. The cases should offer a representative sample of all AD cases brought 
against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products.  
2. The cases should have been raised against Saudi petrochemicals products at 
the national level. 
3. The cases should have been well covered in the Saudi media, and the 
offending companies should have received good governmental support. 
4. The cases should have terminated in a unique way; in some cases after 
application of AD duty.  
5. Some of the cases should include the issue of subsidies. 
       However, these three cases fulfil all criteria for doing the examination properly 
under this research in order to get the right result and point out the legal problem. 
This will be seen in chapter three of this research. 
1.3 Objectives of study 
Petrochemicals products are important to the Saudi Arabian economic system, as 
recognised in the Saudi Arabian government’s plans for improvement. The AD cases 
brought abroad represent potential obstacles to the realisation of this plan. 
Consequently, this research sets out to fulfil a number of economic and legal 
objectives as follows: 
                                                                                                                                          
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:049:SOM:EN:HTML> accessed 1 June 2014. The Turkish 
case number 2008/40, see The Turkish Ministry of Economics, available at 
<http://www.economy.gov.tr/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
46
 The Global Anti-dumping Database held by the World Bank, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
74930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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1- To avoid AD and anti-subsidy cases being brought against Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals products in the future; 
2- To establish legal solutions to address current cases; 
3- To improve the competition between petrochemicals products inside the 
Saudi Arabian domestic market, by applying legal processes, such as limiting 
the Saudi Arabian government’s interference in the sector; 
4- To reform Saudi Arabian subsidy programmes, so they become compatible 
with anti-subsidy law under the WTO agreement; 
5- To improve the AD process to achieve guarantees of fairness for all parties; 
6- To protect the petrochemicals sector worldwide by establishing a new treaty 
under the WTO agreement or beyond the WTO framework; 
7- To encourage and advance alternative dispute resolutions as a primary step in 
any AD and anti-subsidy’s legal process; and 
8- To propose a Disputes Resolution Centre (DRC), as well as an International 
Trade Court (ITC).  
This thesis aims to explore the lack of compatibility between the export 
policies in Saudi Arabia and the WTO agreement rules.
47
 Firstly, there are export 
policies related to the Saudi Arabian government, which actively subsidises the 
domestic petrochemicals sector, conferring an advantage and having a direct effect 
on product pricing. This has an impact, both inside and outside Saudi Arabia. 
Secondly, the domestic competition policies in Saudi Arabia require examination, 
due to the huge debate regarding the effectiveness of competition laws, which relate 
to the petrochemicals sector.
48
 Finally, the Saudi government reports interference in 
                                                 
47
 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 
(1999), 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994). 
48
 Competition Law issued by a Royal Decree 138 dated 22 June 2004. 
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this sector, challenging the development of SABIC into the largest petrochemicals 
company in the world.  
  This work also aims to consider how countries including India, Turkey and 
the European Union follow WTO import regulations in reference to domestic AD 
and anti-subsidy laws. The effect of this will be examined by investigating a number 
of cases brought against Saudi petrochemicals products. Furthermore, the impact on 
Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products following these cases will be analysed.
49
 The 
scope of this examination will be in reference to WTO AD and anti-subsidy 
regulations,
50
 to clarify the extent to which these countries observe the agreement. 
Alternative disputes mechanisms will also be considered as a means to reduce the 
number of AD cases brought against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products, as well 
as those that have a positive effect on AD cases around the world in general.  
1.4 Research questions 
 Based on the problem statement and research aims, the researcher has formulated 
six research questions:  
1- Are Saudi Arabia’s existing policies and regulations for exporting 
petrochemicals products compatible with the WTO rules that are applicable 
to dumping and subsidies? 
2- Did the AD cases brought by Turkey, India and the EU countries against 
Saudi petrochemicals products have an impact on these products? 
                                                 
49
 Indian, Turkish and European Union Anti-Dumping cases against the Saudi Petrochemicals 
products, supra 32 & 33. 
50
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results Of The 
Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 UNTS 14. Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), 1868 UNTS 201. 
13 
 
3- What are legal weaknesses in the AD and anti-subsidy laws under the WTO 
agreement?  
4- Can the petrochemicals industries be protected either under the WTO 
agreement or beyond the WTO framework, and if so how?  
5- What measures should Saudi Arabia implement in order to prevent 
imposition of AD duty on its petrochemicals products in future?  
6- Is there an effective mechanism for the resolution of disputes on AD and 
Anti-Subsidy under the WTO? 
1.5 Methodology 
This research studies the legal processes relating to all the export procedures 
applied to Saudi petrochemicals products in the international markets pertaining to 
AD and anti-subsidy actions. The research will combine investigation and analysis of 
recent AD cases against the Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products, with an 
examination of Saudi Arabian domestic competition law and legal processes. 
Consequently, the methodology in this research involves a textual legal 
analysis involving case law study. It will begin with an analysis of AD and Anti-
Subsidy regulation under the WTO agreement and Islamic law, which is applicable 
to Saudi Arabia. The analysis of AD and anti-subsidy under the WTO agreement will 
be performed in reference to selective cases from the Dispute Settlement. It will then 
reveal all the relevant provisions regarding these two matters. After which, cases 
against Saudi Arabia brought by India, Turkey and EU member states will be 
analysed. This will help to explain the legal matters pertaining to the export of Saudi 
Arabian petrochemicals products. Finally, alternative dispute resolution procedures 
available under the WTO agreement will be discussed, with some suggestions for 
14 
 
further development. This research will conclude by offering appropriate 
recommendations to protect Saudi Arabia’s petrochemicals products from 
international AD and anti-subsidy legal action. This conclusion will include 
proposals to resolve legal issues inside Saudi Arabia, in order to ensure export of 
these products without encountering AD and anti-subsidy legal issues. Carefully 
selected primary and secondary sources related to AD and anti-subsidy laws will be 
drawn on to support this research.  
1.6 Literature Review  
To attain in depth knowledge and understanding of previous studies and research 
concerning AD and anti-subsidy laws as related to petrochemicals products, a 
comprehensive literature review is required. This research employed a novel and 
unique approach to AD and anti-subsidy. All previous studies and researches 
regarding these two topics usually present one side. This can mean studying the 
internal market with the aim of protecting it and domestic industry by finding 
weaknesses in the domestic legal system and trying to resolve them. Alternatively, 
conducting theoretical and analytical studies to determine how to improve and 
develop regulations at the international level to improve on any defects or 
malfunctions.  
           Despite the different angle considered in this research, some aspects of it 
share similar aims to previous work. The study aim is to identify ways to protect 
Saudi petrochemicals products in the international marketplace from AD and anti-
subsidy in all parts of the export process by analysing all possible processes and 
legal actions. This will uncover any legal weaknesses and defects in the Saudi 
Arabian legal system related to the export of these productions abroad, and introduce 
15 
 
practical solutions to apply to counter legal action being taken by importing 
countries against Saudi products. 
         To date, there are a reasonable number of useful studies published concerning 
AD and anti-subsidy. One such study was that by Wenre Qian in reference to China, 
which provided: “An analysis of the legal problems and issues arising from the 
European Union’s current AD legislation with regard to the People’s Republic of 
China”.51 It analysed the implementation of policy, and explores legal problems and 
issues from both a theoretical and practical perspective. It began by examining the 
origins of EU AD legislation - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
AD rules. After which it provides an in depth justification of the legal problems 
associated with EU AD practice in the context of China's economic reforms, starting 
from 1979. To suggest solutions to resolve the problems and offer a justification, the 
author considered comparable research revealing alternative strategies from the US 
AD legislation, and that in Australia, New Zealand and Japan, where applicable to 
China. China's accession to the World Trade Organisation on 2
nd
 of December 2001, 
new issues and disputes have arisen with regard to AD practice. Therefore, this study 
attempted to find a solution that would be acceptable to EU and China, focusing on 
the regulation itself, theoretically rather than practically. However, this kind of 
research is not helpful to Saudi Arabia as it focused on two different jurisdictions: 
the EU and China.   
      In other PhD research, conducted by Alfonso Mendieta-Pacheco regarding the 
“Anticompetitive Effects of Antidumping Policy in Mexico”,52 the researcher 
focused on the internal regulations inside Mexico as a “Developing Country”, to help 
                                                 
51
 Wenre Qian, An analysis of the legal problems and issues arising from the European Union’s 
current anti-dumping legislation with regard to the People’s Republic of China (PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow 2003).  
52
 Alfonso Mendieta-Pacheco, Anticompetitive Effects of Antidumping Policy in Mexico (PhD thesis, 
University of East Anglia 2009). 
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reduce the increasing number of AD cases brought by developing countries. The 
researcher proposed implementing a confirmed domestic market structure inside 
Mexico. The main hypothesis introduced in this research was that price distortions 
generated by the introduction of AD policies serve as a departure point for the 
achievement of collusive agreements.
 
The researcher was trying to test a theoretical 
model: “Duopoly Compete Infinitely”. Although this research examined 
antidumping it did not cover all the aspects covered by the current research; 
however, the theoretical model provided a practical foundation upon which to base 
conclusions.  
      Gabriele Suder’s PhD study introduced “Anti-Dumping Measures and the 
Politics of EU-Japan Trade Relations in the European Consumer Electronics 
Sector”.53 This research focused on the role of price cuts in dumping measures in 
order to determine what aspects dominate the market or increase market share 
between competitors creating similar products. The researcher analysed the 
relationship between EU-Japanese trade policy and examined the competitiveness of 
European consumer electronic industry. This research differs from the current 
research in two respects. First, it focused on electronic industrial products, whereas 
this study concerns the petrochemicals industry; however, both products are subject 
to AD problems and therefore attract the interest of researchers.  Second, this 
research emphasised the relationship between EC and Japan in particular, whereas 
the focus of this study is Saudi Arabia. Although this research also applies a different 
methodology, the analysis of antidumping legal difficulties provided by Suder is of 
value in some aspects. 
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 Gabriele Suder, Anti-Dumping Measures and the Politics of EU-Japan Trade Relations in the 
European Consumer Electronics Sector (PhD thesis, University of Bath 1993).  
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          Other researchers have presented comparative studies between just two 
jurisdictions. For example, research by Cheong-Chi Chun: “A Comparative Study on 
Anti-Dumping Laws in the EU and Korea in the Context of International Rules”,54  
which concentrates on Korean electronic products as a target of EC AD regulations. 
The researcher tried to find a solution to limit the barriers encountered by Korean 
electronic products using a comparative methodology. This involved comparing the 
two AD regulatory systems as they applies to the EC and Korea as non-members of 
the EC community to locate lack of provisions in Korean AD law to protect Korean 
products. However, the research principally focused on protecting Korean electronic 
products in relation to the EC market, and was not applicable to different 
jurisdictions. This research, however, will seek solutions to protect Saudi 
petrochemicals products globally, and not within a single jurisdiction. This means 
applying multiple models and new ideas to find solution to these issues internally. 
However, there is an option to introduce new models to reduce the increasing 
number of AD cases between contracting parties, save time and make the trade 
between contracting parties smoother.   
           The research study, “Analysing the Impact of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) on the Sustainability of Competitiveness of the Petrochemicals Industry in 
Saudi Arabia” by Abdulaziz Aljarallah,55 was found to be the closest to this research. 
The researcher was trying to ascertain the impact of AD measures on Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals products, but from an economic perspective only. The research 
focused on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the petrochemicals 
industry in Saudi Arabia after joining the WTO. Hence, this research does not cover 
                                                 
54
 Cheong-Chi Chun, A Comparative Study on Anti-Dumping Laws in the EU and Korea in the 
Context of International Rules (PhD Thesis, University of Hull 1996). 
55
 Abdul-Aziz M Aljarallah, Analysing the Impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the 
Sustainability of Competitiveness of the Petrochemical Industry in Saudi Arabia, (PhD thesis, 
Durham University 2010). 
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all the objectives introduced here. The study aims and outcomes also differed, 
although some of the statistics and guidelines were of use to this research. However, 
the study was limited by its aim to protect the sector internationally from other 
competitors, rather than protecting the products during the exporting abroad process. 
        The differences between this research and other research reveal the gap that this 
study intended to fill. This study reports unique and specific research to uncover 
strategies to protect Saudi petrochemicals products from AD measures when 
exporting them to other countries, including the application of legal protection to 
some products internally in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, it will also help to identify 
models to reduce AD cases worldwide between contracting parties after the huge 
increase in these types of cases, particularly in developing countries “new users”.    
1.7 Saudi Arabia and Petrochemicals Products  
In 1976, Royal Decree Number M/66 date 6/9/1976 established the "Saudi 
Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)", which held stocks on the Saudi 
stock exchange. The Saudi government owns 70% of the company’s capital, with a 
total value of 30 billion Saudi riyals; the citizens of Saudi Arabia and the GCC own 
the remainder of the capital.
56
 Shares in SABIC are listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange, and it is one of the most important companies directly affecting the 
performance of the Saudi stock exchange market, both positively and negatively. 
Furthermore, the financial health of the company reflects that of Saudi Arabia’s 
economy.  
The objective of establishing the company was to invest in the country's 
hydrocarbon resources, by providing petrochemical’s materials of high value (e.g. 
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  (http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/default.aspx). Accessed 5 January 2015.  
19 
 
chemicals, polymers and fertilizers) and quality for export and to develop industrial 
manufacturing within Saudi Arabia, to increase the percentage contribution of non-
oil sectors to the national income. 
The company’s total production capacity reached 6.3 million metric tons in 
1985, rising to 55 million metric tons by the end of 2007. In 2009, the company 
attained a capacity of 59 million metric tons by the end of 2009, although it had 
planned to reach 73 million metric tons.
57
 SABIC was not able to reach its target for 
2009 for a number of reasons, one of which concerned legal problems associated 
with dumping.    
SABIC's plan is to reach 130 million metric tons by the end of 2020,
58
 to 
become one of the best petrochemical industries in the world. The total profits of the 
company in 2008 were 22 billion Saudi riyals, the total sales revenue was 151 billion 
SR, and total assets were 272 billion Saudi Riyals.
59
 In 2009, total profits were 9 
billion Saudi Riyals, total sales were 103 billion Saudi Riyals and total assets were 
297 billion Saudi Riyals
60
. 
The difference in the figures above, in relation to 2008 and 2009 total profits 
and sales, reflect and effect from AD duty and process. At present, SABIC is one of 
the ten largest petrochemical companies in the world, and the largest non-oil 
producing company in the Middle East.
61
 SABIC products are a very important 
component of thousands of industries worldwide, as detailed subsequently in this 
thesis.  
                                                 
57
 SABIC annual report for 2008, 2009.  
58
 SABIC website,  
(http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/factsandfigures/production.aspx), accessed 5 
January 2015. 
59
  SABIC, the annual report 2008, 2008, p 3. Also see SABIC website ( http://www.sabic.com/ ). 
60
 SABIC, the annual report 2009.  
61
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SABIC has entered into partnerships with several major petrochemicals 
companies around the world and at the time of writing owns an estimated 64 
companies in the petrochemical industry, whether as full or partial owner. For 
example, it owns Asia Pacific Pte Ltd in Asia, which occupies a good position in the 
sales of petrochemical products to China, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and South Korea and Japan.
62
 It also owns three petrochemical 
companies in Europe: Geleen in the Netherlands, Teesside in the United Kingdom 
and Gelsenkirchen in Germany.
63
 
          Petrochemicals are products produced from oil and natural gas in a 
complicated industrial process. There are many different types of petrochemicals 
products, obtained in different ways; according to a business dictionary, a 
petrochemical is a  
Chemical obtained either directly from cracking (pyrolysis), or indirectly from 
chemical processing of petroleum oil or natural gas. Major petrochemicals are 
acetylene, benzene, ethane, ethylene, methane, propane and hydrogen, from 
which hundreds of other chemicals are derived. These derivatives are used as 
elastomers fibres, plasticisers and solvents and as feedstock for production of 
thousands of other products.
64
 
The petrochemicals products made by SABIC can be divided into six 
sections under specific divisions, as follows:
65
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1- Chemicals products, which are very important elements in thousands of 
goods necessary for our modern lives. These products are divided into 
Olefins, Aromatics and Oxygenates. 
2- Intermediates, which are very important products in manufacturing 
transfer, i.e. for producing textiles and soap. These products are divided 
into Fibre Intermediates, Industrial Gases, Chemical Intermediate and 
Linear alpha Olefins. 
3- Polymers. SABIC is the fourth largest petrochemicals company in world 
producing polymers.  
4- Fertilizer, which is important to achieve global food security. 
5- Metals. SABIC is the fifth largest company in the world, and the first in the 
Middle East, to produce iron and steel by direct reduction.  
6- Plastics, SABIC produce a very high quality resin. 
         This list is important as it explains briefly, the different kinds of Saudi 
petrochemical products and their importance to various industries. It also assists to 
establish similarity when analysing cases.  
1.8 Summary of chapters 
This research comprises seven chapters, starting with this introduction, which forms 
Chapter 1. This chapter has provided some brief the background to this research, 
offered a statement of the problem and the research questions. It has also included 
the objectives of the study, the methods used in this research and finally, a summary 
of the chapters.  
In Chapter 2, the concept of international trade agreements under Islamic 
law, as the law applicable to Saudi Arabia will be considered. The chapter will 
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examine selective AD cases according to AD laws to provide a clear understanding 
of anti-subsidy law. It will discuss the compatibility between AD and anti-subsidy 
laws under the WTO agreement and Islamic law, as well as GCC country regulations 
related to AD and anti-subsidy. 
Chapter 3 covers several AD cases raised against Saudi Arabia at both the 
national and international level, as well as detailing the reasons why the Saudi 
Arabia government did not strive to resolve these cases. After this, some of these 
cases will be analysed in detail in order to examine those elements relating to 
dumping. Finally, the chapter discusses the legal, economic and political impact of 
these cases on the Saudi petrochemicals sector. 
In Chapter 4, some weaknesses of AD and anti-subsidy provisions will be 
considered as methods to reduce the number of actions brought. Provision of a legal 
guarantee in these cases is one of the most important gaps covered by this research, 
and will be addressed in this chapter. In addition, the chapter will address the idea of 
good faith under these provisions as a way to reduce cases between parties. Finally, 
it will discuss the idea of establishing an agreement on petrochemicals products to 
afford these products greater priority under the WTO provisions, and the importance 
of establishing an international petrochemicals organisation similar to OPEC, as an 
additional solution, beyond the WTO agreement, to defend these products in the 
global market.  
Chapter 5 will address those legal issues affecting the Saudi legal system that 
might trigger importing countries to bring cases against Saudi petrochemicals 
products. It will discuss direct and indirect subsidies from the Saudi government to 
this sector, and explain the direct effect of these on the pricing of petrochemicals 
products when exported abroad. Moreover, it will address the fact that even with a 
23 
 
legal framework to maximise competition inside Saudi Arabia, no such competition 
occurs, because many of the companies are government owned. Saudi Arabia will 
need to initiate significant changes to afford opportunities to investors, whether 
Saudi or foreign, to enter the petrochemicals sector. Finally, the chapter will suggest 
a greater role for GCC members in such cases.  
Chapter 6 will discuss alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as being 
ideal for ending disputes between parties at lesser financial cost and in a timely 
manner. It will examine the notion of allowing flexibility, enabling companies to 
enter disputes directly without government involvement. This chapter will suggest 
the establishment of two institutions under the WTO, the Dispute Resolution Centre 
and the ITC.  
The final chapter will contain the research outcomes and recommendations, 
in order to improve the AD and anti-subsidy law under the WTO agreement in 
general, and offer an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, as well as different 
Saudi legislation and processes, to ensure smoother trade exchange and facilitate the 
movement of goods between nations.  
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CHAPTER 2: AD AND ANTI-SUBSIDY UNDER THE WTO IN 
CONTRAST WITH ISLAMIC LAW AND SAUDI ARABIA’S 
DOMESTIC LAW  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the AD and anti-subsidy rules
1
 set out in the WTO 
agreement,
2
 and the extent to which similar rules apply in Islamic law and in Saudi 
Arabian domestic law. The examination undertaken in this chapter aims to answer 
research question one: Are Saudi Arabia’s existing policies and regulations for 
exporting petrochemicals products compatible with the WTO rules that are 
applicable to dumping and subsidies? This analysis will take place in reference to 
AD and anti-subsidy rulings under the WTO framework and discuss its 
implementation, as well as the principal arguments and cases that have arisen under 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DUB).
3
  
To examine the compatibility between AD and anti-subsidy rules under the 
WTO agreement and Saudi Arabian domestic law, it is important to determine first 
whether AD and anti-subsidy rules are compatible with Islamic law. This is because 
Saudi Arabia can only adopt regulations with implications for its domestic legal 
system that are compatible with Islamic law. This is highlighted in its Basic Law of 
Governance (article seven “Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its 
                                                 
1
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 UNTS 14. Agreement on Implementation 
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 
UNTS 201. 
2
 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 
1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994). 
3
 DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, The Legal 
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 UNTS 
401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994). 
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authority from the Book of God Most High and Sunnah of his Messenger, both 
which govern this law and all the laws of the state”4). The findings of this chapter 
will have implications for other countries using Islamic law as their domestic legal 
systems.  
The intention of AD and anti-subsidy rules is to remove unfair competition
5
 
or unfair trade practices;
6
 therefore, they can directly affect free trade and the process 
of exchange between contracting parties. It is crucial to mention that the WTO 
agreement is a unique agreement based on negotiations between contracting parties; 
thus, it differs from other international agreements. However, AD and anti-subsidy 
actions undertaken globally can themselves represent obstacles to the successful 
implementation of the WTO agreement, as discussed in this chapter.  
This chapter has five sections. Section 1, examines AD and anti-subsidy 
regulations under the WTO agreement and implementation practices. It also 
discusses and analyses these in reference to their main tenets, to deliver a clear 
understanding of AD and anti-subsidy law. In section 2, AD and anti-subsidy are 
examined in reference to Islamic law provisions, to provide an understanding of the 
scope of Islamic legal opinion concerning them. Section 3, will analyse AD and anti-
subsidy as manifest in Saudi Arabian domestic law. Section 4, will then discuss 
compatibility between AD and anti-subsidy rules under the WTO agreement, in 
reference to Islamic law and Saudi Arabian domestic law. The final section 
concludes the chapter, presenting the results of all examinations and the relevant 
analyses.  
                                                 
4
 Saudi Basic Law of Government (Consider the Saudi Constitution), Issued by the Royal Order 
number A/90 dated 1
st
 of March, 1992. Available at the Saudi Council of Ministries 
<http://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=4> accessed on 1 June 2014.  
5
 Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 508. 
6
 Peter van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 
(3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 674. 
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2.2 AD and Anti-Subsidy under the WTO 
In this section, AD and anti-subsidy are examined, by applying an in depth analysis 
to cases brought and reported by the Dispute Settlement Body, in order to attain a 
clear and full understanding of the rules. This section is divided into three main 
parts. First, it addresses AD under the WTO agreement, relative to the key elements 
and principal related cases under the DSU. Second, it covers the anti-subsidy rules 
under the WTO agreement, as linked to the most important DSU cases. Finally, it 
addresses the relationship between AD and anti-subsidy.  
2.2.1 Dumping under the WTO 
The AD Agreement (AD Agreement) is an Agreement concerning the 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
7
 
which is often considered the most complex and technical provision under the WTO 
Agreement.
8
 Dumping action refers to unfair competition in international markets, 
which may injure or threaten similar domestic products.
9
 Dumping is not itself 
unlawful, except where it causes injury to, or threatens, a similar domestic industry.
10
 
Yet, in some cases, dumping or AD duty can function to circumvent competition 
rules; when one country imposes a duty on another country this may then bring 
additional pressure to bear on other countries. This can lead to one country obtaining 
a concession, whether political or economic, based on an international decision.  
                                                 
7
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 UNTS 201. 
8
Edwin Vermulst, The WTO Anti-agreement, (1
st
 edition, Oxford University Press, 2008) 1. 
9
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 UNTS 201 
10
Peter van den Bossche, the Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 508. 
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In 1904, the first AD rule was issued by Canada.
11
 By the 1920s, many other 
countries had issued similar types of rules to protect their domestic markets.
12
 
According to international trade agreement rounds, and after the adoption of AD law 
under GATT article VI
13
, contracting parties maintained an interest in negotiations 
on AD, as seen during the Kennedy Round.
14
 Finally, the WTO Agreement required 
implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, stating that dumping was illegal.
15
 
The number of AD cases has increased over the past 10 years.
16
 However, it 
this does not mean that the AD Agreement has failed. In reality, many things have 
changed globally, especially in terms of international trade, which might prompt 
reconsideration of the agreement in view of the high number of cases.  
2.2.1.1 Definition of dumping 
Aggarwal characterised dumping as a form of price discrimination between national 
markets;
17
 clarifying that it refers to unfair competition in the international 
marketplace. However, this characterisation does not uniformly express a precise 
definition of dumping. To demonstrate dumping has occurred, similarities must exist 
between products and equate to injury to those similar products or a threat to the 
industry producing them. In such cases, the action of dumping is categorised as 
causing price discrimination.  
                                                 
11
 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, (3
rd
 edition, 
Routledge 2005) 232. 
12
Aradhna Aggarwal, The Anti-dumping Agreement and Developing Countries, an Introduction, (1st 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2007) 49. 
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Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
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available at <http://www.wto.org/> accessed on 1 June 2014. 
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Bentley and Silberston define dumping as the practice of selling a product for 
export at a price below its normal value,
18
 “Dumping arises from the pricing 
practices of exporters as both normal value and export prices reflect pricing 
strategies in home and foreign markets”.19 Nevertheless, this definition focuses on 
prices in general and the selling operation itself, which is insufficient evidence upon 
which to claim dumping.  
It is suggested that the closest definition is that provided by Bossche, it 
suggests “[the] bringing of a product onto the market of another country at a price 
less than the normal value of that product”.20 For the purpose of this study, this 
definition is deemed the most accurate, in that it includes all the details regarding 
dumping, so that they can be clearly understood. However, were points about 
similarities and injury or threat included, these would then be clearer and more 
comprehensive. The definition used in this research is: the bringing of a product to 
the market of another country at a price less than the normal value of that product, 
thereby causing injury or threat to an industry producing a similar product. 
Nonetheless, in the Appellate Body Report for US-Mexico Stainless Steel the 
definition of dumping, as stated in the AD Agreement is: 
“Dumping” is defined in Article VI: 1 of the GATT 1994 as occurring 
when a product of one country is introduced into the commerce of 
another country at less than its normal value. Article VI: 1 further states 
that dumping is to be “condemned” if it causes or threatens to cause 
material injury to the domestic industry producing a like product…”21 In 
the other way, this similar product has to be destined for consumption in 
the exporting country “…a product is to be consider as being “dumped” 
if the “export price” of the product “exported” from one country to 
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Philip Bentley & Aubrey Silberston, Anti-dumping Countervailing Action (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2007) 11. 
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Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, 43. 
20
 Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 508. 
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Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, 38. 
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another is less than the comparable price of the “like” product when 
destined for consumption in the “exporting country.”22  
 
Yet, the same case referred to key elements of the dumping as: 
The elements of the definition of “dumping” contained in Article VI: 1 
of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement –namely, that 
“dumping” occurs when a product is “introduced into the commerce of 
another country” at an “export price” that is less than the “comparable 
price for the like product in the exporting country”-suggest to us that 
article VI: 1 of the GATT 1994 and article 2.1 of the AD Agreement 
address the practice of an exporter.
23
  
 
Based on the previous statement, it can be asserted that there are seven important 
elements that must be met as pre-conditions for dumping to be said to exist; all seven 
conditions need to be present before AD can be alleged. They are as follows: 
1. The product has to be exported “Introduced”; 
2. The product has to be from another country; 
3. There has to be a market for competition between goods;  
4. The product has to have a normal price and a lower price; 
5. There have to be similarities between the products; 
6. Differences in pricing must lead to injury or threat to similar products; and 
7. There must be a causal link between low price and injury. 
2.2.1.2 Key elements of dumping  
The key elements involved in dumping, as mentioned above, are: exporting the 
product from another country, competitive market, the price, domestic and imported 
products, and injury or threat to the domestic industry. This section includes an 
analysis of all these elements. 
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2.2.1.2.1 Exporting products from another country 
As defined above, to implement AD provisions in any situation, the first point to 
consider is whether the product is being imported from another country. In other 
words: “…introduced into the commerce of another country…”.24 However, the 
introduction of an exported product into another country has to take place in the 
ordinary course of trade. This is as mentioned in article 2.1, in reference to the US-
Japan Hot-Rolled Steel case. The panel cited no clear definition of the word 
“ordinary” in the AD Agreement: “… However, the AD Agreement does not define 
the concept of “ordinary course of trade” either in article 2.1 or elsewhere, and 
establishes no general tests for determining whether sales are made in the ordinary 
course of trade, or not…”.25 Thus, in the absence of a definition of “ordinary 
course”, the panel gave the AD authorities the right to determine if the product made 
was similar to that produced domestically or not: “…it seems clear to us, and the 
parties do not dispute, that investigating authorities must determine whether sales in 
the home market are made in the ordinary course of trade …”.26  
There is evidence that a local authority cannot apply provisions pertaining to 
competition between two or more similar products produced in the same country or 
within a union of countries. Nevertheless, it is required that the similar imported and 
dumped product has affected domestic industries: 
The domestic industry consists of the domestic producers as a whole of 
the like products, or of those producers whose collective output 
constitutes a major preparation of the total domestic production of those 
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 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 UNTS art 2.1. 
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 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
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products. The terms “domestic industry” and domestic producers are also 
used interchangeable in article 3.1 and 3.4 of the Agreement.
27
  
 
However, if only a portion of the exported products is produced in the country where 
the dumping case arose, an AD provision could not be applied. This is because the 
source of the products is the same, as mentioned in the footnote to article four:  
…producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only 
if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls; or (b) both of them are 
directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they 
directly or indirectly control a third person…28  
 
This means, the product has to be fully exported from another country, and originate 
from that country or union of countries.  
2.2.1.2.2 Market and competition 
In order to apply AD rules to influence competition in the marketplace, it is 
important to have a domestic marketplace in which domestic and imported products 
can compete. This means the domestic marketplace should employ clear regulations 
regarding competition, to govern operations between domestic and imported 
products effectively. There should be a good business environment, supportive of 
both foreign and local investors seeking to conduct business fairly with equal access 
to opportunities. However, the most important point here is to exercise authoritative 
control over the market, by checking the prices and competition between products. 
This will maintain businesses at a good competitive level, and offer protection. 
Moreover, it is important for authorities to maintain strong information rich 
databases concerning competition, both nationally and internationally. This will 
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assist in uncovering illegal actions, such as dumping, which might affect the market 
negatively, either directly or indirectly.  
2.2.1.2.3 Price 
When referring to value, and the definition ‘priced less than the normal value’, both 
domestic prices and export prices are mentioned in the WTO agreement in reference 
to dumping actions. These relate to the mechanisms for uncovering dumping actions. 
Price is the most important element reported in AD cases, as an entire case can be 
built on information about price. Article 2 paragraph 1, mentions that dumping is: 
“…introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value if 
the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the 
comparable price…”.29 However, in the US-Japan Hot-Rolled Steel case, it was 
mentioned, with regard to the establishment of normal value, that: “…we note that 
article 2.1 establishes that normal value is the “comparable price, in the ordinary 
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting 
country”.30 
Simply put, dumping is when an imported similar product is sold at less than 
its original price in the exporting country. However, this price would also need to be 
less than the price for a similar product in the importing country. However, arguably, 
there is no standard for a ‘normal’ price, as pricing alters according to the 
circumstances of each individual case. In particular, normal value of domestic sales 
cannot be used as a measure, where there are no relevant domestic sales.
31
 Therefore, 
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the normal value of a product is the sale price in the home market, the market where 
it is produced or the export market.
32
  
However, multiple external factors can affect the price, whether directly or 
indirectly. The cost of manufacturing, taxes, government fees, rate of currency 
exchange, and inflation, all effect the determination of normal price. Some of these 
elements are not considered in cases where price is a concern, such as the rate of 
exchange and inflation. On this particular point, one case affected the United States 
and Korea concerning unnecessary conversion from the US Dollar to the Korean 
Won, which allegedly affected price.
33
 Therefore, for normal value to be applied four 
conditions are required:
34
 
1. The sale must be in the ordinary course of trade; 
2. It must be a like for like product; 
3. It must be destined for consumption in the exporting country; and  
4. It must be comparable. 
 
The export price and normal value have to be determined and ordered for a case to 
be ready for AD duty under the these provisions: “Once normal value and export 
price have been determined in accordance with the provisions of articles 2.1 through 
2.3, article 2.4 then establishes rules governing the comparison of normal value and 
export price”.35 Thus, price is an important tool for calculating the dumping margin. 
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In other words, without the price of exports or the price of sales, the dumping margin 
cannot be calculated, as will be seen later in the chapter.  
2.2.1.2.4 Similarities  
According to AD Agreements article 2.6, a like product is defined as one that should 
be, “…identical, i.e. alike in all respects to product under consideration…”36 Thus, 
an imported similar product must have characteristics that closely resemble the 
domestic product. AD cannot be applied in cases where there is no clear 
identification of like products. This criterion might be clearer if WTO contracting 
parties prepared a list of like products to clarify this point. With access to an official 
list, it would be easier to manage similar products without confusion.  
A question has been raised relating to similarities wherein the quality and 
usage of a product is not mentioned. It might be that two products are similar in all 
respects and elements, although one is of a better quality than the other is. 
Consequently, a study of the business environment between the two countries (the 
country in which the products are being dumped and the one which is doing the 
dumping) is very important, in order to discover the extent of the similarities 
between the products. While there may be similarities in all respects and products are 
therefore identical (as mentioned in the AD rules); there may be variations in the 
uses or quality of products.  
2.2.1.2.5 Injury or threat 
This classification is one of the most complicated, and it is hard to prove clearly. 
Complications arise when calculating the percentage of injury or threat to a domestic 
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industry; for a case, this has to be, “…more than 50 per cent of the total production 
of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry…”.37 However, 
the concept of threat to the establishment of domestic industries from an imported 
similar product is unclear, potentially leading to abuse, or misuse of AD regulations, 
due to the difficulties of calculation.  
The AD Agreement does not set out specific injuries. However, there are 
three types of injury under this agreement; as follows:  
1. Material injury to an established domestic industry;  
2. Threat of material injury to an established domestic industry; and  
3. Material retardation of the establishing of a domestic industry.38  
 
A central rule when citing this type of injury is that it has to be a proven material 
injury to established domestic industries, which extends beyond threat. Thus, 
domestic industry has a responsibility to prove injury from the imported product and 
to present numbers and figures, to enable the investigating authority to locate that 
injury. However, it may not be easy to prove an injury that has resulted in the 
material retardation of domestic industry. Many other kinds of retardation can 
adversely affect established industries, so misdirection may apply.  
In article 3 of the AD Agreement, the means of determination of injury are 
clarified, “A determination of injury for purpose of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall 
be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination…”.39 This 
process must be followed up by an investigation, as mentioned in the EC-Bed Linen 
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case: “…They provide for no exceptions, and they include no qualifications. They 
must be met every investigating authority in every injury determination”.40 However, 
a determination of injury must be based on positive evidence and objective 
examination: 
…investigating authorities must ensure that a “determination of injury” 
is made on the bases of “positive evidence” and an “objective 
examination… of the volume and effect of imports that are dumped –and 
to the exclusion of the volume and effect of imports that are not 
dumped.
41
  
 
There is no such methodology specified under this article for investigating 
authorities to apply when calculating the volume of dumped imports; “Although 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 3 do not set out a specific methodology that 
investigating authorities are required to follow when calculating the volume of 
“dumped imports””.42  
The investigative authority has the right to determine the extent or existence of 
any injury or threat to the domestic industry; this has to be based on fact, as 
mentioned in the Mexico – Corn Syrup case:  
The third sentence of article 3.7 explicitly recognizes that it is the 
investigating authorities who make a determination of threat of material 
injury, and that such determination – by the investigating authorities – 
must be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or 
remote possibility.
43
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In Thailand, the verdict in the H-Beams case represented a different opinion; the 
judgment stated that injury cannot be based only on the evidence provided by parties 
to the investigation. Nevertheless, the investigating authority was found to have the 
right to search for more facts in this case,  
…in our view, the ordinary meaning of these terms does not suggest that 
an investigating authority is required to base an injury determination 
only upon evidence disclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to the 
investigation. An AD investigation involves the commercial behavior of 
firms, and, under the provisions of the AD Agreement, involves the 
collection and assessment of both confidential and non-confidential 
information.
44
  
 
Moreover, the investigating authorities were not able to perform an investigation 
based on future injury or threat, as this was deemed too difficult to determine, as the 
Mexico – Corn Syrup judgment emphasised,  
…In determining the existence of a threat of material injury, the 
investigating authorities will necessarily have to make assumptions 
relating to “the: occurrence of future events” since such future events 
“can never be definitively proven by facts”.45 
 
The determination of injury or threat is crucial in proving the need to apply 
AD duty to imported similar products, to protect domestic industries from illegal 
dumping actions.  
2.2.1.2.6 Causal link  
Before applying AD rules following any allegation, it is important to establish a link 
between imported products and injury or threat; i.e. to ascertain,  
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…(c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged 
injury”.46 So, AD rules do not address the dumping itself; rather they are 
linked to threat or injury caused to domestic products: “We note, 
moreover, that Article VI of the GATT 1994 and AD Agreement deal not 
with dumping per se, but with dumping that causes or threatens to cause 
material injury to the domestic industry producing a “like” product.47 
  
This causal link must be based on all related information in order to guarantee proper 
examination to clarify its existence, as mentioned in the US vs. Stainless Steel case,  
…Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement stipulates that a determination of 
injury shall be based on an objective examination of both the volume of 
the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on price in the 
domestic market for like products, and of the consequent impact of the 
dumped imports on domestic products of such like products.
48
 
 
However, it is argued herein that a causal link must take the form of a connection 
between low price and injury, not between the imported product and injury. It is 
evident that the imported product is not the cause of the injury; injury is due to the 
low price and similarity to domestic products. Therefore, if the price were set at a 
normal value, then dumping or injury would not apply. It is evident, therefore, that a 
proper determination must be made between low price and imported product and 
injury “…A proper determination as to whether is dumping or not can only be made 
on the basis of an examination of the exporter’s pricing behaviour as reflected in all 
of its transactions over a period of time…”.49  
It should be stressed that it is permissible to sell imported products on the 
international market or to compete in a market legally; prohibition is linked to selling 
a product below the normal price, thereby causing injury or threat to other producers. 
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It is apparent, then, that a causal link between low price and injury must be proven. 
Without such a link, such rules do not apply. The investigative authority is 
responsible for establishing a causal link by collecting relevant information, as 
mentioned previously.  
2.2.1.3 Main steps of the dumping cases  
Dumping cases, at a national level, have to be initiated by complaints from a 
domestic similar industry; this should involve a complainant who produces more 
than 50% of an entire internal producer’s capacity in the market.50 However, a 
government authority can initiate the process on behalf of domestic industry, and a 
percentage of that domestic industry will then be applied.
51
 
Typically, the country affected by the imported dumped products performs 
the investigation and makes the decision to apply AD duty. It would therefore be 
fairer if the AD authority could check information collected from both disputants, 
and then transfer the case to a domestic commercial court.  
During an investigation, all parties have a right to defend their interests under 
AD Agreements: “The panel justified this finding by noting that it would provide 
interested parties in an AD investigation a “meaningful opportunity to defend their 
interests” during the investigation…”.52 In addition, article 6.2 stresses, “Throughout 
the AD investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity for the 
defence of their interests”.53 Thus, AD investigators must perform three different 
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steps: (1) the initiation of the investigation; (2) a preliminary and final investigation; 
and (3) observing changes in circumstances requiring a review of duty.  
In terms of initiation, the local authority should start an investigation once all 
similar domestic producers have submitted their applications; they will then send a 
questionnaire to all parties. It is a practical point, worthy of note, that the authorities 
must collect all the information related to the investigation to check for alleged 
dumping and injury: “The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of 
the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation”.54 Authorities must check the 
dumping margin also. In cases where the dumping margin is de minimis or 
negligible, the action against the imported product should be terminated. This 
process should not take more than 60 days, to allow the exporting country to adjust 
its pricing, “…the authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted 
their export prices”.55 
After the process of initiation, the authorities have the right to take measures as 
discussed in the case of US–Hot-Rolled Steel: 
Article 10.7 of the AD Agreement provides that certain preliminary 
measures may be taken “after initiation”. This implies that at the time of 
the critical circumstance determination, the authority has already 
determined, under article 5.3, that the petition contained sufficient 
information of dumping and injury, and causal link to justify the 
initiation of the investigation.
56
 
 
However, the period that elapses between the preliminary and final determination 
has to follow the AD rule on this point “…normally within 12 months and in no case 
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more than 18 months…”.57 At this point, the investigating authority would then 
apply the AD duty according to the available facts and information.   
 Usually a final determination takes no more than 5 years: “…AD duty shall 
be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition…”.58 However, 
without any changes in the circumstances or facts, authorities would be able to 
extend the effect of AD duty in excess of 5 years. If there is a change in the 
information being given, especially the price, the review would take place and lead 
to termination of AD duty or a reduction in it. However, article 11 allows for a 
review of AD duty upon a request from any of the involved parties.
59
  
2.2.1.4 Termination or suspension of the AD process 
The rejection, termination, or suspension of AD cases can take place according to 
three possibilities: 
1. If a domestic industry of similar product in an importing country has withdrawn 
its case, it will be terminated immediately as there is no allegation from the 
domestic industry.
60
  
2. If the domestic industry for a similar product cannot prove a dumping action 
implicating the imported product, or has not fulfilled all the conditions of the AD 
provisions, in order to continue the AD process.
61
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3. If the margin of dumping is de minimis, which means the margin is less than 2 
per cent of the export price: “…there shall be immediate termination in cases 
where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis”.62  
4. If the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is less than 3 per cent 
of imports, it will be considered negligible: “…the volume of dumped imports 
from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of imports 
of the like product in the importing Member”.63 
5. Price undertakings, which are implied when the importing country voluntarily 
undertakes to revise its prices or to cease exports at the dumped price:  
proceedings may be suspended or terminated without the imposition of 
provisional measures or AD duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary 
undertakings from any exporter to revise its price or to cease exports to 
the area in question at dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied 
that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated.
64
 
 
2.2.1.5 Legal understanding of AD duty 
For the purpose of this study, this point is best addressed in three sections: (1) the 
legal characterisation of the charge or duty, fine, tax, or tariff; (2) how AD duty is 
calculated; (3) the beneficiary of the charge.  
2.2.1.5.1 Legal characterisation of AD duty 
The WTO aims to support free trade between members by removing obstacles, in the 
form of rules, tariffs, etc. As the agreement has reduced tariffs to a minimum 
between members, benefits are being eroded in cases of dumping when WTO 
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agreements are enforced; this is because a decrease in variability is frequently in 
place from the outset. The legal characterisation of AD duty in this research can be 
considered as tariff based. Tariffs and AD duties are important as means to protect 
domestic industries. As stated by Dinlersoz and Dogan “Tariffs and AD duties are 
two important tools that can protect industries from foreign competition and generate 
revenue to countries initiating them”.65 As mentioned previously, AD duty is applied 
to protect domestic producers from the imported products: “in other words, an AD 
duty serves the purpose of industry protection”.66 Thus, tariffs can be applied for 
various purposes, such as to promote income levels throughout a nation: “A tariff is 
typically designed to maximise either domestic revenue or domestic welfare”.67 
However, a tariff may also be imposed to protect domestic industries and products 
by creating a price differential leading customers to prefer a domestic product.  
2.2.1.5.2 Calculating the AD duty 
Before imposing AD duty all dumping conditions must be fulfilled. Dumping 
margins, injury or threat and any causal links must be assessed prior to applying AD 
duty; as in the EC-Bed Linen case:  
Members have the right to impose and collect AD duties only after the 
completion of an investigation in which it has been established that the 
requirements of dumping, injury, and causation “have been fulfilled”. In 
other words, the right to impose AD duty under article 9 is a 
consequence of the prior determination of the existence of dumping 
margins, injury, and a causal link.
68
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The aim when applying AD duty is to impede any unfair competition generated by 
the dumping of similar imported products, which are injurious or threatening to 
similar domestic products: “…the very purpose of an AD duty is to counteract the 
injury caused or threatened to be caused by “dumped imports” to the domestic 
industry…”.69 The aim of all AD processes is to target three points, as mentioned in 
articles 2.4.2 and the EC – Bed Linen case: “This provision allows Members, in 
structuring their AD investigations, to address three kinds of “targeted” dumping, 
namely dumping that is targeted on certain purchasers, targeted to certain regions, or 
targeted to certain time periods”.70 Calculations of AD duty simply reflect the 
margin between the price when selling a product from abroad onto the domestic 
market and the sales price of that product in its home country, where it is lower.  
 The dumping margin has been defined in the Appellate Body Report US-
Mexico Stainless Steel as: 
…the difference between the “export price” and the “normal value” (that 
is, “the domestic price” of the like product in the exporting country) 
determined in accordance with article VI:2 further clarifies that the 
“margin of dumping” is in respect of the dumped “product”….71  
 
However, it has been confirmed that dumping and the margin of dumping both 
concepts related to export matters “Other provisions of the AD Agreement also 
confirm that “dumping” and margin of dumping” are exporter – specific concepts”.72 
Arguably, the Appellate Body was not in agreement with the panel’s report with 
regard to its interpretation of article 9.3:  
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We do not agree that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of article 9.3 
would favour “importers with high margins of dumping…at the expense 
of importers who do not dump or who dump at a lower margin”, as the 
Panel suggest.
73
  
 
The proper interpretation is that, “…an “offset” is provided for the so-called “non-
dumped” transactions”.74 However, AD duty should not exceed the margin: “The 
amount of the AD duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping…”75 
Under article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement, there are three methodologies for 
calculating the dumping margin, as mentioned in US – Softwood Lumber V: “This 
provision establishes three methodologies that investigation authorities may use to 
calculate the “margins of dumping during the investigation phase”.76 These are as 
follows, weighted average-to-weighted average, transaction-to-transaction and 
finally weighted average-to-transaction.
77
 The first two methodologies, as used by 
the authorities, are normally introduced to establish the dumping margin. The final 
methodology is used under two conditions only: i.e. (1) if the authorities find the 
pattern of the export price, and (2) where there is a clear explanation of why it is not 
possible to use the first two methodologies. The investigating authorities normally 
apply these two methodologies to establish dumping margins. The second sentence 
of article 2.4.2, sets out a third methodology (weighted average-to-transaction), 
which involves an asymmetric comparison, and may be used only in exceptional 
circumstances. For example, if the following two conditions are met: (i) “the 
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authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different 
purchasers, regions or time periods”; and (ii) “an explanation is provided as to why 
such differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted 
average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison”.78  
However, in the same case, it was agreed that the investigating authorities 
would use multiple averaging, under the weighted average to weighted average 
comparison, methodology.
79
 However, the idea differs in cases where the 
investigating authorities choose to apply multiple comparisons, i.e. 
...[i]f an investigation authorities has chosen to undertake multiple 
comparison, the investigation authority necessarily has to take into 
account the result of all those comparisons, in order to establish margins 
of dumping for the product as a whole under article 2.4.2.
80
  
 
Moreover, in the US Softwood Lumber V case, the Appellate Body 
mentioned the interpretation of zeroing, thus “zeroing is not permissible when 
calculating margins of dumping by comparing normal value and export prices on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis is consistent with other provisions of the AD 
Agreement as well...”.81 The zeroing concept, as applied in the US has also been 
clarified in relation to Korea, where  
the investigating authority treats as zero the difference between the 
weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price in 
the case of those sub-groups where the weighted average normal value is 
less than the weighted average export price.
82
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2.2.2 Subsidy under the WTO 
Subsidy a means to support unfair competition; it is similar to dumping, but does not 
include the same complicated provisions as dumping. An important point about 
subsidies relates to developing countries and the impact that cutting subsidies can 
have on them.  
Article XVI of GATT
83
 addressed the subsidy issue; reporting that subsidies 
have a harmful effect on contracting parties within domestic industries. It issued 
implementation rules for the article, known as the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.
84
 The principle underpinning this agreement was 
mentioned in the US – Export Restraints case “…In our view, the object and purpose 
of the SCM Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which 
distort international trade…”.85  
Objections expressed by developing countries who have sought to continue 
subsidising their own domestic industries. Contracting parties have set developing 
countries agreed time limits, within which to end domestic subsidies; this represents 
special treatment under the WTO. Such agreements extend permissions to 
commence a subsidy programme, to help develop national economies, as mentioned 
in article 27, paragraph 1. However, this does not allow individuals to export 
subsidies abroad, as mentioned in the Brazil – Aircraft case “…the prohibition on 
export subsidies—applies to the developing country Member complained 
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against…”.86 Moreover, prohibition is relevant when subsidising a product by 
developing countries in this case: 
Where, as here, it is agreed that the Member in question is a developing 
country Member within the meaning of article 27.2(b), it is for the 
Member alleging a violation of article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement to 
demonstrate that the substantive obligation in that provision -- the 
prohibition on export subsidies -- applies to the developing country 
Member complained against. That is, it is for the complaining Member to 
demonstrate that the developing country Member in question is not in 
compliance with at least one of the elements laid out in article 27.4.
87
 
 
Other countries have argued in favour of subsidising agricultural and other products, 
and agricultural produce is granted exceptional status commonly.
88
  
Following the 2009 world crisis,
89
 the majority of countries, whether 
developed or developing, subsidised their domestic economies directly; this was 
especially true among the G20 nations.
90
 According to anti-subsidy rules, this was a 
prohibited act. The following sections detail the concept of subsidy and some 
important points related to it.  
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2.2.2.1 Definition 
A standard definition of subsidy states that it is the notion of payments made by a 
government to a private entity.
91
 This definition, limits subsidising action to 
payment. In fact, there are different types of subsidies. A subsidy refers to all kinds 
of financial, aid, gifts, features, exemptions or incentives given by a government or 
any of its related departments, whether directly or indirectly, to support its domestic 
industries or national economy. The definition used herein encompasses different 
kinds of direct or indirect forms of subsidy.  
In the Canada Aircraft case between Canada and Brazil, the Panel interpreted 
the word benefit in article 1.1(b) as,  
…the ordinary meaning of “benefit” clearly encompasses some form of 
advantage…in order to determine whether a financial contribution (in the 
sense of article 1.1 (a) (i)) confers a “benefits”, i.e., an advantage, it is 
necessary to determine whether the financial contribution places the 
recipient in a more advantageous position than would have been the case 
but for financial contribution.
92
 
 
However, there should be a clear distinction between financial contribution and 
benefit: “…financial contribution and its conferral of a benefit are “separate legal 
elements in article 1.1…which together determine whether a subsidy exists”.93 
According to the argument put forward by the Canadians, in the case of US-
Export Restraints with Canada, it was proposed that the United States define subsidy 
as “any government action that confers a benefit, thus avoiding the need to show a 
financial contribution…”.94 However, Canada noted four categories, relating to 
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governmental action, which could be considered under the guise of financial 
contribution. The first three could be considered as direct governmental action:  
(i) makes a direct or potential direct transfer of funds, such as 
grants, loans, or loan guarantees; (ii) foregoes or does not 
collect government revenue otherwise due, such as tax 
credits; and (iii) provides goods or services (other than 
general infrastructure) or purchases goods…95  
(ii)  
However, in the fourth category, Canada considers the governments’ financial 
indirect aid as specifically; 
to meet the terms of that provision, five elements must be satisfied: (a) a 
government must entrust or direct; (b) a private body; (c) to carry out one 
or more of the types of functions listed in subparagraphs (i) through (iii); 
(d) which would normally be vested in a government; and (e) the 
practice must, in no real sense, differ from practices normally followed 
by government.
96
  
2.2.2.2 Types of subsidies 
Subsidies can be divided into two types: direct or indirect. Direct subsidies occur 
when the government, or any of its departments, gives direct financial aid to assist 
domestic industries: “…there is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member… [involving a]…direct transfer of 
funds…”.97 However, this form of aid must aim to reduce either imports or increase 
exports, as stated in article XVI.
98
  
Indirect subsidies under the WTO agreement might include gift giving by the 
government; for example, freeing land for industry use, which can then affect the 
price of the end product and its ability to compete in the marketplace: “… [where] 
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there is any form of income or price support…”.99 Thus, all gifts of lands can be 
classified under the category of price support. This may take the form of an 
exemption from tax or a special reduction in tax, which might then benefit the 
organisation concerned by allowing them to obtain raw materials freely or more 
cheaply than their competitors.  
However, if indirect subsidies are given to all industries, whether national or 
international within a territory, there should be no prohibition implicated, as long as 
it does not affect other overseas products. The prohibition on subsidies is in place to 
avoid clear intent to subsidise national products and industries, thereby preventing 
the economy from improving and developing. 
2.2.3 Relationship between dumping and subsidies 
Dumping and subsidies encompass different provisions,
100
 although they generate 
similar consequences. Dumping relates more to prices, i.e. comparing the prices of 
similar products in the domestic market between importing countries and exporting 
countries.
101
 Simply put, if the price in an exporting country is lower than that in an 
importing country, then this comprises a dumping action. However, the cause of the 
lower price might relate to a subsidy programme provided by the exporting 
government, to assist its domestic industry to increase the volume and quality of its 
exports. Dumping can result from subsidies, but the reverse is not possible. As has 
                                                 
99
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1868 U.N.T.S., Article 1 paragraph 1.1 
(a) (2). 
100
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
101
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
52 
 
been clearly defined, the aim of subsidies is to increase exports or reduce imports, 
both of which can cause dumping.  
Dumping and subsidies coincide in effect, in the form of injury or threat. 
Dumping can injure the domestic market of a similar product from an importing 
country only. Nevertheless, subsidies might also injure the importing country’s 
domestic products as well as those of the exporting country, as this subsidises the 
economic or domestic products. Subsidies, however, generally do not relate 
specifically to similar products. 
There is a strong relationship between subsidies and dumping, even where 
different definitions or aims apply; as their regulations are very similar within the 
claim process. Consequently, it is of benefit to research both in tandem, as this will 
provide a fuller understanding of injury and unfair competition regulations under 
international trade provisions. Some cases, where there is a connection between the 
two, have effected Saudi Arabia, where dumping has resulted directly from 
subsidies.  
2.3 AD and anti-subsidy under Islamic law 
Islamic law (Sharia) derived from the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
Muslims believe the Qur’an is the word of God. The Sunna describes the actions of 
Prophet Muhammad (peace upon him) as defined by An-Na’im, “The methodology 
known as ual al-fiqh, through which Muslims have historically understood and 
applied Islamic precepts as conveyed in the Qur’an and Sunna, was developed by 
early Muslims scholars”.102 The third source of Islamic law is ijma, or the agreement 
of jurists taken from among the followers of the Prophet Muhammad; as a source of 
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law it is supported by the Qur’an and Sunna.103 Additional sources are qiyas, and 
ijtihad; these are restricted to use when there is no guidance available on the point 
under discussion in any of the previous three sources. The final source, ijtihad, states 
the controversial opinion that scholars must carefully rely on analogical reasoning to 
find a solution to a legal problem: "It also defines and regulates the operation of 
juridical techniques such as ijma (consensus), qiyas (reasoning by analogy), and 
ijtihad (juridical reasoning)".
104
 For those qualified to conduct it, to do so is 
considered a religious duty. Thus, a mujtahid is recognised as an Islamic scholar who 
is competent at interpreting Islamic law in the form of ijtihad. 
  For the early Muslims, trade played a very important role in their lives. God 
says in the Holy Qur’an, of trade by the Quraysh Tribe between Syria and Yemen: 
“For the accustomed security of the Quraysh. Their accustomed security [in] the 
caravan of winter and summer”.105 When the Prophet Mohammed emigrated from 
Mecca to Medina in year 622 CE, the first priority following the building of his holy 
mosque was to open a market for people to trade in.
106
  
However, Islamic law has the advantage of striking a balance between 
individuals and societies’ interests: “… Islam has raised a balance between the 
interests of individuals and society …”.107 Thus, economics under Islamic law differs 
from that in capitalist or socialist systems, as its aim is entirely different. Islamic law 
stresses and encourages people to embark on trade and engage competitively; as God 
says in the Holy Qur’an “O mankind, eat from whatever is on earth [that is] lawful 
and good and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear 
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enemy”.108 In addition, God says in the Holy Qur’an “O you who have believed, do 
not consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual 
consent. And do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever 
Merciful”.109 
Under Islamic law, traders were taught how to act in the marketplace to 
promote flexibility and trust. Islamic law prohibited any form of fraud or deception 
during trade between people: “Muslims are brothers and it is not permissible if they 
sold any things with any flaw and not shown to the payer”.110 However, Islamic law 
also prohibits paying someone for something that is being undersold; Prophet 
Mohammed said, “A man is not to undersell his brother, nor is he to try to out haggle 
his brother”.111 Thus, a trader must not be involved in any form of prohibited trade or 
sale of products under Islamic law.
112
  
This next section discusses the understanding in Islamic law of acts such as 
dumping and subsidising, analysing key elements in relation to each other. It begins 
by exploring dumping under Islamic law, and in the second section also examines 
the notion of subsidy under Islamic law.  
2.3.1 Dumping under Islamic law  
The rules of competition under Islamic law are the same, whether they affect 
domestic or international markets. Islamic law encourages the notion of competition 
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for good deeds, even between traders. God states in the Holy Qur’an: “… So for this 
let the competitors compete”.113 Therefore, it is not acceptable that any kind of harm 
come to the market or products due to the unfair treatment of people. God also says 
in the Holy Qur’an “And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and 
do not deprive the people of their due and do not commit abuse on the earth, 
spreading corruption”.114 On this point, the Prophet Mohammed stated, “There 
should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm”,115 as a general principle in any 
treatment. The final evidence from the Holy Qur’an and the traditions of Prophet 
Mohammed show the general rules that should be followed when dealing with 
people inside a market. However, Muslims believe that on the Day of Judgment, 
there will be a penalty imposed on people who do not follow these rules. 
First we consider dumping, which is not a term used in Islamic law. 
However, the meaning of dumping, i.e. selling products below their normal value in 
the importing market, it understood and legislated for in Islamic law. Within this 
context, the rule of individual initiative that exists in Islamic law is of relevance. 
This refers to each person’s responsibility for their own behaviour, in particular, that 
such behaviour must follow the rules of Islamic law in circumstances concerning 
good deeds and faith.  
Islamic law prohibits authorities from setting a fixed price on any products 
inside the market, as it respects the principle of a free market without restrictions.
116
 
However, free pricing must be based on the genuine cost of a product, including also 
its profit margin. This is because when 
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“Prices became excessive during the time of the Messenger of Allah, so 
they said: 'O Messenger of Allah! Set prices for us!' So he said: 'Indeed 
Allah is Al-Musa'ir, Al-Qabid, Al-Basir, Ar-Razzaq. And I am hopeful 
that I meet my Lord and none of you are seeking (recompense from) me 
for an injustice involving blood or wealth.
117
  
 
Also, Prophet Mohammed said, “Whoever interferes with the prices among 
the Muslims to cause those prices to increase, Allah has the right to seat him in a 
severe fire on the Day of Judgement”.118 So, Ibn Alqayyim119 said of price fixing, 
that 
… it can be injustice and prohibited and can be fair and allowed. For that, 
if the fixing price will harm people and forcing them to sell their products 
without their interested price or prevent them with what God has 
permitted to them, then it is prohibited. If the fixing price will have a fair 
between people as preventing them for not doing what God has not 
permitted, then it is allowed…120 
 
Nonetheless, some Islamic scholars agree to set a fixed price for an item in 
circumstances where there are urgent economic concerns or potential for huge harm 
to come to the market or consumers.  
Second, it is important for the sale price to be set at a normal value, equating 
to that for similar products in the market, rather than below it. Regarding this point, 
Umer ibn Al-khattab,
121
 when walking into the market, found a trader selling raisins 
below the normal price for similar products. Umer said to him: “Either increase the 
price or leave our market”.122 Moreover, Imam Malik123 said: “If there is a man who 
wants to destroy the market by selling below the normal price, it is better to tell him: 
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either raise your price to the normal level or leave the market”.124 Yet, Imam 
Alshafi
125
 expresses a different opinion, citing Umer ibn Al-khattab’s remorse 
stating, “what I said was not a determination or a court order, but I wanted only the 
good for people, so, whatever and whenever sell your product”.126 Therefore, Imam 
Alshafi agrees that the man’s aim was not to harm the market; it was only to sell his 
product.
127
 However, if the man at that time wanted to damage the market, Imam 
Alshafi would have proposed a different result.  
In this research, we note that Umer ibn Al-khattab agreed to keep the market 
safe by protecting other sellers from harm. Imam Malik and Imam Alshafi both 
agreed that selling a product below market price is prohibited, if it will harm the 
market.  
Third, there is a rule prohibiting monopoly, which might on occasion result 
from dumping. Prophet Mohammed said, “No one withholds goods till their price 
rises but a sinner”.128 Monopolists and price manipulators suffer the penalty of hell 
fire on the Day of Judgment. This evidence stresses the need for free trade, based on 
principles of fair competition without doing harm, whether to the market, the 
consumer or the trader.  
However, a question arises here in relation to the penalty for dumping action 
under Islamic law. Many actions are possible to target dumping under Islamic law. 
First, the trader could be asked to raise the price to a normal value, as in the story of 
Umer ibn Al-khattab. This action helps to protect the market from the harm 
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proceeding from the dumping action. Second, the authority can fix the price if harm 
or injury is anticipated as a result of the act of dumping; the majority of Islamic 
scholars concur with this approach. Third, under Islamic law it is possible to impose 
additional penalties on traders if they are in a position to harm the market by 
dumping. One such action was mentioned in the story of Umer ibn Al-khattab, where 
he asked a trader to remove his product from the market. In addition, under Islamic 
law, a leader can ask a trader, who his selling a product below normal price, to pay 
compensation for any injury proceeding from this action.  
Moreover, Islamic law confirms there is a special system in place to control 
the market, as defined under the concept of Hisbah. God says “And let there be 
[arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and 
forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful”.129 Prophet Mohammed 
said “Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not 
able to do so, then [let him change it] with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, 
then with his heart — and that is the weakest of faith”.130 These two examples 
provide a basis for authorities to control the market and check the implementation of 
free trade between people without incurring harm or injury.  
Thus, it is apparent that Islamic law prohibits dumping in a variety of ways, 
and that Islamic leaders should seek to avoid fixed prices on the market. This can be 
achieved without the control of Islamic law and without harm to other traders inside 
the market. This gives traders the opportunity to compete fairly, as the AD authority, 
i.e. the Islamic leader, controls the market with strict rules. It can therefore be argued 
that historically the first AD rule was applied under Islamic law, not Canadian law as 
suggested earlier.  
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2.3.2 Subsidy under Islamic law  
Islamic law protects trade with stringent rules, which guarantee the market is moving 
in the right direction. However, the most important principle of trade under Islamic 
law is the existence of a free market without interference from the state or 
government. However, under Islamic law the state does not like to interfere by 
subsidising domestic economies, as this contravenes the principles of free trade.  
 Thus, there is no rule of subsidy under the Islamic law, although it can be seen to 
apply in a different way. Subsidies must go directly to poor people, paid through 
Zakah
131
 and charity, as God says:  
Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those 
employed to collect [zakah] and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] 
and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt and for the cause 
of Allah and for the [stranded] traveler - an obligation [imposed] by 
Allah. And Allah is Knowing and Wise.
132
 
 
However, Islamic law encourages people and authorities to do as God 
says: “The example of those who spend their wealth in the way of Allah 
is like a seed [of grain] which grows seven spikes; in each spike is a 
hundred grains. And Allah multiplies [His reward] for whom He wills. 
And Allah is all-Encompassing and knowing”.133  
 
By this is can be understood that people, and governments must be more cooperative 
when seeking to overcome their difficulties.  
Moreover, subsidies are evident in the Prophet Mohammed’s actions. When 
someone asked him for money, the Prophet sold some of his own items to give him 
money. When he did so he said to him, “Go and gather firewood, and I do not want 
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to see you for fifteen days”.134 In this way, Prophet Mohammed encouraged him to 
embark on his own industry and work, also understood as a form of subsidy. 
Under Islamic law as mentioned above, there was no such a provision for this 
action. In addition, if a subsidy could affect the market negatively, it would be 
considered a prohibited act; Prophet Mohammed said, “There should be neither 
harming nor reciprocal harm”.135 In addition, the main principles under Islamic law 
concerning market and trade seek to ensure fair competition inside the market 
without causing any harm or injury to trade. However, a Muslim leader has the right 
to consider whether a subsidy would harm the market or not. 
2.4 AD and Anti-Subsidy under Saudi Arabian Domestic Law 
When Saudi Arabia joined the WTO agreement, Royal Decree number M/30 dated 
13 June 2006 was issued to accept the implementation of new rules with regard to 
AD and countervailing measures.
136
 This rule was adopted by the GCC, to address 
legal issues as a union. A Royal Decree, issued on 28 January 2013, adopted the 
amendment and implemented
137
 a version of the rule in compliance with the WTO 
agreement.  
The rules issued in 2006 contained only 17 articles, offering a general 
framework to establish how the GCC countries could deal with relevant cases. This 
rule established three committees: a Ministerial Committee, a Standing Committee 
and a Technical Committee, each with a unique role in handling different types of 
cases. This research suggests no reason for these committees. The GCC countries 
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were able to take advantage of the EU countries’ rules as an example and counter 
AD and anti-subsidy cases as a conglomerate. At present, the three committees act as 
an obstacle to dealing with these legal issues, which represent the bureaucratic 
process. The implementation of this rule includes 97 articles covering all aspects 
related to AD, anti-subsidy and countervailing measures.  
Thus, when an act of dumping or subsidising of any non-GCC products 
happens, affecting countries with similar products, the GCC countries must work 
together to fight this by filing a case, whether using representatives with 50% similar 
products or through authorities in countries like the Chambers of Commerce or the 
Ministry of Commerce. They act together, like the EU countries, with regard to AD 
and anti-subsidy, thereby strengthening their domestic industries and assisting 
development and improvement in these industries.  
However, when GCC countries’ products face AD or anti-subsidy actions 
against their products, the GCC countries deal individually with these matters 
without support from the GCC countries as a community (as seen in the case against 
Saudi and Omani petrochemicals products).
138
 Saudi Arabia has established its own 
negotiation committee, headed by His Royal Highness Prince Abdul-Aziz bin 
Salman, who was a Deputy of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources for 
the Petroleum Sector, dealing with these cases abroad.
139
 This committee 
successfully concluded AD legal actions against Saudi petrochemicals products, but 
without coordination or cooperation from the GCC countries.
140
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To clarify, the above case (filed against Saudi, Omani and Singapore 
petrochemicals products), was terminated after the committee intervened with the 
Indian government.
141
 However, this case continued in Oman, despite it being a 
GCC country. This clearly shows that the committee was not working in 
coordination with the other GCC countries.  
On another point, a department in the Saudi Ministry of Commerce examined 
the AD authorities in Saudi Arabia, and took on more of a role in such cases, 
whether inside or outside Saudi Arabia. However, this department did not intervene 
with the committee officially or even work closely with the GCC committee to 
protect the GCC industries. Thus, it is apparent that there are three bodies handling 
cases in Saudi Arabia: the committee headed by HRH Prince Abdul-Aziz, the 
department under the Ministry of Commerce, and finally the umbrella body of the 
GCC council itself. This confuses the situation, when any sector or industry seeks to 
deal with cases. Ideally, there should be more coordination and cooperation within 
the GCC council, as all GCC countries have agreed to handle such legal issues 
together.  
Furthermore, if a dumping case affects one GCC member in another GCC 
member’s country, the question arises: will AD rules be applied? As these countries 
deal with each other as a single conglomerate, one member cannot apply the AD law 
against another. However, this research found that competition law is applicable in 
such cases. Nonetheless, AD law for GCC countries does not mention or cover this 
point. 
Regarding subsidy, when Saudi Arabia signed the WTO agreement, there 
were several reservations as stated in chapter 1, one of which was its subsidy 
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programme.
142
 Until now, Saudi Arabia’s government has been offering subsidies in 
many areas, such as electricity and gas.
143
 These programmes have had a direct 
effect on competition, both inside Saudi Arabia and outside, in the countries to 
which the products are exported. The absence of an anti-subsidy law in Saudi Arabia 
therefore needs to be addressed. To some extent anti-subsidy is covered in the Saudi 
AD law, adapted from the GCC, where subsidy is mentioned in reference to harmful 
actions in article 1. On this particular point, Saudi law requires reform, in order to 
provide a clear view of anti-subsidy and AD and the separation between them.  
2.5 Compatibility between WTO law, Saudi Arabia’s AD and Anti-
Subsidy laws and Islamic Law 
The European Union has received complaints regarding the compatibility of the US 
AD Act of 1916 and the WTO agreement: “We note that EC contests the 
compatibility of the 1916 Act as such – not of particular instances of application – 
with certain provisions of the WTO agreement...”.144 In this particular case, the panel 
recommended the US alter the AD Act 1916 to render it compatible with the WTO 
agreement: “We therefore recommend that the DSB request the United States to 
bring the 1916 Act into conformity with its obligations under the WTO 
Agreement”.145 This request was based on public international law, which requires 
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nations to fulfil all the obligations included in any agreement signed by that 
nation.
146
  
In the previous example, domestic AD and anti-subsidy laws had to be 
compatible with AD and anti-subsidy laws under the WTO agreement. This was an 
obligation imposed on states, as they were signatories to that agreement. Therefore, 
the following section explores whether Islamic law and Saudi domestic law, 
concerning AD and anti-subsidy, are compatible with the WTO agreement.  
2.5.1 Competition between products and normal value 
In reference to AD law, dumping has been defined under article VI of the GATT as a 
product being “…introduced into the commerce of another country at less than 
normal value of the products…”.147 There is no difference between Islamic law, 
Saudi Arabian domestic law and the WTO agreement in this regard. Islamic law 
stresses the need for fair competition between products in the marketplace. Umer ibn 
Al-khattab asked that the product be removed from the market if prices were not 
increased on similar products. In addition, under Islamic law, if action leads to harm 
and injury from other products under Islamic law, this will prohibit Muslim leaders 
from implementing penalties. This article is therefore also compatible with domestic 
Saudi AD laws.  
There is a slight variation when determining normal value and AD duty under 
Islamic law in comparison with that under the WTO agreement. Nevertheless, it is 
acceptable to adopt this from the WTO agreement, as the Saudi leader has the right 
to adopt laws if they do not conflict with Islamic law. The idea of AD under Islamic 
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law is simpler than that under the WTO agreement. However, Islamic law, Saudi AD 
domestic law and the WTO agreement agree, regarding the need for fair competition 
in the marketplace between products. 
2.5.2 Fixing the price of such a products 
As mentioned above, the Prophet Mohammed refused to fix prices where this might 
negatively limit competition in the marketplace; this is also included in the 
application of the WTO agreement to AD laws, and to insuring fair competition 
between products. Fixing a price would not be fair to either the trader or the trade 
process. In this case, Islamic law positions the general rules of competition between 
traders inside the market, to protect against any interference that affects price. This is 
entirely appropriate and supportive of the main theory behind AD. However, if there 
is harm to the market under some scholars’ understanding of Islamic law, the leader 
may then interfere in the market and fix the price. However, no one has the right to 
interfere in the market and fix prices under the WTO agreement.
148
 
2.5.3 The injury to other products  
Under Islamic law, it is important to address injury at any point during the trade 
process. We can refer to the action of Umer ibn Alkhattab (see above) when he 
returned to the man’s house and asked him to sell his product wherever he wished, as 
his purpose was not to damage the market. In addition, if there is an injury caused by 
dumping action in a market, under Islamic law, it is prohibited. This principle is 
applicable to the WTO’s AD rules. Moreover, if there were any harm that would be 
                                                 
148
 See the Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994). 
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caused by a subsidising programme, it would then be prohibited under Islamic law, 
as clarified in this chapter. The idea of no injury to the market under Islamic law is a 
guiding concept and a pillar of the trading mechanism. 
2.5.4 Compatibility with subsidy  
However, there is a difference between Islamic law, Saudi domestic law and the 
WTO agreement in the area of anti-subsidy. Saudi Arabia still operates some subsidy 
programmes
149
 prohibited under the WTO anti-subsidy agreement. The anti-subsidy 
concept under Islamic law differs, as the government must support society and the 
people directly. Moreover, direct subsidising programmes under Islamic law must 
continue to protect society from poverty. If no harm comes to the market from 
subsidising a product it can be legitimately subsidised under Islamic law.  
2.5.5 Compatibility between Islamic law and WTO agreement 
Islamic law has the flexibility of openness and the capacity to adapt to WTO 
agreements, if there is no such conflict between both of them and the general 
principles of Islamic law. If a WTO agreement does not include any prohibition on 
contracts or products, it will be acceptable. For that reason, AD and anti-subsidy law 
under the WTO agreement can be adopted under Islamic law, with only slight 
amendments about subsidy and price fixing. Moreover, Islamic law typically prefers 
to adapt as society changes, which is one of its key advantages.  
                                                 
149
 Trade Policy Review, prepared by the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Report no. 
WT/TPR/256, 21 December 2011, vii. Also, See report by Reuters Arabic news, available at 
<http://ara.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idARACAE9B2FFP20131110> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined AD and anti-subsidy rules under the WTO agreement, 
Islamic law and in Saudi domestic law. It is interesting to observe how these rules 
derived from evidence presented in the Holy Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet 
Mohammed, which show how important it is for traders to operate inside a regulated 
market. It is evident, as seen in this chapter, that the initial application of the idea of 
the AD concept historically took place under Islamic law more than fourteen 
hundreds years previously. 
In this chapter, compatibility between the WTO agreement, Islamic law and 
Saudi domestic law has been highlighted concerning AD and anti-subsidy. As Saudi 
Arabia relies on Islamic law to underwrite its basic regulations, there are few barriers 
to the adoption of laws from the WTO agreement. However, other legal systems that 
use Islamic law as a basis for regulations can perform the same steps without 
difficulty. At present Saudi Arabia applies AD and anti-subsidy rules under the GCC 
umbrella; the GCC members defend their products as if they were in one country, in 
a similar way to the EU. However, historically, the GCC has not become involved in 
cases of AD and anti-subsidy. In the example of cases involving Saudi Arabia, India 
and Oman, AD duty was cancelled by Saudi Arabia only, although both countries 
were GCC members. This indicates insufficient coordination and cooperation 
between the GCC countries with regard to AD and anti-subsidy cases. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF AD CASES RAISED AGAINST 
SAUDI ARABIA'S PETROCHEMICALS PRODUCTS  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details AD cases filed against Saudi Arabia’s petrochemicals products 
in India, Turkey and the European Union (EU).
1
 The petrochemical’s sector has 
traditionally applied AD regulations in order to protect itself.
2
 AD cases can 
generally be divided into those raised at the national or international level. The cases 
examined in this chapter are confined to those opened at national level.  
The second question put forward in this research concerns the impact of AD 
cases raised against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse the cases levelled in depth, to determine the extent to which 
they might affect national revenues over the long term in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
many countries have used AD regulations for their own aims, by enacting laws in 
their own interests, as mentioned here by Doreen Bekker,  
it is alleged […] that sometimes, AD is being used as more than just a 
countermeasure to injuries. In some cases, AD duties are being imposed 
on imports that are being fairly traded. This allegation implies that it 
should be possible to cheat the AD Agreement.
 3
 
 
The cases considered here (those brought by India, Turkey and the EU against 
Saudi petrochemicals products) are the most recent, and it is believed that they could 
have been resolved very differently. In the cases discussed, the results were either 
                                                 
1
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
www.commerce.nic.in, accessed 1 June 2014. Turkish case: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569. EU case: 2011/c 49/10, EU v 
Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
2
 Hylke Vandenbussche and Maurizio Zanardi, “What explains the proliferation of antidumping 
laws?”, Economic Policy V. 23(53) 93-138. 
3
 Doreen Bekker, “The strategic use of anti-dumping in international trade”, (2006) South African 
Journal of Economics, 74: 3, 501. 
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cancelling AD duty against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products or ending the 
investigation before resolution.
4
 The termination of cases typically followed political 
negotiation with the countries alleging dumping, as will be demonstrated in this 
chapter. Thus, termination of these cases for political reason is links to one of the 
key themes considered in this research; the role of political negotiations in AD 
cases.
5
 
This chapter will analyse the impact of the cases from a variety of different 
perspectives: legal, economic and political. It will also consider the positive and 
negative effects of these cases on importing and exporting countries. However, first, 
it is important to distinguish between what is meant by national and international 
level cases. As will be seen in this chapter, India, Turkey and the EU have all used 
AD regulations frequently against imported Saudi petrochemicals products, and 
some of these countries have made considerable use of these regulations.
6
  
3.2 Background 
Before proceeding to analyse cases between Saudi Arabia and India, Turkey, and the 
EU, it is important to mention that the copies of the cases referred to in this thesis are 
the non-confidential copies, as these were the only versions of proceedings available. 
There are alternative copies, which remain confidential between the authorities and 
interested parties, and it was impossible to access these.  
                                                 
4
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
<www.commerce.nic.in>, accessed 1 June 2014. 
5
 The reasons for choosing these cases was mentioned in chapter 1 in the section stating the research 
problem.  
6
 There are two groups of Anti-dumping Users: traditional and new Users. Before the 1980s, the 
traditional users were Australia, Canada, EU and USA. However, since then, they have been joined by 
other countries, classified as “new users”, which like Brazil, China, India and Mexico.  
Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade, (Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2005). 
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It is necessary to stress the importance of attaining the statistics for national 
versus international AD cases. National cases are those raised by contracting parties 
against other members under national jurisdiction. International level cases are those 
where the dispute is referred to the WTO; this typically occurs when one of the 
parties disagrees with the domestic procedures employed by the country making the 
allegations.  
A further division in cases made by some scholars is to distinguish between 
traditional users of AD laws and new users: 
In 1980, the list of the top AD users was quite short; the four traditional 
users accounted for all but two of worldwide AD cases. In 2002 the list 
of top AD users looked quite different: India (80 cases), United States 
(35), Thailand (21), EU (20), Australia (14), Peru (13) and PR China 
(11).
7
 
 
Based on the information put forward in materials pertaining to the cases between 
Saudi Arabia and India, Turkey and the EU, it is possible to know the extent of the 
direct impact on the Saudi petrochemicals sector on one side and the national 
economy on the other. The Saudi Arabian petrochemicals sector is one of the most 
important industries in Saudi Arabia.
8
 Therefore, the next step is to introduce 
statistics relating to AD cases against Saudi Arabia from a range of sources. 
3.3 Cases against Saudi Arabia at the national level  
It is difficult to obtain accurate figures for the number of AD cases at national level 
around the world. This is despite the fact that all contracting parties need to inform 
the WTO committee of any AD actions they take at the national level under the AD 
                                                 
7
 Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade, (Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2005), 690. 
8
 Fawaz Hamad Al-Fawaz, “The importance of the petrochemical industry”, available at 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2006/05/23/article_5297.html> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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Agreement.
9
 Thus, in this section, AD cases from many sources will be clarified. 
Moreover, on the Saudi government’s side, there are no clear statistics detailing the 
AD cases applied against Saudi Arabia; when the researcher requested this data via 
official department channels in Saudi Arabia, the request was refused on the grounds 
of confidentiality.
10
 The officials in the relevant departments consider the 
information about AD cases to be top secret information; although this should not be 
the case. AD cases, like other similar cases, are set out in confidential and non-
confidential trial copies, and non-confidential copies should ideally be made 
available to interested parties, such as researchers and interested organisations, but 
the Saudi authorities refuse this.  
According to the WTO statistics regarding AD cases,
11
 there were 879 AD 
initiations out of 4358 cases on products from chemical and allied industries;
12
 this 
represents 20.16% of total AD initiations. In addition, in relation to AD measures in 
this area there were just 597 cases out of 2795 cases,
13
 representing 21.35% of all 
AD measures in the world. By referring to these numbers and percentages, it is 
apparent that in many cases the petrochemicals sector is the subject of AD 
investigations and measures. These percentages show how important it is to identify 
another solution to disputes, to reduce the high number of AD investigations and 
cases raised globally. However, Adamantopoulos and Notaris state, “The increase in 
                                                 
9
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. Article 16.4. 
10
 I have tried many times to contact the Saudi official department in order to obtain non-confidential 
copies of the anti-dumping cases between them and other countries. My contact was first with SABIC 
and then the Ministry of Commerce. Both refused to give me a copy of these cases. I tried again by 
approaching the committee for anti-dumping negotiations, directed by HRH Prince Abdul-Aziz bin 
Salman, but they refused as well. There is a misunderstanding of these cases in Saudi Arabia, as there 
is not adequate distinction between confidential and non-confidential copies.  
11
 These cases were between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 2013. 
12
 The Anti-dumping Initiations by the sector, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
13
 The Anti-dumping Initiations by measures, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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use of AD measures by non-traditional users, however, will inevitably lead to an 
increase of WTO AD litigation, and maybe to changes in traditional users’ practices 
regarding article 2”.14  
  In addition, this high number of cases against the petrochemicals sector must 
be analysed in depth and given great consideration, by both researchers and 
contracting parties. The reason being, that the petrochemicals sector is one of the 
most important industries in the world, and hundreds of other industries worldwide 
use petrochemicals products directly or indirectly. Any impact on this sector can 
have a direct effect on other industries also. In this research, it is asserted that the 
petrochemicals sector is an important one, directly and indirectly affecting the entire 
global population.  
However, the reported number of AD initiations and investigations varies 
between sources, as will be analysed. Research by the World Bank Global AD 
Database
15
 shows 6325 AD initiations and investigations worldwide, between 1979 
and 2012.
16
 However, this number does not include cases of user countries with 
minimal information, which would then add to this total. There are a huge number of 
cases, more than reported by WTO statistics; in addition, many details of each case 
remain unrecorded in official documents. As mentioned, the data referred to here 
                                                 
14
 Konstantinos Adamantopoulos and Diego De Notaris, “The future of the WTO and the reform of 
the anti-dumping agreement: a legal perspective”, 2000-2001, Fordham International Law Journal, 
24:30, 47. 
15
 The Global Anti-dumping Database under the World Bank, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
74930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014. 
16
 In this database, anti-dumping cases have been categorised by countries and each country has its 
cases nationally in an EXCL file, kept up-to-date to the latest case. These files have very detailed 
information about each case, which has been carefully collected from each state by this research 
centre. At the end of this database page will be found the countries of the anti-dumping users with 
minimum information, and without any numbers of these kinds of cases.  
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was collected from each country very carefully, and has been used elsewhere in a 
variety research papers, published in a range of academic journals.
17
  
The database referred to provides accurate information to uncover in depth 
details of the cases. There are two reasons for the variation in numbers between the 
research databases mentioned above and the WTO’s AD statistics. First, the data 
from the former extends over a period greater than that of the WTO, as it dates back 
to 1979. This can assist researchers to explore the legal background and acquire 
greater knowledge of cases involving international trade between countries more 
fully. It may also help to develop regulations in the future in accordance with 
changing legal circumstances. Second, in any AD case, the country making the 
allegations has to initiate the AD case in accordance with their membership duty; 
this database includes many non-member countries, therefore, returning higher 
figures than reported in the WTO statistics.  
Concerning the two databases, if we examine WTO AD statistics, it is 
apparent that Saudi Arabia has faced 28 initiations and measures,
18
 and 20 cases as a 
third party under the DSU.
19
 These are entirely different from the figures held on the 
Global AD Database. According to Global AD Database statistics, Saudi Arabia has 
faced 34 AD initiations and investigations, not including countries that applied AD 
regulations with minimal information cases.
20
 There were six initiations in Australia, 
one in Canada, three in China, four in the European Union, nine in India, one in New 
Zealand, two in Pakistan, three in South Africa, three also in Turkey, and finally one 
                                                 
17
 For example, Prof Zanardihas used this data in his research. He is a Professor in Economics at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles and a specialist in statistics of economic figures. 
18
 The Anti-dumping Initiations by country, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
19
 Dispute by Country/Territory, Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
20
 The Global Anti-dumping Database under the World Bank, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
74930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
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in the United States and one in Taiwan.
21
 Twenty-six of these cases were against 
Saudi petrochemicals products, accounting for 76.47% of all AD investigations 
against Saudi Arabia.  
The cases selected for this research are those initiated by India, Turkey and 
the European Union, due to sufficiency of information. Attempts were made to 
acquire data on cases from China also, but no English copies of these cases could be 
acquired from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce,
22
 Chinese official newspapers or 
the Saudi Arabian official departments. Nonetheless, it is considered that the cases 
selected are suitable for analysis purposes and will deliver reliable evidence. The 
cases are:  
 European Union in 2011 for the exporting of Polyethylene that originated 
from Saudi Arabia;
23
 
 Turkey in 2008 for the exporting of Ethylene that originated from Saudi 
Arabia;
24
 and 
 India in 2009 for the exporting of Polypropylene that originated from Saudi 
Arabia.
25
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 The Global Anti-dumping Database under the World Bank, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
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 Many efforts have been made to find alternative ways to locate these cases, including the Chinese 
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See <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/>, accessed on 1 June 2014.  
23
 The EU Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2011/c 49/10, EU v Oman and Saudi Arabia 
[2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
24
 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569. 
25
 The Indian Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at <www.commerce.nic.in> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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3.3.1 Analysis of cases 
Before analysing the AD cases between Saudi Arabia and India, Turkey and EU, it is 
important to set out the main principles deemed applicable to dumping under the 
WTO, as discussed in Chapter 2. In order to have a dumping margin, export and 
normal prices must be clear. In addition, the product must be ‘similar to’ a product 
produced by the domestic industry as well as representing a clear ‘injury or threat’ to 
the domestic industry. A ‘causal link’ must exist between the injury and the export 
price. Hence, the first part of this section will analyse export and normal pricing with 
the dumping margin. Second, discussion turns to the notion of a similar product and 
the impact on domestic industry, before finally considering the injury or threat and 
proof of a causal link. However, it is also an important component of this research, to 
determine whether subsidy played a role in the dumping in these cases; thus, this 
forms the final part of this section. 
3.3.1.1 Export price, normal value and dumping margin 
Before commencing the discussion stage of this section, regarding export price, 
normal value and dumping margin, it is important to remember that dumping refers 
to selling an exported product for less than its normal value, as stated in article VI, 
GATT.
26
 In cases where the export price is clear, there is no concern, as all prices are 
matched with real information. However, a problem arises where there is no clear 
export price or normal value; such cases, are hard to prove, as there is no evidence. 
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 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 55 UNTS 194; 61 Stat. pt. 5; TIAS 1700, Article 
VI. 
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According to Reid M. Bolton “… in many cases there is no easy way to determine 
what a normal price is for the purposes of AD investigations”.27  
As mentioned in Article 2 of VI implementation, section 2.2 states that where 
there are no sales of a like product in an export country, or where there is a low 
volume of sales regarding the market situation, in such a situation, 
the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a 
comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate 
third country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost 
of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for 
administration, selling and general cost and for profits.
28
 
 
This article clearly demonstrates that it is possible to calculate the margin of 
dumping in specific circumstances. The cost will normally be calculated where it is 
under investigation by an exporter or producer. However, the amount for 
administrative, selling and general costs and profits will be based on actual data, kept 
by the exporter or producer under investigation.
29
 In cases where there is no export 
price or where the export price is “unreliable”,30  
the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the 
imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the 
products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the 
condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may 
determine.
31
  
 
Following this brief review of dumping and the relevant key elements discussed in 
Chapter Two, cases between Saudi Arabia and India, Turkey, and the EU, will be 
                                                 
27
 Reid M. Bolton, “Anti-dumping and Distrust Reducing Anti-dumping Duties under the W.T.O. 
Through Heightened Scrutiny”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2011, 66, 74. 
28
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. Article 2.2. 
29
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. Article 2.2.1.1 & 2.2.2. 
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 “Unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the 
importer or a third party” Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. Article 2.3. 
31
 “Unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the 
importer or a third party” Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. Article 2.3. 
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examined in order to answer the second research question: Did the AD cases brought 
by Turkey, India and the EU countries against Saudi petrochemicals products have 
an impact on these products? 
3.3.1.1.1 EU case number 2011/c 49/10 
In a case, initiated by the EU countries in AD proceedings concerning the import of 
certain Polyethylene Terephthalate products from Saudi Arabia and Oman to the 
European Union, it was declared, 
…the allegation of dumping is based on a comparison of a constructed 
normal value (manufactured costs, selling, general and administration costs 
(SG&A) and profit) with the export price (at ex-works level) of the product 
under investigation when sold for export to the Union.
32
  
 
The above quotation shows that the EU applied article 2.4 of the implementation of 
article VI, GATT. However, the information remains unclear, as this is an initiation 
without examination by the authority. Usually, in such an initiation, the authority 
does not apply the articles to the facts; usually it simply offers brief information to 
initiate AD proceedings, by sending out questionnaires and receiving them back 
from interested parties. However, in this initiation, it was mentioned that the 
complaint provided necessary evidence of the negative impact of the dumped 
product on the EU: 
The prima facie evidence provided by the complainant shows that the 
volume and price of the imported product under investigation have, 
among other consequences, had a negative impact on the quantities sold, 
the level of the prices changed and the market share held by the Union 
industry...
33
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 The EU Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2011/c 49/10, EU v Oman and Saudi Arabia 
[2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
33
 The EU Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2011/c 49/10, EU v Oman and Saudi Arabia 
[2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
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The prices of the complainant, i.e. the EU industries were affected negatively, which 
triggered the AD investigation.  
 Thus, this examination is not a clear example, as the authority used the same 
articles as those set out in the WTO regulations on AD, but the complainant 
withdrew the case.
34
 
3.3.1.1.2 Turkish case number 2008/40  
This case concerned the export of Mono ethylene Glycol (MEG) from Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bulgaria in 2008. As mentioned, determination of the normal value in 
this initiation in article 4 (1) was, “due to the production costs of the domestic 
market, prices reached [which are] directly determined by adding a reasonable profit 
generated value [are] taken as the normal value for each of the three countries.” 35  
In relation to article 4 (1), the Turkish authority identified the export price in 
this initiation. However, a decision was made by the Turkish authority in the AD 
determinations regarding the same case (number 2010/11), after the authority had 
received completed questionnaires from the interested referring to the domestic 
selling price in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait:  
[was] based on costs and export price. However, in these countries, 
which [provide] the basic raw materials used in the production of MEG, 
“Ethane” is only produced by state-owned companies and the price of the 
supply/demand conditions are identified and announced by the 
authorities.
36
 
 
                                                 
34
 Case number 2011/835/EU, EU v Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], official Journal of the European 
Union 330/45. 
35
 Case number 2008/40 brought by the Turkish anti-dumping authority against the Saudi 
petrochemicals products. 
36
 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 4. 
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The judgment mentioned that these countries could access very cheap raw 
materials, which could result in lack of fair competition between industries 
producing similar products abroad.  
In addition, in reference to the same point, it was stated that Saudi Arabia 
fixes prices internally, meaning there is no competition inside Saudi Arabia between 
the industries for the similar products “….[a] price fixing mechanism for the review 
of the terms of these prices [to] reflect the market..”.37 Nonetheless, “the total cost 
provided by these importing companies does not reflect market conditions and the 
cost of labour and other overhead costs, raw materials…”.38 Therefore, although 
Saudi Arabia has issued a competition law to prescribe competition between 
products, the conditions for genuine competition inside Saudi Arabia remain 
unfulfilled.  
A further related point is that, in a report issued by the Saudi American Bank 
in Saudi Arabia (SAMBA), it was stated that Saudi Arabia is subsidising its 
petrochemicals sector through cheap feedstock: 
Ethane has been the feedstock of choice for Saudi products for one 
simple reason: the cost advantage is substantial. Owing to the Kingdom’s 
substantial gas resources, ethane is supported by Saudi Aramco to 
petrochemicals producers at $0.75 per million BTUs. This compares with 
a current market price of $3.5 per million BTUs for most producers in 
the US, who also tend to use ethane (the price was approaching $14 per 
million BTUs around a year ago).
39
  
 
This statement shows involvement in petrochemicals pricing by the Saudi 
government, through Saudi Aramco, which sells raw materials below the global 
market price.  
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 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 3. 
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The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 3. 
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Saudi American Bank in Saudi Arabia (SAMBA), Report Series August 2009, available at 
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The above quotations from the Turkish AD case raise two important issues, 
which affect the export price: one regarding the Saudi domestic market conditions 
and the other in relation to the involvement of the state in the domestic market. 
Regarding the first point, the two states, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, did not create the 
necessary market conditions in their domestic markets, which was a form of unfair 
competition. The fixed price led to unfair competition, as mentioned in the Turkish 
decision. In relation to Saudi Arabia, all the market conditions in the domestic 
markets were made available, although they were not mentioned in the decision; nor 
were the rules for fair competition or the opportunity for domestic and foreign 
investors to invest in Saudi Arabia in this sector.
40
 It might be that foreign investors 
do not want to invest in this particular area in Saudi Arabia because of associated 
economic benefits and priorities; however, ultimately a competitive market functions 
as a positive investment atmosphere. Despite this, the Saudi petrochemicals sector is 
mostly government-owned (through SABIC); with the result that prices are usually 
fixed, or at the very least subject to governmental interference.  
Secondly, with regard to raw materials; this should not be an issue, as long as 
the government does not become involved in markets and pricing; thus, raw 
materials could be sold to domestic petrochemicals industries at the global price. 
However, Saudi Arabia is well endowed with oil and gas reserves; thus, it can supply 
low cost materials to any industries manufacturing products comprised of these 
elements. Nonetheless, the state must open its market to these types of industry and 
                                                 
40
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supply all industries (whether government-owned or otherwise) equally; in fact the 
option of an open market might not be a possibility in Saudi Arabia, due to 
government involvement in the market price, i.e. through subsidy.
41
  
Regarding normal value, the Turkish authority applied the following 
provision:  
where the normal value was based on sales in the domestic market, the 
domestic market of the country of origin for similar products within the 
framework of normal commercial transactions or to pay the prices paid 
by buyers on the basis of an independent calculation”.42  
 
Clearly, raw materials in Saudi Arabia are not subject to the same market 
conditions as in Turkey. In fact, normal value is based on Western Europe market 
conditions: “…with a much higher profit by using investment returns (hence this 
higher profit will be in the normal value) in favour of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait”.43 It 
can be seen in this research, that to apply this to the case concerned is erroneous, as 
Western Europe differs entirely from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in many respects; i.e. 
economically, legally, and in terms of development and technology. Moreover, 
Western Europe does not have the same oil and gas resources as these two countries, 
and so similar market conditions do not apply. A comparison should be made at the 
same level of trade as market and ex-factory, as mentioned in article 2.4 of the 
implementations of Article VI of GATT.
44
 The Turkish authority should try to find 
another country to offer an appropriate comparison for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
such as Venezuela. 
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In relation to the above statement, the Turkish authority calculated the 
dumping margin for Saudi Arabia (SABIC) as 30.1% for firms that were not 
cooperative,
45
 which must be reconsidered, as the application is not compatible with 
the GATT with regard to article VI and its implementation.  
3.3.1.1.3 Indian case number 14/5/2009-DGAD  
In the case of India, the initiation of an AD procedure was in response to imports of 
Polypropylene from Saudi Arabia, Oman and Singapore into India. There are more 
details available for this case than for the previous cases, as the entire AD 
investigation process in India was concluded with the application of AD duty. This 
case raises the same issue as the Turkish case with regard to normal value: 
they were not able to obtain any documentary evidence or reliable 
information with regard to domestic price in the subject 
countries……The applicant has also stated that the raw materials are 
based on the market conditions and are being sourced from state-owned 
enterprises.
46
  
 
These allegations against Saudi companies and others are detailed further, later in the 
preliminary and final findings of this case.  
With regard to normal value, the Indian authorities applied the same method 
as the Turkish, i.e. referring to GATT, as mentioned in the Preliminary Findings: 
 …whether the domestic sales of the subject goods by the responding 
exporters in their home markets were representative and viable 
permitting determinations of normal value on the basis of domestic 
selling prices and whether the ordinary course of trade test was satisfied 
as per the data provided by respondents,[is] subject to verification…47  
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However, the authorities noted, regarding the Supreme Court of India case of M/s 
Reliance Industries Ltd., that the single weighted average for normal value should be 
separated for each of the subject countries: “…then determine a separate single 
weighted average normal value for each of the subject countries as a whole and the 
same is compared with the ex-factory export realisation of each cooperating 
respondent”.48 Based on the above information, the normal value for each Saudi 
industry was given separately as follows: 
1. With regard to M/s Advanced Polypropylene Co. : “ …Considering the fact 
that the prices of petroleum in general and as well as of the subject goods fell 
significantly during this period……….the authority has proceeded to 
construct the normal value on the basis of the unit cost [to] make and sell 
…”.49 The authority aimed to find a way to protect its domestic industries by 
applying AD duty to exported products, especially from Saudi Arabia. 
However, there is no relationship between the price of petroleum and the 
normal value, as the price of petroleum is priced globally. This means, the 
authority has not professionally determined the normal value correctly.  
2. With regard to the M/s Saudi Polyolefins Company, the authority determined 
normal value based on total domestic sales, as it was provided with details of 
the selling price, which were agreed to be legally acceptable.
50
 
3. With regard to M/s Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the 
authority was described as non-co-operative, because it did not provide any 
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details as required. However, in this exanimation, there was no mention of 
what basis the authority calculated the normal value or the other elements 
related to it.
51
 
4. With regard to M/s Exxon Mobil Chemical Asia Pacific - Saudi Arabia, the 
same statement was made as for SABIC; namely, that the company did not 
co-operate with the Indian authority in this matter.
52
 Here too there was no 
method shown to explain how the authority would determine normal value.  
In the Indian case, the dumping margin was clearer than in the Turkish and 
EU cases. After the authority considered the export price and normal value, as 
discussed above, a dumping margin was applied to the Saudi petrochemical 
industries. The margin was 53.59% for the Advanced Polypropylene Co., 1.89% for 
the M/s Saudi Polyolefins Company, and 185.68% for the non-cooperative producers 
and exporters.
53
 The only comment made about the dumping margins was in relation 
to M/s Saudi Polyolefins Company as well as M/s Advanced Polypropylene Co. The 
first company’s percentage was regarded as de minimis,54 and the authority did not 
apply any AD duty on the goods it exported. The second company could not 
understand how the authority linked the price of petroleum and normal value. This 
price would be expected to have no effect on normal value, as it is globally priced 
and there is no interference by government.  
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3.3.1.2 Similar products and the domestic industry 
In order to apply AD provisions, it is important to identify like products, as well as 
the domestic industry for similar products. According to the GATT and the 
implementation of article VI, the like product must be identical in all respects if AD 
regulations are to apply.
55
 However, in the case of the domestic industry, reference 
must be made to domestic producers of like products, unless there is a relationship 
between the exporting and domestic industries.
56
 Nonetheless, in practice, domestic 
industries must deliver more than 50% of the total
57
 for like products in AD cases. 
Therefore, on this particular point, there were no issues related to identifying like 
products within the domestic industry, as like products were identical in all three 
cases, and there was no requirement for further clarification. In some cases, however, 
the definition of “like product” could be raised as an issue between parties: “Since 
the definition of ‘like product’ has not been settled in the AD context, administering 
authorities enjoy much discretion in determin[ing] the product scope of AD 
investigations”.58 However, in some cases, as in the Footwear case between China 
and Indonesia, it was not easy to distinguish between slippers and outdoor shoes, and 
the court “…had to be satisfied in order to consider slippers and outdoor shoes as 
one product”.59 The case failed because these were not deemed identical products: 
“The test failed in the other direction (i.e., the Commission could not determine that 
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outdoor shoes could be replaced by slippers for outdoor use, due to slippers’ ‘usual 
flimsiness’”.60 Even though both can be regarded as shoes, the use of shoes was a 
deciding factor, suggesting a difference in products.  
3.3.1.2.1 EU case number 2011/c 49/10 
Returning to the EU case against Saudi Arabia and Oman, the product was 
Polyethylene Terephthalate. The product was identical in all respects to the domestic 
product as clarified: “The product subject to this investigation is Polyethylene 
Terephthalate having a viscosity number of 78 ml/g or higher, according to the ISO 
Standard 1628-5”.61 However, the Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) 
industries filled this case on behalf of the union industries, “...by the Committee of 
PET Manufactures in Europe (CPME)...on behalf of the producers representing a 
major proportion, in this case more than 50% of the total Union production of certain 
polyethylene terephthalate”.62  
Before considering another case, however, it is important to mention the 
process of “Sampling”. A huge number of Union producers have been involved in 
AD cases. In order to conclude such cases on time the Commission typically selects 
one producer as representative of Union producers; i.e. “The Commission has 
decided to limit to a reasonable number the Union producers that will be investigated 
by selecting a sample (this process is also referred to as ‘sampling’). The sampling is 
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carried out in accordance with article 17 of the basic Regulation”.63 This statement 
shows no conflict between this article and the AD regulations in the GATT 
agreement. It is deemed an acceptable way of organising allegations between 
interested parties.  
3.3.1.2.2 Turkish case number 2008/40 
In the Turkish case concerning MEG, the documents refer to the product under the 
Turkish Custom Tariff Authority. Moreover, further clarification states; i.e. “...the 
formula (CH2OH) 2, which MEG, glycols is the smallest compound to colourless, 
odourless, clear and very hygroscopic syrup liquid”.64 In addition, the legal 
percentages under the WTO in AD cases referring to domestic similar producers 
were mentioned clearly in the initiation.  
3.3.1.2.3 Indian case number 14/5/2009-DGAD 
In the Indian case, the product’s name was clarified: The product under 
consideration is “Polypropylene (i.e., photopolymers of propylene and copolymers 
of propylene and ethylene)”. These subject goods are classified under Custom 
Headings 39021000 and 39023000.
65
 
Moreover, the initiation pointed to different uses of the subject product 
“...The subject goods are used as woven sacks for cement, food-grains, sugar, 
                                                 
63
 Case number 2011/c 49/10, EU v Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], official Journal of the European 
Union C 49/18. 
64
 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 1. 
65
 The Indian Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia:14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at <www.commerce.nic.in>, accessed 1 June 2014, (page 1 of 
the Initiation Notification). 
88 
 
fertilizer, bags for fruits & vegetables, TQ & BOPP films, containers etc.”.66 The 
identical nature of the two products is addressed, thus: 
There are no differences either in the technical specifications, quality, 
functions or end-uses of the dumped imports and the domestically 
produced subject goods and the product under consideration manufactured 
by the applicant. The two are technically and commercially substitutable 
and hence should be treated as ‘like article’ under the AD Rules.67 
 
However, a domestic producer raised the case on behalf of domestic similar 
industries: “The application has been filed by M/s Reliance Industry Ltd. on behalf 
of the domestic industry”. The total number of industries and similar producers 
reached the legal percentage required to proceed with an AD case: “... the total 
domestic production of the like article and is more than 50% of Indian production of 
the like article”.68 
Accordingly, it can be seen that the authorities in AD cases against Saudi 
products applied AD regulations properly and that the domestic regulations relating 
to GATT on AD were also applicable. However, the Indian case was legally clearer 
when identifying the like product, as it mentioned the diversity of uses of the like 
product, thereby applying the correct legal written formula and procedure.  
3.3.1.3 Injury and causal link 
This section is one of the most important and difficult in relation to the application of 
AD regulations. Without injury and a causal link, AD provisions could not be 
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applied. As mentioned in Chapter Two, dumping itself is not illegal but is penalised 
if it causes or threatens material or other injury to an established industry, or one that 
is planned. Before examining these cases, it is important to consider both elements in 
relation to the implementation of Article VI of GATT. 
On the subject of injury, article VI states that dumping can cause injury or 
threat to a domestic industry: “...if it causes or threatens material injury to an 
established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the 
establishment of a domestic industry...”.69 Thus, it must be based on positive 
evidence including examination of the volume of dumped imports and the effect of 
pricing on domestic producers.
70
 The authority should check two points: increases in 
quantities dumped and the price undercutting of like products in the domestic 
market. However, as mentioned in Chapter Two of this research, the causal link must 
be between the lowest prices for importing the product and the injury or threat as 
known at this point. It is agreed that the cause of dumping is the importing of the 
product, but not the product itself; otherwise, this would mean that any imported 
product could be regarded as dumped, which is not the case. The injury is caused by 
the low price of the imported product. 
3.3.1.2.1 EU case number 2011/c 49/10 
This initiation details the identified injury as: 
Injury means material injury to the union industry or threat of material 
injury to the industry, or material retardation of the establishment of such 
an industry. A determination of injury is based on positive evidence and 
involves an objective determination of the volume of dumped imports, 
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their effect on prices on the Union market and the consequent impact of 
those imports on the Union industry....
71
 
 
However, the initiation mentioned an increase in the imported product in terms of 
market share: “The Complainant has provided evidence that impacts of the product 
under investigations from the countries concerned have increased overall in absolute 
terms and have increased in terms market share”.72 Consequently, this caused a 
negative impact on the dumped Saudi Arabian product, which  
…had a negative impact on quantities sold, the level of the prices 
charged and market share held by Union industry, resulting in substantial 
adverse effects on the overall performance, the financial situation and the 
employment situation of the Union industry.
73  
 
In this initiation, and as provided by the Union’s complainant industry, the 
injury could be classified into three particular points, quantities sold, price charged 
and market share by union industries. Yet, this must be linked to the low price of the 
imported similar product, if AD duty were to be applied. However, the complainant 
withdrew the case, so it will be difficult to examine the three points of injury and 
find a causal link.  
3.3.1.3.2 Turkish case number 2008/40 
Referring back to the Turkish case: the authority examined whether there was an 
increase in the volume of Saudi exported products. It was demonstrated that there 
was an increase during the period under examination, and also that dumped imports 
affected the prices of domestic producers. It was stated that value increased in this 
period affecting Turkish domestic producers. Moreover, the Turkish authority 
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examined economic indicators for domestic production: sales, exports, market share, 
inventories, capacity, employment, fees, productivity, domestic price, costs, cash 
flow, growth, capital increase and increase in investment; all were evidence of the 
effect of dumping on the domestic industry, although not evidence of dumping 
itself.
74
  
3.3.1.3.3 Indian case number 14/5/2009-DGAD 
In this case, the initiation stated that the applicant had put forward all the related 
evidence regarding the injury:  
The applicant has furnished evidence regarding the injury having taken 
place as a result of the alleged dumping in the form of increased volume 
of dumped imports, price underselling, price suppression, and substantial 
decline in profitability, return and cash flow for the domestic 
industries.
75
 
 
However, in the preliminary findings, and after the authority had examined all the 
evidence, it found an increase in imports from 100 (in 2005-06) to 164 in the period 
under investigation.
76
 With regard to demand and market share, the imports from 
these countries continued in the range of 5% to 6%, and the market share of domestic 
industry improved.
77
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Thus, capacity fell in the period of investigation compared to previous years, 
and the sales volumes of both importing and domestic industries were enhanced.
78
 
There was also an increase concerning landed value from subject countries as well as 
heavy discounts post shipment from exported countries.
79
 There was also positive 
price underselling in each of the subject countries. These elements are all considered 
evidence of the effect of dumping inside India’s market, as referred to in the GATT 
agreement in relation to article VI and its implementation.  
3.3.1.4 Whether there is any “subsidising” for Saudi products as well as for the 
domestic products of the importing countries 
It is important to examine whether there are any kinds of subsidies from the Saudi 
government for the products in the three AD cases. Usually there are two different 
implementation processes for AD and anti-subsidy under the GATT agreement; 
although, in practice all cases have to be dealt with separately, even if they are 
related in some circumstances. By checking the WTO reports with regard to subsidy 
cases, there was no case found against Saudi Arabia concerning anti-subsidy 
regulations. Nonetheless, this does not mean there is no any allegation concerning 
this point, because it may be integrated within AD cases.  
Thus, if we reconsider the Turkish case mentioned above, two issues were 
reported in this case. One with regard to market conditions and the other in relation 
to the involvement of the state (Saudi Arabia) in its domestic market, which affects 
the export price. As shown in the definitions of subsidy regulations, a subsidy is 
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deemed to exist, among other conditions, if: “… there is any form of income or price 
support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994…”.80 Thus, this expressed the 
involvement of the Saudi government in the domestic market as affecting the export 
price as a kind of subsidy.  
Having examined many of the WTO members’ legal actions relative to AD 
and anti-subsidy, the research shows more attention is generally paid to the former 
than the latter. The anti-subsidy cases under the DSU numbered only 102.
81
 Thus, it 
is recommended that the WTO takes more action on this point and activates the 
Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures more fully. 
3.3.1.5 Termination of AD  
At the end of this section, when analysing AD cases against Saudi Arabia, it emerges 
that the European Union Commission has been very careful when making decisions 
with regard to AD regulations, more so than the authorities in the other cases (the 
Indian authority in particular). The argument and use of language in the European 
case was very strong and more specific in terms of detail, than the Indian case. The 
European Union authority used an element considered as evidence of the dumping 
itself, unlike the Indian case. Thus, it can be seen that the Indian case was abusive in 
its application of the regulation, meaning that it might not have complied with the 
GATT regulation and article VI implementation.  
However, these cases were terminated for many different reasons; however, 
after this the Saudi Arabian government put political pressure on these countries in a 
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different way. In the EU case, the complainant withdrew from allegations on 12
th
 of 
October, 2011.
82
 Following the Turkish case, the Saudi Government expressed its 
thanks and appreciation to the Turkish government after termination of AD duty 
against the Saudi petrochemicals products mentioned in the case.
83
 Agreement was 
achieved through the regular weekly council of ministries, which met on 26
th
 of 
March, 2012. From the Turkish perspective, there were no official documents 
demonstrating the reason for terminating AD duty against Saudi petrochemicals 
products.  
Moreover, the Indian case included a unique form of termination. The Indian 
AD decision was dated 9
th
 of August, 2012; the Indian authority retained AD duty on 
Oman and Singapore but dropped it from the Saudi petrochemicals products. It was 
mentioned in this decision, that: “On December 30, 2011 the Central Government 
has withdrawn the duties imposed on the imports from Saudi Arabia by Notification 
130/2011...”.84 Thus, based on the previous statement and the time elapsed between 
the termination of these cases, it can be clearly seen that Saudi Arabia put political 
pressure on the committee assessing the AD. This may have led to increased priority 
to negotiate in future AD cases against Saudi products. Finally, all three cases have a 
direct impact, whether on the alleging countries or Saudi Arabia, as will be seen later 
in this chapter.  
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3.4 Cases against Saudi Arabia at the international level  
The dispute settlement report on AD cases
85
 mentioned no disputes against Saudi 
Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia has been involved in a total of 20 cases under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as a third party.
86
 Thus, AD cases against 
Saudi Arabia have continued to further the DSU level under the WTO agreement. In 
this research, the reasons for the non-pursuit of cases against Saudi Arabia at the 
international level under the WTO may be as follows:  
3.4.1 WTO membership 
The majority of AD cases against Saudi Arabia were established before Saudi Arabia 
joined the WTO. According to the statistics from the Global AD Database, 11 out of 
34 cases occurred before Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organisation at the 
end of 2005 (this equates to 32.35%).
87
 
In addition, Saudi Arabia fought for ten years to become a member of the 
WTO,
88
 and negotiations did not prioritise these cases. The priority was to fulfil the 
conditions and requirements of becoming a member of the WTO. Thus, most Saudi 
companies faced action against them without any real support from the Saudi 
government, as Saudi Arabia did not regard AD actions as a threat to its industries.  
However, the Saudi Arabian government acted by appointing a committee 
(under the Ministry of Petroleum),
89
 to address and negotiate. This committee aimed 
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to terminate AD cases against Saudi Arabian products overseas, which involved 
petrochemicals products. Protecting Saudi industries domestically was the 
responsibility of another department, under the Ministry of Commerce.
90
 It can be 
seen in this research, that whether an AD dispute is inside or outside Saudi Arabia, 
the same department should deal with it, in order to establish more comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding in such cases. 
 3.4.2 Experience  
Saudi Arabia is still a new member of the WTO and has limited experience of how to 
deal with AD cases, whether locally or overseas. Even when facing cases of AD 
against its products after the joining the WTO in 2005, it had minimal experience of 
how to handle cases. Consequently, Saudi Arabia was not involved in any AD cases 
at the DUS level. On the other hand, in some of the AD cases mentioned above, 
Saudi petrochemical companies did not follow up on matters seriously, or participate 
in a trial in the country where the allegation was made.
91
 In general, Saudi 
companies preferred an alternative way to resolve AD cases. 
3.4.3 Saudi Arabia’s interest in the oil sector 
Saudi Arabia had no interest in focusing on industries in general or petrochemical 
industries in particular, nor did it expressly offer these industries government support 
in cases of dumping. Their entire focus was on the oil sector, as it is the primary 
source of income into the country. However, Saudi Arabia recognised the 
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importance of diversifying national revenues in order to manage fluctuations in oil 
prices and to ensure national economic stability without focusing on oil profits.
92
 
Moreover, the Saudi government planned to extend and develop the production of 
petrochemicals,
93
 although these cases can be an obstacle to free trade and the 
movement of goods between countries. 
3.4.4 Saudi Arabia’s special policy 
Some of the AD cases against Saudi Arabia were connected with political action, 
even where they related purely to legal matters. Saudi Arabia has a special political 
approach that differs from that of other countries;
94
 it emphasises quiet negotiation 
focused on larger political issues only. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has not paid 
substantial attention to AD cases, as these have generally involved minor issues, 
when compared to major political concerns. On the other hand, Saudi political policy 
does not support international escalation, such as with AD cases, because Saudi 
Arabia prefers to maintain a good relationship with countries worldwide. Thus, 
Saudi industries, when facing cases like these, must address matters unaided, and in 
some cases without any government support. 
3.4.5 Alternative solutions  
As mentioned above, the Saudi government has not expressed interest in legal AD 
measures, meaning that those Saudi industries facing AD cases have to resolve them 
independently. This has led to the emergence of some alternative solutions to 
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resolving such cases. One such solution is to leave the importing country’s market, 
or at least to prevent exports for a short period, until a legal alternative can be found. 
Another solution is to form a union or coalition with local industries in the importing 
country, or to establish a Saudi industry in that country, owned by the Saudi 
company. Typically, this has involved buying up the entire shareholdings of 
companies inside the importing market.
95
 This then makes it difficult for an 
importing country to apply AD regulations against Saudi companies subsequently; as 
such action would conflict with article 4 of the implementation of article VI, 
GATT.
96
  
For the above reasons, it is logical not to engage in AD cases at DSU level 
against Saudi Arabia. Saudi industries cannot support their actions in the WTO 
setting without assistance from their government, which has not been available thus 
far.  
3.5. The impact of the AD cases 
AD action has a broad impact on all concerned (importers and exporters); for this 
reason, contracting parties strive to prohibit illegal dumping actions, as they 
themselves result in unfair competition. The impact on importing and exporting 
countries is similar in some instances; however, it is also necessary to ask, how 
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recent AD cases against Saudi Petrochemicals products have affected these 
products?  
       The following section clarifies the impact of illegal action on Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals products. It considers that, just as there is an impact from dumping, 
the applying of AD duty on exporting countries can have a direct impact on domestic 
industries as well. Therefore, the impact is on both sides, not only on the importing 
countries. However, the AD regulation should be applied with careful consideration.  
3.5.1 The legal impact 
Repeated use of AD actions, without legal justification or strong proof of necessity, 
undermines the credibility of the legislation and the legitimate aims for which it was 
created. It is therefore essential that its use be in accordance with correct legal 
procedures and standards set under the WTO agreement. The aim of the legislation is 
to ensure fair competition between products in the international marketplace, which 
helps to accelerate the pace of trade between nations and support it. However, the 
frequent use of such legislation to extend the best opportunities to local producers or 
to monopolise the local markets ahead of international producers, renders regulations 
worthless.  
 It can be seen from this research that the frequent use of AD processes is to 
allow unfair competition, albeit in a new way and with legal cover. Due to the 
increasing frequency of legal issues of this nature between contracting parties and 
since the global economic crisis, it has become necessary for countries, which are 
parties to GATT to review texts in accordance with their new economic 
circumstances and to investigate the abuse of laws. In reviewing these laws, 
therefore, it is necessary to impose sanctions, or act legally against a state that is 
100 
 
using legal actions in an abusive way or in bad faith. This would then promote the 
use of such laws in accordance with the aims for which they were developed, as legal 
safeguards exist in practice; i.e. to complain to the WTO as well as to the 
investigator and decision-maker in such cases. In other words, these are not 
sufficient to achieve a legal trial with results that will satisfy all parties concerned. 
- Creating a negotiation AD committee  
Recent AD cases against Saudi petrochemicals products have had a direct 
legal impact on Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has directly established a negotiation 
committee to uncover a legal solution to allegations through direct negotiations, for 
the first time.
97
 This is a major step forward from the Saudi government, 
representing its recognition of the negative direct impact of AD cases on 
petrochemicals industries. The importance of this negotiation committee to the 
government is evident, as one of the governmental officials responsible for the 
committee succeeding in its duty is a Royal Prince.
98
  
- Amending the recent AD regulation. 
Saudi Arabia recognised the importance of making an amendment to the 
legal AD system under the GCC; this was enacted on 28 January 2013.
99
 This 
change was to make the regulation more compatible with the WTO, and to 
strengthen the protection of similar domestic products inside Saudi Arabia from 
competition.  
These two legal steps illustrate the extent to which the Saudi government has 
broadened its legal understanding of the AD regulation and its potential to influence 
the Saudi economy in general negatively, and Saudi petrochemicals products in 
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particular. This was the first time that the Saudi government took legal action in such 
a case with the aim of trying to find a solution to protect its petrochemicals products. 
Consequently, these two steps directly affected the Saudi government, generating 
more calls for legal action in such cases in consideration of possible damage to Saudi 
petrochemicals protect.      
3.5.2 The economic impact  
It is important to assess the impact of the recent AD cases against Saudi 
petrochemicals products. The subsections below discuss the impact of AD cases 
from different perspectives: price, competition, sales quantities, production, 
development and national plans, employment, and impact on national income.  
3.5.2.1 Price and profit 
The first impact to consider is that affecting price, which is the main element or tool 
applied when making an AD calculation. Thus, the first element to examine is 
whether we are considering export price, normal price or domestic price when 
calculating the dumping margin. In order to understand the impact of dumping on 
price and profit, three hypotheses will be considered:  
1. In cases where the price of an exported product is lower than the cost of a 
similar domestic product, the latter will be affected and will be considered as 
dumping if there is attendant injury or a causal link. This is similar to the 
guidelines in the AD cases against Saudi Arabia mentioned above. However, 
this price should have a direct impact on the profit and other economic 
elements related to it. Moreover, it will not represent proper competition 
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between the products. Conversely, the exporter will accrue greater profits, as 
well as strengthening the presence of products in the importing market.  
2. In cases where the price of an exported product is similar or a little lower 
than the cost of a similar domestic product, it will be difficult to allege 
dumping, as it might be a case of de minimis or negligence.
100
  
3. In cases where the price of an exported product is similar or a little higher 
than the cost of a similar product, the domestic industry for that similar 
product will be able to generate profit and develop the industry as soon as the 
selling volume moves in the right direction. However, competition between 
the domestic product and the exported product will then be high, as well as 
meeting the aim of the GATT agreement, which would favour the consumer.  
Nonetheless, in the previous hypothesis, there were few alterations made to 
prices. Most of the importing countries complaining about Saudi products, had a 
suitable level of pricing inside their domestic markets, and so were able to continue 
making a profit.
101
 However, Saudi Arabia was affected by AD cases targeting its 
petrochemicals products, and suffering AD duty. It has been reported that Saudi 
Arabia lost around 5 Billion Saudi Riyals in 2013 because of AD cases brought 
against its petrochemicals products.
102
 Correspondingly, statistics taken from 
financial statements for the years 2009 to 2012, illustrate that Saudi petrochemicals 
products had lost value, as these statements showed reduced ability to sell during 
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those years.
103
 Consequently, the price rose, which will have a direct effect on 
competitive ability of competition and sales volumes.  
3.5.2.2 Competition 
There is a direct impact proceeding from competition between these petrochemicals 
products. This will have an immediate effect on the domestic industries targeted by 
the exporting producer. The competition would then not be as good as it should be. 
Initially, the domestic producer will try to compete as much as possible using such 
tools as pricing or offers, but it will not be able to continue competing. In contrast, 
the exporting producer will find it easier to exert their influence to their own benefit 
in the importing country.  
With regard to the AD cases against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products, 
the competition continues at the same level, as all companies have the ability to 
compete inside the complainant’s markets. There were no strategic decisions made to 
leave any of the complainant countries.
104
 Saudi Petrochemicals products continue to 
be sold inside these countries; moreover, some reports shows investment in 
petrochemicals products has actually increased.
105
  
It appears that competition has not really altered, yet some elements from 
within the domestic Saudi market have exerted an effect. Fixing prices and cheap 
raw materials have been the two most important elements domestically inside Saudi 
Arabia; these have had a direct effect on the competition and other products in the 
international markets. Thus, even where there is capacity to compete with Saudi 
products, these actions are not judged legal under the WTO agreement.  
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3.5.2.3 Selling quantities 
Selling quantities are placed in an inverse relationship between the domestic industry 
and exporting producers. While exporting producers’ sales quantities increase in a 
dumping situation, the sales quantities of importing countries decrease. However, 
this will not be the situation in every dumping case, only when there is a high level 
of dumping.  
In cases involving Saudi Arabia, the selling quantity affecting the Saudi 
producers and importing countries was unpredictable, sometimes it increased and at 
other times it did not.
106
  
3.5.2.4 Industrial producing 
In the case of dumping, domestic industrial producers were typically unable to 
increase production and could either decrease or cease to produce a particular kind of 
product. Conversely, the exporting producer might then choose to make more of a 
similar product, as it would expect this to sell better inside the importing country, or 
to continue to sell at the same level. However, domestic industrial producers might 
not be affected significantly, and in such cases, the effects then relate to the amount 
of dumping. The impact of dumping might not relate to industrial production at all, 
as stated in the dumping definition in article VI: “…or materially retards the 
establishment of a domestic industry…”.107 In fact, most cases against Saudi 
products did not mention retardation of the establishment of the domestic industry, 
and domestic companies continued to produce similar products without any 
problems. Therefore, it can be seen that Saudi petrochemicals companies continue to 
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produce the quantities expected in according to the following years’ financial 
reports.
108
    
3.5.2.5 Development and national plans 
There was a clear direct impact on the development of the domestic industry for the 
Saudi petrochemicals sector as well as on all the national strategy plans associated 
with industries of this kind, especially where a particular industry is important to the 
importing nation. A dumping action can retard future plans for both an industry and 
the country itself. However, AD duty has an effect on export industries as well as on 
national strategy plans.  
Regarding Saudi Arabian cases, AD cases would be expected to have a direct 
affect on company’s petrochemicals plans, and on their national plans, especially 
their strategic plans for 2020, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. The aim of the 
2020 plan is to increase production ability, which can be done by entering new 
international markets to sell these petrochemicals products. In this context, AD cases 
against these Saudi petrochemicals products are evidently likely to weaken 
producers’ ability to compete in international markets, hindering the plan. Therefore, 
the Saudi government has to consider AD cases as representing serious action 
against its petrochemicals products, with the ability to delay the planned national 
strategy. This explains why, the Saudi government, has appointed a new committee 
to deal with this problem and to find a solution to avoid delay to the national strategy 
plan for 2020.  
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3.5.2.6 Employment 
In the cases considered above, dumping by Saudi producers had not affected the 
employment processes undertaken within the petrochemicals industries of the 
importing countries or inside the Saudi petrochemicals sector. This is due to the very 
strict Labour laws inside Saudi Arabia that make it difficult to make employees 
redundant in any sector.
109
 Moreover, national statistics also show no notable loss of 
jobs in Saudi Arabia.
110
 However, AD duty was expected to affect the Saudi supply 
side, because producers chose not to hire additional employees in the absence of 
positive future expectations. The effects in this regard, however, are limited and not 
as easily identifiable or applicable to other areas. 
In addition, as mentioned above, the strategic plan for 2020 aims to generate 
more capacity to hire more employees in this sector in Saudi Arabia. However, if AD 
duty continues to affect Saudi petrochemicals product, it will affect expansion 
negatively. For that, the Saudi government has taken steps to end AD actions against 
Saudi petrochemicals products.  
3.5.2.7 National income 
There is an indirect effect from dumping cases on both exporting and importing 
countries, especially where the industries involved are important. Petrochemicals 
production is difficult to manage cost effectively, whether it is run by the private or 
public sector. Typically, dumping has an indirect effect on national income for both 
exporters and importers. Initially dumping could reduce sales quantities in the 
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importing country or threaten the development of the sector; this will in turn affect 
the taxes being collected, and thereby the national income.  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, national income might be affected by the 
application of duty, as petrochemicals are the second most important source of 
national revenue after sales of oil and gas. It is evident, therefore, that there will be 
an indirect impact from AD regulations on both the exporting and importing 
countries. However, this impact is hard to measure, as the major national revenue is 
from oil and gas. Nevertheless, the government should consider and study the impact 
of this if they want a better future for the Saudi petrochemicals sector.  
3.5.3 The political impact 
No particular AD case has been shown to have a direct or indirect impact on political 
relations between both exporting and importing countries. However, it is not 
impossible that such impact could arise; potentially leading to political conflict as 
stated by Reid M. Bolton: 
For example, when the United States recently announced that it was 
placing tariffs on Chinese automobile tires under the WTO’s safeguard 
provision (7), China announced only two days later that it would be 
initiating an AD investigation into whether exporters in the United States 
were dumping automobile and chicken products into China (8).
111
 
 
This statement shows the extent to which politics can affect AD cases between WTO 
contracting parties, raising political issues between the conflicting parties.  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the country’s media reported the AD case with 
India as a high profile disagreement; some newspapers even demanded the expulsion 
of Indian workers from Saudi Arabia as a way to defend Saudi petrochemicals. This 
case, therefore, had the potential to affect international relations between Saudi 
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Arabia and India. However, both parties agreed to initiate negotiations between 
themselves, pursuing diplomatic approaches to find a solution.  
The GATT refers to negotiation between countries or “contracting parties”, 
as an important tool that can have a considerable effect. It may result in parties being 
ordered to close a case without investigation or even after AD duty has been applied, 
as arose in these AD cases.
112
 Political pressure means direct political negotiation 
between governments to apply diplomatic methods to end the conflict or dispute. 
Some countries, e.g. Japan, prefer to negotiate by appointing a committee of experts 
with real authority and experience in finding a solution.  
However, such negotiation might not involve a government directly; it might 
involve representatives of the domestic industries themselves. This is generally 
easier than negotiating with a government, which may need to consider 
governmental policy and procedures, lengthening the time spent in negotiation. 
However, in some circumstances, it might be necessarily for a negotiation to be with 
the government itself, ultimately depending on the facts of the case and the political 
atmosphere.  
The negotiations between Saudi Arabia and EU, Turkey and India relative to 
AD investigations in recent AD cases against its petrochemical products resulted in 
the termination of all investigations and duties.
113
 This result was positive, and so 
negotiation was an important step preceding the investigation or trial phase. This 
step helped to limit the increasing numbers of AD cases among the WTO members, 
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and made it possible to find alternative solutions. This approach should be legalised 
under the GATT agreement. Political pressure will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter in relation to the AD investigation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported on the many AD cases raised against Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals products at the national level. Some of these cases were analysed to 
answer the second research question concerning the effect of these cases within 
Saudi Arabia. The responsibility for compatibility is on the domestic legal systems 
of those countries making allegations, which need to check the applicability of 
regulations. In this analysis, all the countries concerned observed the WTO 
agreement and its implementation in terms of AD regulations. However, in applying 
these regulations to facts, it was apparent that on some points the parties did not 
follow WTO provisions, giving more space to domestic producers inside the market 
ahead of the exporting producer. This action is referred to as new unfair competition, 
but falls within the law and the WTO umbrella. The problem lies not in the 
regulations, but in their application to the facts, as some contracting parties have 
sought to apply these regulations in a way that abuses the exporting producer. Thus, 
it is argued that contracting parties should reform AD and anti-subsidy regulations to 
avoid this kind of misuse.  
 In addition, it should be noted that cases against Saudi Arabian products are 
important as they often relate to the petrochemicals sector, which is one of the most 
significant industry sectors in Saudi Arabia after oil. Until recently, however, the 
WTO has not distinguished between a country like Saudi Arabia, which has 
considerable resources with regard to petrochemical elements and raw materials, and 
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other countries; this an important point to address. In general, the petrochemicals 
sector around the world has led to many cases of this kind, and alternative solutions 
to prosecution need to be found, to move the global economy forward. Therefore, in 
the chapters that follow some legal suggestions relating to this issue are proposed.  
This chapter has also considered the impact of AD allegations on countries. 
An AD action can have a direct effect on all parties, and can harm the economy of 
the conflicting parties. If such regulations are applied against an exporting country, 
this can affect the industries of that country, and also harm the importing county and 
its industries. As mentioned, AD cases could impede the free movement of goods 
and products between nations, resulting in a need for further reform to the 
regulations between contracting parties, or replacement with another set of 
regulations, as will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE WTO LAW 
ON AD AND ANTI-SUBSIDY MEASURES WITH PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE PETROCHEMICALS SECTOR 
4.1 Introduction   
This chapter examines some aspects of AD and anti-subsidy regulations,
1
 exploring 
methods available to resolve related legal matters. AD and anti-subsidy laws might 
require change or reform to address legal and practical considerations. This chapter 
answers the sixth research question: Is there an effective mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes on AD and anti-subsidy under the WTO? Both regulations 
have suffered reduced effectiveness because of the large number brought by new 
parties; “As hard as it is to believe, the sharp increase in new users may understate 
how concentrated the use of AD was until recently”.2 In addition, during the recent 
global economic crises, and since the beginning of 2008, there have been an 
increasing number of AD cases,
3
 partly linked to subsidies, offered as bailouts to the 
US and EU industry sectors during 2009.
4
 Recent legal challenges will help to 
elaborate on some legal points related to AD and anti-subsidy regulations, to 
increase compatibility with global economic and trade-related changes. However, 
more flexibility is required from all parties, to meet the target of developing AD and 
anti-subsidies under the WTO agreement: “As the Chair noted, a successful 
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conclusion to the negotiations will ‘require additional flexibility in Members’ 
positions’.”5  
It has been proposed that AD regulations might require complete replacement 
and integration into competition law,
6
 as will be discussed later in this chapter. This 
would be a more helpful and an appropriate solution to support the movement of 
goods and free trade around the world. Changes to competition law would offer 
greater coverage in all areas, including dumping, by reducing the high number of AD 
cases.
7
 Indeed, there is already an argument that AD and anti-subsidy policies are 
redundant, as competition law protects all parties in relation to the market 
mechanism. With regard to anti-subsidy, developing countries need to see benefits 
when subsidising industrial sectors, such as placing their products in a position to 
compete with those of developed countries. This will also have a positive impact on 
developed countries, as will be discussed in this chapter. All these elements will help 
to reduce and protect petrochemicals products from AD and anti-subsidy cases, 
which is an important aim of this thesis.  
This chapter also analyses some of the legal defects related to AD from a 
practical perspective (AD duty, the price of domestic similar products after AD 
measures). The legal guarantees to all parties in an AD investigation are also 
examined herein. These factors lead to a need to address the conditions of good faith 
under the WTO agreement, as an aspect of dispute resolution, and to avoid double 
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remedy. Finally, a solution for the petrochemicals sector, to avoid the high number 
of cases brought against them under the WTO, will be proposed. This will contain 
one proposal operating within the WTO framework and another beyond its scope.  
4.2 The measures that can be challenged under AD law 
This section will introduce and challenge legal and practical points raised under the 
AD law, with a view to resolving AD cases. This will help reduce AD cases in the 
future, particularly those brought against petrochemicals products, as is the stated 
aim of this thesis. At present, petrochemicals products account for the highest 
percentage of AD cases, when compared to other products,
8
 “Another interesting fact 
[…] is that a high percentage of AD actions affect the base metals (mainly iron and 
steel) and chemical sectors”.9  
This work aims to uncover how petrochemicals industries can best avoid 
cases, thereby resolving legal issues; also, whether resolution should be achieved at 
the domestic level or internationally. The AD process can restrict free trade between 
countries, and without reconsideration, this might become an obstacle. According to 
Thomas “Over the last 30 years, however, AD has emerged as the leading obstacle to 
implementation of the free and fair trading system established under the 
GATT/WTO”.10 In other words, AD law represents a serious problem hindering 
international free trade between countries. “Today AD is a bigger problem for 
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international trade than economically meaningful dumping…”.11 More negative 
interpretations of AD suggest that it might lead to a cold war between countries as 
stated by Thomas “… if AD rules are not formally reformed, there seem to be two 
possible scenarios: an “AD cold war” or an “AD epidemic””.12 Based on this, 
contracting parties must therefore take this matter seriously if they want to change or 
replace the regulation in the WTO agreement.  
Since AD regulations require some updating to suit changing circumstances, 
this research suggests two factors as a basis for a proposed change to the law: 
1. In the practical application of the laws, some legal defects have been found, 
which mean they cannot continue unchanged. Furthermore, there are some 
legal matters related to the formatting, legal processes or misunderstanding of 
these regulations, which have a prejudicial effect on the judicial process and 
decisions.  
2. The regulations have become outdated, as the world is changing rapidly and 
circumstances have changed also; thus, unless they are updated regularly 
these laws might not have a direct effect on the application of the law 
contributing to global developments.  
Before moving to the next section, it is worth exploring earlier suggestions related to 
the reform of AD regulations. One of the ideas suggested thus far is to export 
products without restriction, once countries have improved their economic welfare. 
Adam Smith initially proposed this, and later Ricardo observed, “countries will 
improve their economic welfare if they specialise in the production of those products 
in which they have a comparative advantage and are able to export their surplus 
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production without restriction”.13 Thus, competition is supported and overproduction 
is not a concern. However, this idea has two notable flaws: First, in reality it is not 
possible to develop domestic industries in all countries (especially in developing 
countries) that will function complementarily to meet global needs. Second, this 
approach would reduce competition between countries, potentially leading to 
monopolisation over a few products by a few countries. Several changes were placed 
in contention, for consideration by the Doha Development Round:  
…clarifying how domestic agencies notify the affected foreign firms and 
their affiliates for the purpose of quantifying total sales……removing 
discretion from domestic agencies when calculating the dumping 
margin……eliminating the practice of “zeroing”…….ending the use of 
third-country benchmarks to calculate the normal value, and restricting 
the opportunities for creating “constructed values” that have no 
benchmark in reality……the burden of proof that domestic firms must 
present to the investigating agency in order to open an investigation.
14
  
 
Moreover, alternative suggestions included implementing an anti-trust law 
(competition law) rather than an AD law, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
15
 
These suggestions could trigger changes to AD processes, ultimately reducing AD 
cases and resolving related issues. However, some WTO members have suggested an 
additional option to avoid AD measures, which would involve signing a mutual 
agreement that they would not bring AD actions
16
 when exporting products to each 
other; such an agreement is already in place between Chile and Canada.
17
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4.2.1 AD duty 
The most important legal matters relate to the AD duty itself. It is known that AD 
legal procedures cannot be initiated without a written allegation from the domestic 
industries regarding a threat or injury to similar products;
18
 moreover, there must be 
potential for 50% or more of the total amount of trade for a similar product inside the 
domestic market.
19
 These processes were referenced in cases between Saudi Arabia 
and other countries,
20
 as discussed in Chapter 3. Without the principle of injury or 
threat to domestic products, AD would not apply and AD duty would not be 
relevant.
21
 However, in reality, after all the legal conditions and legal processes have 
been observed in order to apply the AD duty, duty is usually paid directly to the 
governments of the importing countries
22
 whose industries have been injured or 
threatened. This means, the domestic industries themselves receive nothing from the 
duty, even though it is their companies and products that have been damaged by the 
importing and dumping of products. 
Arguably, while the government collects duty, which is classified in this 
research as equivalent to a tariff,
23
 the domestic industry that has been injured or 
threatened may frequently continue to face financial ruin. Thus, only governments 
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benefit directly from the application of the AD law. Moreover, governments also 
continue to accrue additional economic benefits from protecting the domestic 
products, as they receive taxes from these industries.  
An example of the above point is the case of Saudi Arabia and India,
24
 where 
the Indian Ministry of Finance was responsible for the imposition and collection of 
AD duty,
25
 which means that the duty went directly to the Indian government. In 
European Countries, the EU usually collects the duty and gives it to national customs 
authorities: “The duties are paid by the importer in the EU and collected by the 
national customs authorities of the EU countries concerned”.26 Thus, ultimately the 
government receives the duty, despite the case being predicated on injury or threat to 
the domestic sector. 
It is essential, if the AD law or similar domestic law is to be just, that injured 
industries receive compensation from the AD duty paid because of the AD conflict. 
However, such a provision is yet to be legalised under the AD Agreement and would 
need to be mentioned in decisions made in relation to AD allegations. However, 
compensation has to be a fixed percentage of the AD margin, and compensation 
must be limited, so as not to exceed a fixed percentage of the total dumping margin. 
In this way, domestic industry will receive fair compensation to cover the damage 
and injuries caused by the imported products. However, all these processes must be 
subject to a legal guarantee, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Some would argue that applying AD duty to similar exported products would 
provide a good opportunity for domestic producers to offset losses, reducing the 
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need for compensation. Theoretically, this might be correct; however, in practice, it 
would be impossible. The reasons for this are twofold: one is the competition inside 
the domestic market, and the second is variable consumption patterns. First, 
competition between the producers of similar products might already be very high, 
whether or not products were exported or manufactured for the domestic market. 
Therefore, AD duty on dumped exported products would not generate any beneficial 
effect in relation to those domestic industries injured by these products. 
Consequently, the producers of the domestic products would not receive any offset 
of their losses because of the AD action. This was not always the case; previously 
cases that ended with duties being imposed necessarily led to decreased imports. We 
also discovered that it is not a general rule that cases that end in favour of the 
importers led to increased imports.
27
 On the second point, the consumer might 
continue to buy imported similar products, even after AD duty has been applied, 
despite the price being higher. Once again, domestic industries would not then 
receive any reparation for their losses with regard to the action taken. The solution 
with regard to this point would be to reconsider the way that AD duty works, and 
replace it with compensation as part of the AD decision.  
Before considering the next legal point, a question arises regarding whether 
bestowing compensation would encourage producers of similar domestic products to 
bring actions, in order to receive compensation where possible. It might be possible; 
however, the process of applying compensation to AD decisions would lead to the 
reform of many legal barriers and complex conditions affecting domestic industry. 
This would be achieved through a process of legal guarantee in AD cases, under 
which competition policies would be discussed. This reform would help to reduce 
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the number of false AD claims, as the parties concerned would be subject to 
penalties when making false claims. Indeed: 
…the United States and the European Community may finally seek to 
reform AD because other countries have also realized how large a 
loophole it, how easy it is to use, and perhaps most important, how easy 
it is to misuse.
28
  
 
4.2.2 The rising price of domestic similar products 
The purpose of AD regulations is to ensure that competition between domestic and 
international in similar products is lawful and devoid of price discrimination.
29 
However, condemnation of AD might occur because those bringing actions may 
want to monopolise the market in the importing countries,
30
 which could affect the 
national economy. All AD that is condemned is criticised in relation to price; this is 
the most important concern of the AD process. AD processes have a direct effect on 
price especially chemicals products, “There is evidence for most of the chemicals 
that the AD cases did affect import volumes”31  
In AD cases, domestic industries might claim AD applies against exported 
similar products, as an excuse to raise the prices of similar domestic products, as the 
international product prices will be higher after AD duty is applied. This might serve 
domestic industries by allowing them to increase prices domestically. This means 
domestic industries would receive greater profits, and international similar products 
would be forced out, or offered at lower cost than domestic and other domestic 
similar products. However, the AD process may have a positive impact on domestic 
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and non-dumped products; “Furthermore, the dumping margin generally had a 
positive effect on non-dumped imports…”.32 
This generates unfair competition between domestic and international similar 
products but from a different perspective. The rising price of similar domestic 
products, after applying AD duty on international products was not been covered by 
the WTO AD Agreement.
33
 It suggests unfair competition between domestic 
industries, who have taken advantage by applying duty against exported products; 
thus, ultimately the AD legal system has not had an adequate effect on ensuring 
genuinely fair competition between all parties, after applying AD. Attention under 
AD regulations is directed toward protecting similar domestic products without 
extending that protection to international products.  
Moreover, there might be intent from similar domestic producers to 
monopolise the market. They may reach mutual agreements in order to show a closer 
lower price when compared to imported similar products, allowing them to prove the 
dumping action is due to the imported product. Such practices do not fall within the 
AD Agreement.  
Thus, when authorities apply AD duty to an imported similar product, they 
should also check prices regularly for all products, whether domestic or imported, in 
order to extend appropriate protection to all parties. The only follow up commonly 
undertaken is intended to protect domestic products.
34
 If there is any unrealistic rise 
in the prices of domestic industries, this should be halted by those departments 
responsible for controlling domestic prices. This controlling of market prices, when 
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collecting facts for all parties, before, after, and even during the process of the AD, 
would have considerable impact on capacity to maintain the stability of market 
processes. 
In addition, the producers of similar exported products should have the right 
to prove domestic producers of similar products have brought AD cases, allowing 
them to benefit by raising their prices in such instances.
35
 This would enable 
producers to remove some of the AD duties levied against their products, or at least 
help them to review the duties at an earlier stage.  
However, a price rise might also affect additional AD cases subsequently, in 
review. AD laws under the WTO agreement should include a cap on domestic 
industries’ prices after a pre-established period, to ensure there is no trickery 
involved in the movement of products within domestic industries. 
4.2.3 Legal guarantees  
One of the challenges and legal points raised in this chapter, regarding AD 
regulations, involves ensuring a full guarantee in all investigations, as well as 
implementation of legal processes to assist complainant parties at the national level. 
In fact, throughout the number of AD cases against Saudi Arabia outlined in Chapter 
3,
36
 a guarantee was not found to be sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of 
contracting parties in the case of conflicts relating to AD and legal anti-subsidy 
matters. 
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As seen in previous chapters, when Saudi Arabia faced AD cases from India, 
Turkey and the EU, the same AD authorities handled the investigations, and the 
primary and final decisions.
37
 Thus, the importing countries’ authorities might then 
take the opportunity to apply AD duty against imported products, ultimately for the 
benefit of the domestic industries of those countries. However, it is not sufficient to 
be fully neutral concerning AD processes, as local authorities benefit from imposing 
the AD duty. These authorities are supposed to act to limit harm to their country’s 
domestic industries from imported products. Thus, we might ask: how can the same 
department conduct an investigation and exercise judgment against these imported 
products? The problems arising from this can be summarised as follows:  
1. Those authorities who conduct AD investigations are the same ones who 
make decisions on these kinds of cases, and logically someone cannot be 
both officer and judge in the same case. 
2. As domestic industries and authorities have the same nationality and share 
the same interests, and moreover as the authority has the duty to protect 
domestic industries, it is likely to seek to force through an application of AD 
duty on imported products. It can be seen, that in some circumstances there is 
opportunity for abuse by those authorities applying the duty.  
Thus, if this is the situation, how can an investigation and decision in relation 
to AD be wholly neutral? It is crucial to answer this question here, as it will support 
the concept of a legal guarantee for all parties under AD regulations.  
The relevant AD authorities usually conduct investigations and follow up on 
the market in coordination with other government departments, with regard to AD 
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allegations. However, the authorities should ideally not be involved in decisions 
regarding AD. The duty of authorities’, as administrators, is clearly to organise AD 
procedures inside their own countries, but they should not act as a Juridical 
Authority, unless they are also able to act as prosecutors in cases handled by local 
courts. These authorities therefore must carry out their duties to ensure all matters 
related to AD processes are proceeding in a suitable direction. The authorities are in 
a position to conduct all the investigations between the parties to a conflict and can 
also prepare related documents, to enable the local trade court to make a decision. 
After this, the entire case must be transferred to the local trade court so that the judge 
can make an AD decision and determine whether to continue the AD process or 
otherwise. Using this method, will ensure the process goes forward with a full 
guarantee, protecting the neutrality of all parties.  
Examples of this can clearly be seen in all of the cases discussed in Chapter 
3; these were brought against Saudi petrochemicals products in India, Turkey and the 
EU.
38
 All cases were considered at every step by the AD authorities, who were 
ultimately responsible for imposing the AD duty. The authorities guided the entirety 
of the AD process, raising the issue of lack of neutrality, as they conducted the 
investigations, collected evidence, and finally pronounced judgment against Saudi 
products.  
It is suggested that the only way to ensure neutrality is to place the judgment 
in the hands of the domestic trade courts to avoid misunderstandings or confusion.
39
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Courts must offer a comprehensive guarantee of neutrality toward exported products, 
if regulations are to be applied satisfactorily. Therefore, the contracting parties must 
take the necessary steps to apply a legal guarantee in AD cases, to ensure fairness 
and neutrality at the national level in AD procedures. This will help to reduce the 
increasing number of AD allegations and promote greater stability in international 
trade, as mentioned previously. In addition to ensuring a better flow of movement 
between nations and avoiding complicated AD cases.  
4.2.4 AD regulation is old legislation 
The first AD law was issued in Canada in 1906,
40
 after which the great majority of 
nations adopted the law within their domestic legal systems, “Over the period 1980-
2003 the number of countries with an AD law went from 36 to 97”.41 Recently the 
majority of the WTO countries adopted AD regulations. “… nearly 100 WTO 
members adopted AD legislation”.42 In the case of powerful countries, this adoption 
has, pushed the founders of the GATT
43
 to adopt an International Trade Agreement 
as described in article VI, and other international trade agreements worldwide.
44
 
Finally, in article VI, the WTO established an implementation agreement to organise 
the mechanism for trade.  
It can be seen that the adoption of this law by contracting parties served a 
purpose; nonetheless, the increased movement of goods internationally, and the high 
level of technology around the world altered the circumstances affecting application 
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of the law considerably. In this research, therefore, AD regulations are considered as 
obstacles. Prusa stated, “Over the last 30 years, however, AD has emerged as the 
leading obstacle to the free and fair trading system established under the 
GATT/WTO”.45 Thus, the AD Agreement needs to be reconsidered regarding the 
significant number of cases. Wei stated, “since the beginning of global crisis in 2008, 
there has been a sharp increase”.46 Accordingly, there is no longer a need for 
contracting parties continuing to refer to article VI and its implementation.
47
 Three 
points can be made to stress why the legislation should be regarded as obstructive: 
1. Throughout this research, it has been found that AD legislation might 
become an obstacle to obtain the target of the international trade agreement. 
The frequent bringing of AD allegations, whether by old or new users,
48
 
could represent a misuse, and is not intentional, as these regulations were 
issued to support trade between nations. Thus, AD laws in practice may be an 
obstacle to free trade movement between nations, thus, it is better to find 
another legal solution to resolve this matter.  
2. Based on the frequent use of the regulation by new users, it can be seen that it 
is being used to benefit domestic industries, and to prevent the sale of 
imported products inside the domestic market. This is advantageous as it 
offers more trade opportunities for domestic producers, as well as increasing 
                                                 
45
 Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: a growing problem in international trade, (Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2005) 683. 
46
 Dan Wei, ‘Antidumping in Emerging Countries in the post-crisis Era: A case Study on Brazil and 
China’, 2013, Journal of International Economic Law, 921, 927. 
47
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
48
 There are two groups of Anti-dumping Users: traditional and new Users. Before the 1980s, the 
traditional users were Australia, Canada, EU and USA. However, since then, they have been joined by 
other countries, classified as “new users”, like Brazil, China, India and Mexico.  
Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade, (Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2005) 
126 
 
prices in response to the application of AD duty on exported products, 
especially in view of the world economic crises. 
3. It is necessary to provide legislation to cover all aspects of the trade between 
nations, as will be seen in this section.  
It is time to introduce updated rules to cover all economic and legal aspects 
relating to the export of products to the world market. The contracting parties must 
consider introducing competition law to cover all areas of trade within the 
international markets. Competition would give the authorities significant powers to 
resolve AD complaints.
49
 Bergh,  D. Camesasca consider “...four objectives of 
competition policy first to achieve favourable economic results; second, to create and 
maintain competitive processes; third, to prescribe norms of fair conduct; and fourth, 
to restrict the growth of large firms....”50 So that the broad objective of competition 
policy is to make markets work better. ‘Working better’ involves two important 
subsidiary objectives: efficiency and fairness.  
In particular “...competition law is now applied to many economic activities...”.51 
Thus, a competition law could be a global solution. In addition, they explain: “The 
global reach of competition laws is reflected in the creation of the international 
Competition Network”;52 “... the benefits of competition are lower prices, better 
products, wider choice and greater efficiency...”.53 Consequently, a competition law 
would offer numerous benefits direct to industry and consumers, such as lower 
prices and better quality products for all parties.  
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Dumping is typically condemned as unfair competition, when offered against 
other products in the market. It mostly relates to the price of a product, which is a 
chief component of the AD Agreement. AD regulations are generally used to 
examine the dumping circumstances related to the pricing of similar products, as 
well as the causal link. However, when establishing a competition law, all aspects of 
price and surrounding circumstances should be accounted for, and any new law 
should be broader in range than the AD law. For example, the price under 
competition law is the market price “The theoretical model just outlined suggests 
that in perfect competition any producer will be able to sell his products only at the 
market price”.54  
Arguably, any AD law is a form of price discrimination, aiming to support 
competition between all producers in the market, whether domestic or international. 
This view does not consider consumers, although they crucial to any market. 
The ‘unfairness’ to which AD law is directed [prices that are too low] is 
generally seen in antitrust law as evidence of the proper working of the 
competitive process, and as a phenomenon beneficial to the consumers 
whom antitrust law fundamentally protects.
55
 
 
Consequently, AD regulations do not extend protection to customers. This is because 
AD law encompasses limited procedures by which to defend competition inside a 
particular market. Ehrenhaft argues “The AD law, while condemning injurious 
international price discrimination does not provide a formal meeting competition 
defence”.56 Thus, it can be deemed a weak point of the AD regulation. By contrast, 
competition law functions differently as illustrated elsewhere by Ehrenhaft “The 
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goals of competition laws in other countries tend to be less inconsistent with the 
objectives of AD enforcement. Concepts of ‘fairness’ and protection of competitors 
play a role in the competition polices…”.57 The mechanism of competition law 
ultimately aims to deliver authentic competition between producers to the benefit of 
the consumer. “It is of course correct in principle that competition law should be 
regarded as having a ‘consumer protection’ function…”.58 In addition, this benefit 
also considers competitors. Therefore, Whish and Balley ensure that “competition 
law should be concerned with competitors as well as the process of competition”.59  
Moreover, when applying an AD regulation, it is generally necessary to 
present information related to imported products, such as the normal price in the 
exporting country. This price is tied to the internal economic system of the exporting 
country, and there is no such relationship between it and the sale price in the 
importing country. The economic tools and atmosphere differ entirely from one 
country to another. Moreover, AD measures can be considered as interference in 
other countries’ policies. In contrast, competition law usually deals with polices 
associated with competition in markets, in order to fulfil the requirements of 
competition between products and goods, without the need to seek information from 
other countries. AD regulations have proven unsuitable, therefore, there is a need for 
other regulations to protect all parties in the trade treatment: “Given both the large 
number of AD users and also the huge impact AD duties have on trade, AD will 
surely a top issue for the next WTO round”.60  
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There are arguments against substituting AD law with a competition law; as 
while the first protects domestic producers as a priority, the second protects domestic 
consumers: “As currently implemented AD law is designed to protect domestic 
producers while competition law is aimed at protecting domestic consumers”.61 
However, competition law governs relationships between sellers and buyers, 
clarifying the competitive set up for all parties, whether domestic producers or 
exporters producers. Thus, it is argued that advantages and protection are afforded to 
all parties under competition law.  
4.3 Changes in the perception of anti-subsidy measures  
Subsidies are defined in Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures as “…a financial contribution by government…”.62 This financial 
contribution extends to domestic enterprise or industries, assisting them in 
developing and supporting competition with other similar products. Not only is 
financial support offered, there may also be a case for price support,
63
 especially in 
sectors, demanding greater stability through the pricing of products. All subsidies are 
prohibited under the WTO, and there are a number of processes for investigating 
cases of subsidies, similar to AD cases. However, there is no minimal distinction 
between dumping and subsidies, as both directly affect price and are strongly 
correlated. 
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This section considers and discusses two points concerning anti-subsidy 
regulations. The first point relates to developing countries, and the second concerns 
financial support and the agreement given for many sectors, in response to the 
economic crises in the USA and EU.
64
 Developing countries have found the anti-
subsidy regulation to be contrary to their interests. Following implementation of 
Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
65
, these 
countries were given a timeframe in which to stop supporting their domestic 
industries and enterprises. However, most of these countries are still developing, and 
require more time to establish their domestic sectors. Developed countries have spent 
decades supporting their sectors and industries, in order for them to become mature 
and able to compete in the international market. Thus, the law supports developed 
countries by allowing them to monopolise the international market, as developing 
countries’ products are generally unable to compete with the former. Moreover, 
powerful countries are aiming to avoid supporting developing countries in order to 
offer authentically competitive products to the international market: 
On the one hand, the United States and the European Community preach 
that reducing government interference and accosting free markets will 
maximize growth and welfare. On the other hand, it often seems that just 
when developing countries begin to efficiently operate and became 
competitive in particular markets, industrialized countries shut down 
those precise markets with a trade policy that is universally decried by 
economists.
66
  
 
It appears unfair that developing countries are not afforded the opportunity to take 
the time to develop their sectors and industries. Therefore, the contracting parties 
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need to reconsider article 27, in order to allow developing countries an equal 
opportunity to that enjoyed by developed countries in relation to their products. 
Evidently, developed countries are exerting their authority and control over the 
international market, as they have had the opportunity to develop their products for a 
lengthy period without facing genuine international competition. This means 
developing countries are unable to compete fully, which has a negative impact on 
them, leaving them unable to develop their products to the same extent. However, 
developed countries do not want to extend opportunities to developing countries to 
develop their sectors and the current AD law is evidence of this:  
The new reality depicted in Table 3 must be troubling for AD's two 
strongest supporters: the United States and the EU. They would like to 
retain AD so that they can protect their politically important industries. 
Yet, preserving this option means that many politically important export-
oriented industries now face AD protection in many important export 
markets.
67
  
 
It is known that developed countries pressurise developing countries, and fail to 
extend opportunities to them in the international market. This is apparent from the 
increasing number of AD cases brought by developing countries, who are seeking 
legal protection from developed countries, in order to gain the time to develop their 
sectors and industries.  
However, the situation is complex; developing countries are aware there are 
many benefits to derive from inviting developed industries to locate their premises 
within their borders. This process can help developing countries to improve their 
economies and industries, and in turn reduces illegal immigration; as the developing 
countries stabilise, the drive to emigrate is reduced. Thus supporting development 
will solve problems of illegal immigration as well as reduce unemployment. In 
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addition, developed countries will then be in a position to gather more taxes, as sales 
prices will increase once the developing countries products are better able to 
compete in the developed countries’ markets. Moreover, this trend will lead to a 
reduction in the need to send aid to developing countries.  
 With regard to the second point, when the world was facing an economic 
crisis, the G20
68
 made many decisions intended to help the economy to recover, 
including pumping money into the affected sectors to increase liquidity.
69
 An 
example of this is the considerable financial aid delivered, in the form of 10 Billion 
Euros, from the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
support Cyprus.
70
 This appears to breach prohibition subsidies, as the governments 
of these countries were subsidising various sectors such as industry and banking. 
This clearly demonstrates how the most powerful countries were happy to make laws 
serving their interests, although they do not extend a similar consideration to 
developing countries. Indeed, 
It has been long argued that the international system was set up in a way 
that favours its most powerful members, and that these advanced 
industrial countries have shaped globalization to further their own 
interests rather that creating a fair set of rules, let alone rules that 
promote the well-being of those in the poorest countries.
71
 
 
Thus, the anti-subsidy regulations under the WTO agreement need to be 
reconsidered to deliver more time to developing countries to develop and improve 
their sectors. In the longer term, this will benefit all nations, whether developed or 
developing, as it will help to establish a new international trade map between 
nations.  
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4.4 Good faith 
It was mentioned in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaty that any 
agreement must be established in good faith, “Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”.72 Good faith itself is 
an important concept when seeking to resolve disputes between contracting parties. 
The WTO encompasses fairness between contracting parties in trade; yet, some 
parties prefer other approaches. According to Doreen “….Countries would choose to 
cheat on the international agreement and impose AD duties on what seem to be 
legitimate imports”.73 Apparently, each contracting party must act in good faith in all 
its trade dealings in relation to either domestic or exported products. Bossche and 
Zdouc proved that “…the obligation on Members to use WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings in good faith…”.74 Good faith demands honesty in the treatment of all 
parties. Andrew explains “…The ordinary meaning of good faith is ‘honesty of 
purpose or sincerity of declaration’ or ‘expectation of such qualities in others’…”.75 
It seems that establishing good faith is a legal moral obligation for all contracting 
parties to an agreement, associated members and the international trade community. 
This obligation is stated in Article X of the GATT “…..Each contracting party shall 
administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings”.76 Each of the contracting parties must abide by the WTO 
agreement, as it is a legal obligation, and should be applied to Dispute Settlement 
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Understanding (DSU):
77
 Mitchell observes, “Procedural good faith must be 
integrated further into the DSU to ensure that claims are disputed appropriately and 
that the WTO respects the constructed boundaries of regulatory autonomy”.78 A case 
where this was contravened is described in the following example: 
In US-FSC (2000), the appellate Body found that the United States had 
failed to act in good faith, by failing to bring procedural deficiencies 
‘seasonably and promptly’ to the attention of the complainant and the 
panel, so that corrections, if needed, could have been made. In Argentina 
– Poultry AD Duties (2003), Argentina argued that Brazil failed to act in 
good faith by first challenging Argentina’s AD measure before a 
MERCOSUR Ad Hoc Tribunal and then, having lost that case, 
challenging the same measure in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
79
 
 
By acting in good faith, AD and anti-subsidy cases between contracting parties 
globally will be limited, which will reflect a dispute resolution in itself. Good faith is 
not fulfilled without three elements as stated by Mitchell “…general elements of 
‘honesty, fairness and reasonableness…”.80 However, through the previous 
settlement and analysis of the AD cases against Saudi Arabia from India, Turkey and 
the EU,
81
 good faith can be found to have three principles: Neutrality, Compatibility 
and Transparency.  
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4.4.1 Principle of neutrality  
All dealings between contracting parties should be subject to full neutrality. Every 
investigative step in any dispute has to proceed neutrally from the perspective of the 
investigating party. In order to emphasise this point, the investigator should play a 
role as defender of the economic system and treat exported products in accordance 
with this principle. Furthermore, a general principle of international law is “…to 
carry out treaty obligations in good faith (i.e. based on Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law Treaties)…”.82 Part of this principle, was extended as 
mentioned above in relation to cases against Saudi petrochemicals products in India, 
Turkey and the EU. In addition, the principle also applies to products exported to the 
domestic market, among other areas. However, arguably, the investigative 
authorities for contracting parties have thus far failed to follow and fulfil this 
principle, as no such legal guarantee of neutrality has been applied in AD cases. 
Rather good faith principles are followed in international trade dealings between 
contracting parties.  
4.4.2 Principle of compatibility 
The principle of compatibility is crucial, as all contracting parties must abide by it to 
become members of the WTO. This principle applies, as states guarantee conformity 
to the WTO agreement in all domestic regulations and legal processes: “Distinct 
from international principle, domestic laws also reflect good faith tenets, and good 
faith is a recognised legal notion reflected in almost all jurisdictions”.83 Domestic 
regulations have to be applicable to international trading standards, and this is 
                                                 
82
Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Arwel Davies, World Trade Law Text, Materials and 
Commentary, (2nd edition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 526. 
83
 Andrew Adelman, ‘Procedural good faith obligations in WTO disputes resolution: arguing for 
stronger protections in DSU article 3.7’, 2013, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 541, 543. 
136 
 
achievable through a clear understanding of this agreement and its correct 
interpretation. Chang-Fa lo observes, “…it would be a reasonable interpretation that 
these three elements (i.e. ordinary meaning if the text, the context, and the object and 
purpose) should all be subject to the good faith principle”.84 Thus, the interpretation 
has to be according to the ordinary meaning of the WTO agreement. In addition, he 
stressed, “…the terms of a treaty are to be given with the ordinary meaning. Also the 
context and the object and purpose of the treaty are elements to be based for the 
interpretation of treaty terms”.85 However, the WTO has the authority to order a 
contracting party to amend its domestic laws in order to match the recommended 
principle; as in cases between the US and Japan (see Chapter 6).
86
 States must 
review the laws related to international trade regularly, as well as reviewing the 
investigation processes. In addition, this principle must apply to the domestic judicial 
and taxation system, as well as the administration process.  
Compatibility was discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to cases against Saudi 
petrochemicals products, which showed some Saudi regulations as incompatible with 
the processes of the WTO, and in need of reform by the Saudi government. In the AD 
case brought by Turkey against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products, a concern 
was the lack of authentic competition between Saudi Arabian petrochemicals 
products inside the Saudi market:  
...[was] based on costs and export price. However, in these countries, 
which [provide] the basic raw materials used in the production of MEG, 
“Ethane” is only produced by state-owned companies and the price of the 
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supply/demand conditions are identified and announced by the 
authorities.
87
 
 
This example reveals the importance of insuring legal compatibility between Saudi 
domestic laws on this particular point; the enforcement of the WTO agreement can 
help to reduce the number of AD cases being considered, acting as a form of dispute 
resolution in itself.  
4.4.3 Principle of transparency 
The way forward for any state in today’s world is to be transparent in its dealings, 
especially in reference to international trade and the exchange of goods. One way to 
apply this principle is through the publication of all data related to trade. Authorities’ 
decisions and investigative processes must also be transparent. Before any 
international company invests anywhere in the world, it must first study the laws and 
regulations of the country that it wishes to invest in. Thus, in the absence of 
publications concerning legislation and the implementation of proper related legal 
processes, companies might face issues limiting investment. In this research, the 
issue faced was the need to collect all necessary details with regard to cases against 
Saudi Arabia, considered as resulting from misunderstandings relative to WTO 
provisions. In addition, Saudi Arabia was not sufficiently transparent about the AD 
cases brought against its petrochemicals products by India, Turkey and EU, as non-
confidential information about these cases is not publicly available. As mentioned 
previously, it has been difficult to obtain information from sources in Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, without these three principles, it would not be possible to apply good 
faith, which may breach WTO provisions. The contracting parties must therefore 
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fully abide by these principles to attain their overall aim of the smooth movement of 
goods and products without legal issues arising.  
4.5 Double remedies  
‘Double remedies’ refer to the situation that arises when two legal provisions apply 
to the same situation. Thus, as mentioned under the GATT, article VI (5), it is 
prohibited to apply AD and countervailing duties together to compensate for 
dumping or export subsidies.
88
 However, as mentioned previously, the link between 
dumping and subsidising products is not sufficiently clear. It may be difficult to 
distinguish between the two, as dumping can be a consequence of product subsidies; 
in other words, it might be the reason why a product has a low price. Dumping 
relates to the pricing practices of the private sector, whereas subsidy relates to 
financial support and other types of support from the government.
89
 The subsidising 
of products has had a considerable effect on dumping, and affects pricing directly, 
causing prices to drop, and finally leading to goods being dumped on the 
international market: As reported by Lester, Mercurio and Davies,  
In this situation, it has been argued, a remedy against the export 
subsidies would also address any resultant dumping, as both arise from 
the same source. Thus, concurrent remedies against both the dumping 
and the subsidies would constitute a ‘double remedy’.90  
 
However, it is not easy to separate the subsidising of exported products and domestic 
subsidies of the same product: “In reality, the divide between export subsidies and 
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domestic subsidies may not be as clear as suggested by article VI: 5”.91 Typically, 
the impact directly relates to the dumping calculation, and the dumping margin is 
then affected by prices.  
The case that best reflects this, is that brought by Turkey against Saudi 
petrochemicals products,
92
 which was analysed in Chapter 3. It was explained that 
Saudi Arabia has a state-owned company that produces the raw materials for the 
petrochemicals industry, with the result that the fixed price does not reflect the 
market price. Therefore, the subsidy was being used by the Saudi government and as 
such was reflected directly in the dumping investigation; thus, the Turkish AD 
authority could not delineate clearly between export subsidies and domestic 
subsidies. However, this affected the AD margin, as the calculation of the margin 
included the low price and was affected by subsidies. There was no double remedy 
in this case, as the issue of not drawing a clear line between subsidies and dumping 
is a common one, which needs to be reconsidered by contracting parties. 
4.6 Petrochemicals treaty under the WTO agreement  
In this section, a new option will be presented, suggesting the application of a new 
global treaty to protect petrochemicals products under the WTO agreement. This 
would make petrochemical product exchanges between contracting parties easier and 
smoother, without any obstacles affecting the agreement, as these products will be 
the ones most affected by AD provisions; as illustrated by Doreen “a high percentage 
of AD actions affect the base metals (mainly iron and steel) and chemical sectors”.93 
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This option would also establish a new agreement, and a method for petrochemicals 
export and production, without any of the attendant fears associated with AD cases. 
There is a precedent, as within the WTO, contracting parties have already agreed to 
extend special treatment to agriculture, in order not to provoke legal disputes, as 
these products relate directly to human lives. In contrast, petrochemicals products 
face the highest proportion of AD cases, and without new methods for resolving 
these, the number is likely to increase, becoming an obstacle to offering these 
products. The percentage of AD cases brought against petrochemicals products is 
20.16%, and these account for 21.35% of total AD initiations and measures in the 
world.
94
  
There is an option, for the WTO to extend special treatment to 
petrochemicals products, based on the treatment of agriculture. Much like 
agriculture, the petrochemicals sector is important to people’s lives; without 
petrochemicals products, the manufacture of thousands of other industrial products 
would be impossible. Despite this, to date oil has remained outside the purview of 
the GATT agreement. Hussein states: 
Oil was not explicitly excluded from the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) 1947, but the principal trading parties to GATT, 
mainly OECD members, treated oil as if it was. Their main goal was to 
keep this precious source of energy flowing to feed their energy-hungry 
economies after World War II and avoid problems that might cause 
unnecessary oil supply disruptions.
95
  
 
As petrochemicals are derivatives of oil, they should arguably be given the same 
priority as oil. The lack of action on this to date has resulted in an impact on 
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upstream and downstream prices for oil products, because of AD measures: Krupp 
and Skeath explain, 
… There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the downstream users of 
products that are the subject of AD duties are harmed by higher prices, a 
less competitive upstream market, and, in some cases, by supply 
shortages of the imports affected by the investigation itself and by the 
AD duties.
96
  
 
There is a negative impact on downstream industries, caused by AD measures as 
reported here: 
Finally, our downstream analysis provides some evidence for the 
hypothesis that negative consequences of upstream AD actions might be 
felt downstream. We find that the final dumping margins have significant 
negative effects on the quantity of downstream production.
97
 
 
Approximately ten years ago, the Saudi Royal Prince, Talaal Bin Abdul-Aziz,
98
 gave 
a seminar in the College of Business Administration at Kuwait University on ‘The 
Effect of the WTO on the Arabian and GCC countries’. At the seminar, he spoke of 
the importance of petrochemicals products, citing two reasons: 1) petrochemicals 
products area an important element within the global market; and 2) there will be an 
increase in AD cases in such products.
99
 However, he continued by speaking about 
the negative effect of the WTO on the GCC petrochemicals industries, pointing out 
that these industries and their products face the weapon of AD when they are 
exported abroad.
100
 He then proposed to protect these industries from AD action 
through the coordinated efforts of the GCC countries in negotiations, to assist 
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dispute resolutions under the WTO.
101
 This statement by the Saudi Royal Prince 
emphasises the importance of these products to the GCC exporting countries, and the 
rest of the world (for the reasons given above). However, although a body 
establishing coordination between the GCC countries has been established, it 
remains weak, and so greater coordination globally would establish a clearer 
agreement between the contracting parties that would provide greater freedom of 
movement for these types of products, without raising legal issues.  
Therefore, contracting parties could consider drawing up an agreement to 
protect products. The reasons for providing the agreement at this point in time are as 
follows:  
1. There are many legal barriers to these products, as the worldwide market is 
highly competitive. To emphasise this point once more, a fifth of AD cases 
affect petrochemicals products, as do the majority of anti-subsidy cases. 
Eventually, this could become an obstacle to the distribution of such 
products, and so more negotiations between contracting parties are essential 
to insure the smoother and easier exchange of such products.  
2. As mentioned previously, petrochemicals products are a basic element for 
most industrial products. Without such elements, these industries might not 
be able to manufacture their products, which will then affect national 
economies and consumers.  
3.  The petrochemical industries are not easy to establish or run, and some of 
these industries are facing financial problems. In addition, business people 
typically try to avoid investing in this sector, especially in Saudi Arabia; 
                                                 
101
 HRH Prince Talaal, available at <http://www.princetalal.net/new/subpart.php?partid=64> accessed 
1 June 2014. (Researcher’s Translation). 
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preferring lower risk and lower cost investments, because the costs in this 
sector are very high and require a long-term investment.  
4. In the WTO agreement, there was a reference to the “Agreement on 
Agriculture”.102 This would also support inclusion of a similar agreement on 
a “Basic Petrochemical Element”; thereby, an important sector would be 
supported and its continuation guaranteed.  
It is therefore important for contracting parties to consider an agreement, to avoid 
legal cases relating to petrochemicals products. As mentioned above, this solution 
would avoid around a fifth of AD cases,
103
 and would help the world economy to 
recover from the crises referred to earlier, by increasing industrial production at 
lower costs. Furthermore, it would enable new industries to become established 
around the world, which would mean a global revolution for those products. 
In any petrochemicals agreement made under the WTO, the contracting 
parties would need to be discussing many issues. There are three main elements to 
address: (1) Developing countries and the establishment of their petrochemicals 
industries, and their classification of developing countries according to their 
economic figures. Some of the poorer developing countries require more subsidising 
to establish and improve their petrochemicals’ sectors. (2) The treatment of countries 
with huge oil and gas reserves, where the raw materials are very cheap. (3) The 
treatment of developed countries, which have a high level of technology within the 
petrochemicals sector. Clarification of the relationship between would be of benefit 
                                                 
102
 This agreement is part of the WTO, which includes 21 Articles with many Annexes. The 
agreement affords agriculture special treatment in the international trade market, with special rules for 
subsidising in this sector and for exporting policies. For more information about this agreement, see 
Legal Texts, the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
103
 As the anti-dumping initiations and measures against the petrochemicals products are around 20% 
to 22% of the anti-dumping cases. See the Anti-dumping Initiations and measures by the sector, 
World Trade Organisation, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2014. 
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to all contracting parties. There should also be conditions under which the powerful 
countries can offer help and support to the poorest developing countries. 
Additionally, those countries with large oil and gas reserves should be treated 
differently to the benefit of all parties.  
Any agreement based on this model, should also cover the elements that the 
contracting parties might wish to discuss and agree to; so that it would be in 
accordance with the general terms of the WTO agreement. Any suggested agreement 
must not adversely affect the competition between contracting parties with regard to 
these products; a balance must be attained between the three elements outlined and 
competition law. This would then assist in the further development of this sector and 
its products, as contracting parties would then be able to eliminate AD cases and the 
attendant obstacles they bring.  
4.7. Alternative solutions for the petrochemicals sector beyond the 
WTO framework 
As mentioned above, and throughout this research, petrochemicals products are 
deemed important elements for industry in general. These products are components 
in thousands of other products worldwide. Thus, it is essential to protect them from 
AD and anti-subsidy actions and from interference by governments or other 
organisations. Therefore, if contracting parties cannot agree on a new framework 
with which to treat the petrochemicals sector under the WTO, the establishment of 
an International Petrochemicals Organisation (IPO) is recommended.  
To date, oil producers have already established their own international 
organisation (OPEC) to protect products, by maintaining production at a fixed level, 
and to enable prices to also be maintained; thereby assisting both producers and 
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consumers. The same proposition could be applied to petrochemicals products (listed 
below are suggested action points and associated benefits), as follows:  
1. Where possible, any legal matters, interference from any parties, or any threat 
to these industries should be avoided, to maintain production at a level that is 
acceptable to producers and consumers.  
2.  The role of producers around the world should be co-ordinated in reference 
to quantities and prices, to avoid conflict between them, and guarantee 
coordination with consumers.  
3. These industries should be developed by exchanging experiences between all 
parties and by supporting all research into these products.  
4. Prices should be linked to an international indicator and currency, as is the 
case with oil, to avoid price differentials and governmental financial support, 
so that the price will be the same globally regardless of subsidy.  
This international organisation would have a direct effect on industry and consumers, 
as it would be reflected in all other industries associated with or reliant on 
petrochemicals products. It would also offer processes to help the global economy 
improve after an economic crisis.  
To achieve this, the GCC has established the Gulf Petrochemicals and 
Chemicals Association, which is similar to other international associations.
104
 At 
present, these petrochemicals associations are unable to influence and sustain 
national industries against AD allegations. Non-profit organisations offer examples 
of international organisations with the potential to be established worldwide with 
                                                 
104
 There are many other many national and regional petrochemical associations, which are usually 
run by the industries in this sector. For example, the American Fuel and Petrochemicals 
Manufacturers, available at <www.afpm.org>, the European Petrochemicals Association, available at 
<www.epca.eu>, the Association of Petrochemicals Products in Europe, available at 
<www.petochmistry.net>, the Japan Petrochemicals Association, available at <www.jpca.or.jp>, and 
the Malaysian Petrochemicals Association, available at <www.mpa.org.my>.  
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governmental support, and which would have a direct effect on this sector. Any new 
organisation pertaining to petrochemicals products would reflect positively on 
thousands of products worldwide. It would also eradicate 20% of AD cases and 
allow the petrochemicals industries to strive to improve their products, rather than 
focusing on AD cases.  
At the first meeting of the Developing Eight (D-8)
105
 in Iran in October 2013, 
the eight countries involved agreed to establish an international organisation for 
petrochemicals producers, similar to OPEC. The organisation would need to protect 
industry around the world and ensure greater improvement and development without 
prompting legal action. Egypt and Turkey agreed to the establishment of the D-8, 
and both are members of it.
106
 The D-8 invited Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join in 
order to protect their petrochemicals industry in the international market.
107
 
However, a Saudi official
108
 working in this sector commented that a more common 
procedure now is to have petrochemicals unions, rather than international 
organisations. Nonetheless, an international organisation of this type would seem to 
be beneficial.
109
  
Any international petrochemicals organisation proposed in this research 
should cooperate and coordinate directly with the WTO and OPEC, as well as 
benefitting the petrochemical industries and their products. Cooperation between 
these organisations would mean greater investment in the sector without any of the 
                                                 
105
 The D-8 consists of eight developing countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, available at <http://www.developing8.org/Default.aspx> accessed 1 
June 2014. 
106
 Almasralyoum Newspaper, available at <http://www.almasralyoum.com/node/1757576> accessed 
1 June 2014. 
107
 Alriyadh Newspaper, available at <http://www.alriyadh.com/2010/08/03/article548933.html> 
accessed 1 June 2014. 
108
 Eng. Mohammed Al-Mady, who is the CEO of SABIC and Chairman of the Gulf Petrochemicals 
and Chemicals Association. 
109
 Almasralyoum Newspaper, available at <http://www.almasralyoum.com/node/1757576> accessed 
1 June 2014. 
147 
 
attendant legal issues that affect AD or anti-subsidy. Moreover, WTO legislation 
would be affected by this new organisation, as some of its laws would need to be 
changed if it were to become compatible with the views of the organisation; this 
would in turn have a positive impact on other industries.  
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced many ideas with regard to dispute resolution, in 
particular describing policies intended to protect petrochemicals products from AD 
and anti-subsidy provisions. The contracting parties, in view of the high number of 
AD cases in recent years targeted against petrochemicals products, should reconsider 
the legal provisions under the WTO. Currently, the AD legal system is a set of 
outmoded regulations. AD and anti-subsidy regulations should address the idea of 
“fair competition”, in order to be applicable in the economic legal system, but 
generally fail to do so.  
All previous legal points and suggestions raised could be addressed in a 
second generation WTO agreement, regarding international trade between nations. A 
new round would be required to support discussion between contracting parties. 
Ideally this round could take place in Saudi Arabia and be called the “Riyadh 
Round”. With regard to anti-subsidy regulations, these should be studied by the 
contracting parties; especially in reference to the financial support extended to the 
more powerful countries, in order to support the economic systems in the US and 
EU. This type of financial support is illegal, as established by the WTO agreement. 
Although, recommendations proposed here are that additional time be given to 
developing countries before ending the subsidising of sectors, to support their 
growth. This is essential, as some of these countries have already stopped producing 
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certain products, because they were unable to compete in the international market; 
this will ultimately have a negative effect on developed countries too. 
Any redeveloped standard would be intended to provide additional help to 
reduce disputes affecting petrochemicals products, and regarding AD and anti-
subsidy laws. The mechanism of good faith could resolve legal issues under the 
WTO agreement, and this would make the implementation of WTO requirements 
smoother and easier. The legal points rose in this chapter regarding AD and anti-
subsidy regulations would have an important effect on interpreting WTO provisions 
correctly, and would not allow for any kind of misuse or misunderstanding.  
The challenging AD duty would result in a greater organising of this duty and 
better use of the provision. As mentioned above, at present this duty usually benefits 
governments, while the companies injured by the illegal action receive no benefit. 
With regard to good faith, the implementing of the three principles (neutrality, 
compatibility and transparency) would help to reduce the number of AD cases raised 
against the petrochemicals sector. A realistic change would mean altering AD 
provisions to form a Competition Law that would be broader in scope, and provide 
umbrella protection to oppose unfair treatment during trade between nations, rather 
than using a separate agreement for each aspect of international trade.  
The final important discussion point in this chapter related to the protection 
of petrochemicals products. Contracting parties should consider making an 
agreement between under the WTO in order to protect these products, to limit AD 
cases. Such an agreement would facilitate dealings concerning these products, 
freeing them from legal disputes between contracting parties. In addition, the 
establishment of an International Petrochemical Organisation (IPO) could result in 
greater coordination and cooperation between contracting parties with regard to these 
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products, thereby benefitting all contracting parties and their economies, and helping 
them to overcome the recent global economic crisis. 
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CHAPTER 5: MEASURES SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD 
IMPLEMENT IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE IMPOSITION OF 
AD DUTY ON ITS PETROCHEMICALS PRODUCTS 
5.1 Introduction  
 This chapter will address the measures that Saudi Arabia should implement 
to prevent having to pay AD duty abroad in future. When analysing AD cases 
against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products,
1
 it is apparent that some of the legal 
points mentioned require a solution to avoid being subject to condemnation. AD 
cases may have the negative effect of reducing the quantity of exported 
petrochemicals products, as well as reducing the steps toward developing and 
improving the sector.  
In addition, many legal issues within the Saudi Arabian domestic legal 
system need to be addressed, as they are directly implicated in AD cases against its 
petrochemicals products. This research argues that in order to resolve the increase in 
the number of AD cases abroad levied against Saudi petrochemicals products; some 
internal legal economic policies in Saudi Arabia must be amended. Discovering the 
reasons and scope of these internal legal matters will enable products to be exported 
abroad without becoming subject to AD cases; this will support a smooth and well-
controlled operating mechanism in the export process. 
First, it is essential to note that Saudi Arabia is on the Cooperation Council 
for the GCC countries,
2
 all of which share the same export situations, production 
                                                 
1
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
<www.commerce.nic.in>, accessed 1 June 2014. Turkish case: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569. EU case: 2011/c 49/10, EU v 
Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
2
 The GCC is an international organisation, comprising six countries as full members: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman. It has admitted both Iraq and Yemen to 
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circumstances and a considerable volume of oil and gas resources.
3
 These countries 
have an agreement in place to deal with AD cases abroad as a whole; in future all the 
cases will be dealt with by a special department in the GCC, called “The Secretariat 
of AD”.4 This department will be responsible for managing AD proceedings inside 
these states, with the aim of protecting petrochemicals products relative to imported 
similar products. The GCC countries must aim to manage AD cases in a similar way 
to those cases brought in the European Union in order to protect their products inside 
the EU zone.
5
 However, experience with AD cases in India has shown that Saudi 
Arabia can deal with such cases without cooperation or coordination with Oman, as 
it was one of the parties in that AD case.
6
 The GCC countries are at present 
demanding more consideration and a greater understanding of the need to extend 
special treatment to them. 
This chapter will discuss nine measures that Saudi Arabia should implement 
to avoid the imposition of AD duty on its petrochemicals products abroad. The first 
measure relates to monitoring prices inside the Saudi markets. The second measure 
relates to reforming the Saudi domestic subsidy programme domestically. The third 
focuses on promoting competition between petrochemicals products inside the Saudi 
market. The fourth measure suggests privatising the government’s extensive shares 
in the petrochemicals sector. The fifth measure suggests enhancing coordination and 
                                                                                                                                          
partial membership. Discussion about establishing it began in 1968, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
attempted to overcome the obstacles and difficulties threatening it. The announcement of the 
establishment of this council was finally made in Riyadh on 4 February 1981, available at 
<http://www.gcc-sg.org/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
3
 The GCC countries are wealthy with oil and Gas, around 477.4 billion barrels of oil and 1479.5 
thousand billion cubic feet, which they are around 50% of the total world’s reservation of oil and gas, 
available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/>, accessed 1 June 2014. 
4
 For more information, available at <http://www.gcc-tsad.org/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
5
 The European Countries deal with anti-dumping cases for the whole union under the auspices of the 
European Commission. For more information about the processes undertaken under this commission, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence/actions-against-
imports-into-the-eu/anti-dumping/index_en.htm> accessed 1 June 2014.  
6
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
<www.commerce.nic.in>, accessed 1 June 2014. 
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cooperation between the related Saudi governmental departments, which handle 
exports. The sixth measure is to promote legal awareness of global AD legislation. 
The seventh measure is to review GCC AD law and related domestic regulations in 
Saudi Arabia. The eighth measure is to protect transparency in the Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals sector. The final measure discusses the role of the GCC in the AD 
cases, in particular how it can positively affect Saudi Arabia and the other GCC 
countries. 
5.2 Measures Saudi Arabia should implement to avoid AD duty 
This section considers what measures Saudi Arabia should introduce to its 
domestic economic legal system to prevent the imposition of AD duty on its 
petrochemicals products. These measures directly relate to the export process, and 
could have a positive impact on the import of Saudi petrochemicals products. This 
section will consider pricing, subsidy, competition and the Saudi Government’s 
share in these industries, legal awareness of the WTO, and reviews of laws related to 
the export and economic mechanism, as they relate to the potential resolution of 
problems associated with AD cases levied against Saudi petrochemicals products.  
However, the Saudi petrochemicals industry has found a legal way to avoid 
the AD cases brought against them by purchasing all or some shares in industrial 
producers inside complainant countries.
7
 It is questionable whether this is a final 
solution putting an end to AD cases against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products. 
                                                 
7
 On occasion, SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation) has announced its purchase of shares in 
other companies abroad or the establishing of new industries in other countries around the world in 
the media. The most recent announcement was after the Chinese government closed the anti-dumping 
cases with the Saudi petrochemical companies, which form SABIC. SABIC established an industrials 
base in China for similar products to those in dispute. Through SABIC’s financial reports, it can be 
seen that it has industries in the same countries that filed anti-dumping cases against Saudi 
petrochemical products. For example, it has industries in India, China, the USA, the UK and most EU 
countries. (See SABIC financial report 2011), available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 
2014. 
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As required by AD regulations,
8
 domestic similar products must be supported by all 
other domestic industries producing the same products.
9
 In this case, Saudi shares 
inside these countries might not equate to the required percentage;
10
 thus, cases 
might still be brought against Saudi products. Thus, the Saudi government needs to 
take additional legal steps to avoid the bringing of AD cases against its 
petrochemicals products. 
Pricing is the primary issue under debate, in particular, the reasons for 
different pricing in relation to Saudi petrochemicals products. In addition to pricing, 
this section will address the issue of subsidies for the Saudi petrochemicals 
industries as a reason for AD cases being brought against these products. The issues 
of subsidy and government ownership and the management of the petrochemicals 
sector inside Saudi Arabia are interrelated, as will be highlighted here. Finally, the 
aim of the AD law is to insure fair competition between similar products, and to 
support healthy competition in the international market, which will ultimately be 
reflected in the development of such products and improvements to their quality. 
However, in this research competition between petrochemicals products within the 
Saudi market is not sufficiently compatible with the WTO standard. The Saudi 
government needs to examine this economic legal issue seriously to insure genuine 
competition between petrochemicals products inside the domestic market, as this 
will have many benefits in the long term for the Saudi economy and revenue.  
                                                 
8
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
9
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201, Article 5.4. 
10
 The share of SABIC in these countries might not reach 50%, which is necessary to apply for anti-
dumping cases against imported similar products.  
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5.2.1 Monitoring price 
Dumping is perceived as a form of price discrimination in the international 
marketplace; it leads to unfair competition
11
 because it affects all other similar 
products in that market. Thus, pricing has a direct effect on AD cases, and is the first 
element examined when seeking to impose AD duty on exports and to manage 
normal pricing.
12
 Price is also referenced when clarifying the margin for AD duty on 
any particular dumped product.  
However, on a cost-basis, price has two important basic elements: costs and 
profits. According to Kotler and Armstroing, “Cost-based pricing involves setting 
prices based on the costs of producing, distributing, and selling the product plus a 
fair rate of return for its effort and risk”.13 The concern with Saudi AD cases, as has 
been examined in Chapter 3,
14
 relates to cost, not profit. Kotler and Armstroing 
observe, “A company’s costs may be an important element in its pricing strategy”.15 
The cost typically includes the price of raw materials and administrative fees. Thus, 
the cost of raw materials relates to many other elements, whether the raw materials 
are imported or produced in the domestic marketplace. If they are imported, the price 
might be affected by the currency exchange rate,
16
 as well as by circumstances in the 
international market and in the countries from which these elements were imported. 
                                                 
11
 Aradhna Aggarwal, The Anti-dumping Agreement and Developing Countries, an Introduction, (1st 
edition, Oxford University Press 2007) 16. 
12
 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
13
 Philip Kotler & Gary Armstroing, Principle of Marketing, (15
th
 edition, Person Education Limited, 
2014), 317. 
14
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
<www.commerce.nic.in>, accessed 1 June 2014. Turkish case: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569. EU case: 2011/c 49/10, EU v 
Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
15
 Philip Kotler & Gary Armstroing, Principle of Marketing, (15
th
 edition, Person Education Limited, 
2014), 317. 
16
 A case between the United States and Korea regarding unnecessary conversion from the US Dollar 
to the Korean Won. See the Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel 
Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 
2001. 
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All these aspects are interrelated; thus, a single element can affect all the others in a 
trade arrangement. As a result, the internal market price for similar products in the 
exporting country has a direct effect on AD cases in the importing country. This is 
why governmental departments should undertake price monitoring to avoid cases of 
dumping.  
Until now, the Saudi government has applied very weak monitoring to the 
internal market with regard pricing,
17
 uncovering clear statistics, will require clearer 
policies on this point. Stronger monitoring can protect the internal market from 
unfair competition between domestic products and imported products brought 
against the Saudi market. Meanwhile, it will help to have reliable data regarding the 
pricing of products inside the Saudi market, especially petrochemicals products, to 
help avoid the bringing of AD cases against Saudi exports.  
Prices can be monitored where transparent statistics are available regarding 
not only the internal market, but also the external markets. Relevant government 
departments and internal industries in Saudi Arabia must employ a strong data set 
regarding similar product pricing. They also need to gather more information about 
market circumstances and the costs associated with producing products inside the 
importing countries. This information will help to establish a suitable price for Saudi 
products accounting for the export process; this will help to reduce and avoid the AD 
cases brought against these products abroad. 
Saudi Arabia needs to implement more rules and guidelines to monitor prices 
in the Saudi market. Monitoring has to be done on the basis of the free market and 
                                                 
17
 The Saudi government started monitoring the price to market several years ago, through the 
Ministry of Commerce, but its role remains very weak. It only focuses on prices related to food and 
no attention is paid to prices related to the Saudi industries, whether petrochemicals or others. 
Moreover, four years ago, it established a private organisation, the “Consumer Protection 
Association”, to help monitor prices, but it is still not at the level it should be. For more information 
see the Consumer Protection Association and the Ministry of Commerce official website in Saudi 
Arabia, available at <www.cpa.org.sa> and <www.mci.gov.sa> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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free trade principles without interference from the government and to insure reliable 
data outside the Saudi market. In recent years, the Saudi government realised the 
importance of price monitoring, although it currently focuses on food products 
only;
18
 there is yet no emphasis on the other products required to protect Saudi 
industries. Thus, the Saudi government strongly recommends paying more attention 
to the element of price, as a priority when defending Saudi products abroad from AD 
duty, and thereby avoiding legal action in the future.  
How can Saudi Arabia monitor prices? This is an important question to 
answer, especially as it relates to the free market price. This means, the Saudi 
Arabian government should avoid any interference in pricing and allocate price 
setting according to market competition between all producers and traders. Initially, 
this will require the establishment of a legal framework, enforcing regulations in 
order to insure a legal basis for collecting information from different areas. This will 
help the authority to legalise their actions and procedures, and to collect information 
without raising conflicts with other regulations domestically or with the WTO.  
In addition, this requires the establishment of an authority to manage the 
collection of information and to establish databases by cooperating and coordinating 
with different governmental and non-governmental sectors inside Saudi Arabia. The 
authority has to locate different sources of information, which will then enable 
calculation of accurate market price figures that correspond to reality. After the 
appointed authority has collected all the relevant information, it would then continue 
monitoring by checking the domestic market regularly to guarantee up-to-date prices 
and manage changes to prices. Internationally, the database on pricing would help to 
maintain a balance between the prices inside the country and those outside when 
                                                 
18
 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Saudi Arabia, available at <www.mci.gov.sa> accessed 
1 June 2014. 
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exporting products abroad. This would then facilitate a reduction in the number of 
AD cases against Saudi petrochemicals products in particular and against other Saudi 
exported products in general. It would also help to generate an authentically 
competitive atmosphere inside the Saudi marketplace.
19
  
The WTO provision does not prohibit price monitoring as described in this 
research.
20
 It is useful in any country, including the UK, and is frequently used to 
clarify economic and political factors and to make important economic policies.
21
 
Insuring government agencies are monitoring prices in the internal market will help 
to manage inflation and allow the government to adjust taxation and minimum 
income. This information is important to establish the direction of the internal 
market in terms of growth, when following international regulations and WTO 
provisions.
22
 
5.2.2 Reforming Saudi Arabian Subsidy programmes  
Subsidy programmes raise legal issues against Saudi petrochemical industries, 
leading to the application of AD duty against products. However, the subsidy usually 
has to be applied either directly or indirectly to domestic industries. Directly by 
                                                 
19
 It will help to establish real competition without such a cartel in the petrochemicals products.  
20
 Under footnote 4 in article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards, it mentions the prohibition of the 
monitoring system on prices. However, monitoring requires genuine statistics about prices inside the 
market. Yet, developing countries has been excluded by a special measure under article 9 of the same 
agreement. However, the only purpose to monitoring prices inside Saudi Arabia is to make sure there 
is no illegal movement between goods inside the market. Thus, this agreement cannot be applied as 
there is no option to fix the price or reduce the quantities of imported products. See the Agreement on 
Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
21
 The UK department of energy monitors energy and power prices and publishes these statistics in 
public as described in the article Industrial price statistics: data sources and methodology, available 
at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/industrial-price-statistics-data-sources-and-
methodologies> accessed 1 June 2014. 
22
 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
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giving financial support to these industries
23
, and indirectly by giving facilities or 
materials to the domestic industries, such as giving free land to establish industries 
or waiving taxes in order to support the product pricing.
24
  
The Trade Policy Review by the WTO, Section 71 states,  
Saudi Arabia has notified the WTO that it does not have any subsidy 
programmes that are inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and does not maintain or use 
any prohibited subsidies within the scope of Article 3 of the 
Agreement.
25
 
 
This statement includes the Saudi Arabian official announcement to the WTO with 
regard to subsidy programmes: there are no prohibitions on subsidy programmes, 
which could affect the Saudi market or Saudi industries. However, the same report 
continues in Section 72: 
To this end, three main entities are aiming to expand Saudi non-oil 
exports: (i) the Saudi Export Programme (SEP) of the Saudi Fund for 
Development (SFD); (ii) the Saudi Export Development Centre (SEDC); 
and (iii) the Saudi Export Development Authority (SEDA).
26
 
 
These forms of support are characterised as incompatible with anti-subsidy’s 
regulations under the WTO agreement.
27
 Subsidy programmes have a direct effect on 
product pricing, as identified in Article 1 of the Subsidies Agreement.
28
 Therefore, 
programmes initiated by the Saudi government must be reformed to meet WTO 
provisions. 
                                                 
23
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. Article 1.1. 
24
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. Article 1.1. 
25
 Trade Policy Review, prepared by the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Report no. 
WT/TPR/256, 21 December 2011, 40. 
26
 Trade Policy Review, prepared by the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Report no. 
WT/TPR/256, 21 December 2011, 40. 
27
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
28
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
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However, officials
29
 in the Petroleum and Petrochemicals Research Institute 
in King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)
30
 announced the 
Saudi government is planning to input around 26 billion US dollars into the 
petrochemicals sector in Saudi Arabia
31
 to develop and improve related industries. 
These funds will ultimately be paid to SABIC, as it owns the majority of these 
industries or has part shares in recipient companies, as mentioned above.
32
 This 
represents a direct subsidising of the sector, which is prohibited under the WTO 
provisions,
33
 due to applying AD and anti-subsidy’s measures against these products. 
In a report by the Minister for Petroleum and Gas in Oman, the Minister 
warned all GCC countries against subsidy programmes, as this directly affects 
associated prices, including fuel and electricity prices;
34
 thereby reducing the power 
and wealth in these GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia. This statement shows 
Saudi Arabia’s approach to supporting the petrochemicals industries differs from 
approaches elsewhere, and this affects the price of petrochemicals when exported to 
other countries.  
It is recommended that support be given equally to Saudi and non-Saudi 
petrochemicals industries inside Saudi Arabia, to produce more wealth and develop 
products, regardless of whether the capital for these industries is obtained from local 
or foreign investors. However, it can be seen that Saudi Arabia has initiated a 
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subsidising programme with regard to fuel, electricity, duty-free goods and finally 
long-term loans without interest. Moreover, the form of subsidising programmes can 
directly affect the prices of exported petrochemicals products. The Saudi government 
must offer access to subsidy programmes directly to those who need them, rather 
than using them to reduce the price of products domestically, which then affects 
export prices. For example, it is more acceptable to assist people on a low income 
directly, e.g. in terms of fuel provision. The WTO Trade Policy Review mentioned 
earlier refers to “…gradually reforming domestic energy pricing to create a more 
energy-efficient economy”,35 which can be understood as meaning that Saudi Arabia 
must make some changes to its energy pricing by reforming its subsidising 
programme. In this way, it would ensure subsidy programmes would not have an 
effect on market price, and would then be deemed acceptable under the WTO 
provisions.  
However, other options can be considered akin to subsidies. On the one hand, 
the management of the petrochemicals sector in Saudi Arabia is run in reality by the 
government, because the Saudi government owns 70% of this sector.
36
 On the other, 
there are no foreign investors in this sector in Saudi Arabia, as will be discussed later 
in this chapter. SABIC receives assistance from the government to successfully 
export its products abroad.  
Another important issue concerns the raw materials produced by the 
petrochemical’s sector. The problem with this sector is that the Saudi Arabian 
government owns the majority of available shares. This has an effect on the 
strategies employed, with a direct effect on competition in this product area. 
Moreover, the raw materials for SABIC products can be obtained at very low cost,  
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[was] based on costs and export price. However, in these countries, 
which [provide] the basic raw materials used in the production of MEG, 
“Ethane” is only produced by state-owned companies and the price of the 
supply/demand conditions are identified and announced by the 
authorities.
37
 
 
Saudi Arabia has many sources of oil, gas and hydrocarbons, which are crucial to 
petrochemicals production.
38
 As a result, the Saudi government, through Saudi 
Aramco, which is owned completely by the Saudi government
39
, supplies SABIC, 
and the other petrochemicals companies owned by SABIC with raw materials at a 
very low price; there is no reason to resort to global pricing.
40
 This is why the price 
of Saudi petrochemicals products is usually lower than that of products produced 
elsewhere in the world; explaining the root cause of the AD cases brought against 
them. 
To resolve this issue, the government might think about applying taxes on 
petrochemicals product when they are exported abroad, in order to continue 
supporting programmes that require petrochemicals prices to conform to the price 
principle, as in China. The Chinese government formerly applied a tax on Urea 
products,
41
 which raised pricing to a level equivalent to the international market. 
However, this would not be an applicable solution in the case of Saudi Arabia for a 
number of reasons. First, the Saudi government has undertaken not to apply any 
direct taxes, as mentioned in the WTO report,
42
 although this strategy could be 
changed. Second, an effect on pricing will remain because of the supportive 
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programmes mentioned previously; these would therefore have to be removed in 
every case.  
In this regard, the government should supply the Saudi petrochemical 
industries with raw materials on a global scale, as this will help to open up the Saudi 
market to foreign investments, thereby enabling them to establish enterprises in this 
sector inside Saudi Arabia. This proposal will be developed in the following section 
of this thesis. The Saudi government could rationalise its subsidies programme so 
funds benefit only those in need of them, without any negative impact on the Saudi 
market or industries. This should then avoid the negative impact of AD cases.  
5.2.3 Promote competition within the Saudi Arabian petrochemicals sector 
Saudi Arabia has established a good environment for foreign investment,
43
 
principally due to its regulatory situation. This can be seen following the 
establishment of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA),
44
 to 
promote as many foreign investments as possible inside Saudi Arabia. The report by 
the WTO shows how much has changed concerning this point;  
Saudi Arabia has become the eighth biggest recipient of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the world. Its annual inflow of FDI jumped from an 
annual average of US$ 1.534 million during 1995-2005 to about US$ 
25,000 million over 2005-09.
45
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Abundant regulations facilitate investment, as evidenced by these figures; however, 
the authorities have not devoted adequate attention toward local investors (Saudis 
and GCC citizens).  
Moreover, the trade and investment authorities in Saudi Arabia have 
supported competition inside Saudi Arabia and are trying, as far as possible, to create 
an effective competitive atmosphere between products, whether local or foreign. 
However, these efforts do not establish foreign investment in the petrochemical 
industries in particular or in the industrial sector in general, as the majority of foreign 
investments target trade and other services.
46
 The Saudi government has afforded its 
(70% government-owned) domestic petrochemical industries, special treatment in all 
areas.
47
 This special treatment of the sector threatens investment by foreign or local 
investors, as in reality they are unlikely to receive the same attention from the 
government.  
The Saudi government should also encourage local and foreign investors to 
establish more industries in general and in the petrochemicals sector in particular; it 
must treat them as equal to the Saudi industries, such as SABIC. This equivalent 
treatment would then help to increase the quantity of exports for petrochemicals 
products and thereby generate more jobs inside Saudi Arabia, and thereby an 
increase in national revenues. Moreover, this would facilitate genuine competition 
among all industrial parties in Saudi Arabia. Without this, equivalent and other legal 
processes, investment in this sector would not be a success.  
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As an example, with regard to equivalence between investors, Saudi Airlines, 
which is 100% owned by the Saudi government,
48
 has also been afforded special 
treatment by the government, in particular, inside Saudi Airports and in terms of 
fuelling and other related services.
49
 However, when the Saudi government has 
encouraged competing airlines to enter the Saudi market, the new companies are 
unable to compete, as they are subject to different treatment. Consequently, they 
cannot continue to offer a service inside the Saudi market and have been liquidated.
50
  
The Saudi government indisputably prioritises SABIC. However, article 6 of 
the Implementation of the Saudi Competition Law states: 
1-Any “entity” of a dominant position in the market is prohibited from 
exploiting such a position to violate, limit or prevent competition, 
including the following: ...... B. committing any act that leads to 
hindering the entry of another “entity” into the “market”, forcing it out or 
exposing it to losses, including selling at a loss. C. Imposing unrealistic 
price for a “commodity” through the dominant entity’s hindering, 
limiting or refusing the sale or purchase of a “commodity” in any other 
manner.
51
  
 
Thus, SABIC is in a position to block petrochemical enterprises from entering the 
Saudi market, which renders it liable to the penalties mentioned in Saudi 
Competition Law. However, it operates a legalised monopoly inside the market, as 
shown in this article and by government behaviour regarding SABIC, which is also 
considered in reference to WTO provisions.  
As Saudi Arabia is a wealthy country with substantial oil and gas resources 
and the appropriate legal atmosphere it is able to attract huge international 
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investment inside Saudi Arabia, rather than establishing ownership or control over 
the sector by the government. This enables greater liquidity to be pumped into Saudi 
Arabia through foreign investments, including long-term investments. Moreover, it 
facilitates job creation for Saudi citizens, which in turn generates more income for 
the government, who can apply direct taxes on this sector. The most important 
reason for increasing the presence of competitors is to attract more advanced 
technology into these industries, than would be possible with the government 
ownership model. With regard to this point, it is stated in a report issued by 
SAMBA, that foreign investment in this sector would facilitate the use of new 
technology:  
The integration model will also open the door to further foreign direct 
investment into Saudi Arabia from established global energy and 
petrochemicals firms. These large joint ventures should allow 
considerable technology transfer, though their sheer size will also 
necessitate more diversified and imaginative financing solutions.
52
 
 
This statement confirms that new technology can be transferred by means of foreign 
investment.  
Furthermore, competition law requires that foreign and local investment 
should have the same legal facilities granted to them as the Saudi petrochemical 
industries, unless they start producing and exporting products. However, if there is 
any support for Saudi industries wishing to export products, this support should be 
immediately halted and the industries should seek to ensure implementation of the 
provisions of the WTO agreement on this point.
53
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5.2.4 Privatise the Government’s shares in the petrochemicals sector  
The National Champion idea was introduced after the Second World War, when 
some EU countries began to support their industries in order to compete with other 
companies, whether inside or outside their own states. There are many ways for this 
idea to be applied in reality: “Governments may create national champions directly, 
by acquiring several private firms and merging them into a single government-
owned company…”.54 This happened to the British government in 1967 “… the UK 
government did [this] for example in 1967 when it acquired the largest fourteen 
domestic steel companies so as to create the British Steel Corporation…”.55 The 
other reason for applying this approach is to assist state-owned companies to join 
with the private sector “…by having a government-owned company merge with a 
private firm…”,56 as is the case in France, where the GDF and Suez companies 
merged. Another approach is to extend direct support and subsidies to a preferred 
company in order to improve its ability to succeed in the market.  
At present, the Saudi Arabian government prioritises oil products, and these 
are considered as a National Champions by the government. However, the WTO 
agreement, as will be seen in this research, protects oil products and continues this 
protection as agreed in the GATT. However, all the Saudi government activity with 
regard to the petrochemicals sector, and particularly SABIC, show the sector is 
considered in this light. The Saudi government relies on its petrochemicals products 
being the best in the world, and thus far this appears to be the case; despite the 
emergence of legal issues.  
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The Saudi government owns 70% of the shares in SABIC,
57
 and SABIC in 
turn owns or has a high percentage ownership in the petrochemicals industries in 
Saudi Arabia. An early report by the King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and 
Technology states, 
the great improvement of the petrochemical industry in the Saudi Arabia 
was by The Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), which 
currently produces 95% of the petrochemicals products. Saudi Arabia is 
making an effort actively to reduce this ratio to 75% by 2010 in order to 
promote private investment in order to speed up the manufacturing of 
petrochemicals…58 
 
It is possible to explain why these industries are owned by the Saudi government as 
follows:  
1. It was difficult, toward late 1976, for the petrochemical industries to be 
established as private companies, whether Saudi or foreign investments, 
because Saudi Arabia had recently been founded and lacked the necessary 
infrastructure. The cost of establishing these industries was high and 
considered a long-term investment. 
2. The majority of Saudi investors were focusing on other industrial sectors, 
which were essential to the Saudi market, such as foodstuffs and 
construction materials like cement and other materials; the majority of 
these were short-term investments. Investors were also focusing on 
service companies like banking and insurance, and took a special interest 
in real estate. These industries also have very high annual profits. 
3. At that time, it was difficult to find investors with large sums of capital 
who would be prepared to attempt to establish petrochemical industries at 
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a similar level because of the running costs involved and the high risk 
proceeding from this type of long-term investment.  
4. At that time, there was no legal environment to help and encourage 
investors to invest in petrochemicals by offering incentives and 
guarantees on investments. 
However, SABIC now holds majority shares in this sector in Saudi Arabia and most 
of these factors are now irrelevant. Most investors, local or foreign, are looking to 
invest in this sector under equal conditions and according to a clear legal framework. 
Government shareholdings inhibit competition between petrochemicals products 
inside Saudi Arabia. However, to develop this sector, private investment must be 
supported in this type of investment. Thus, although there is a share between SABIC 
and the private sector through individuals, this ownership has not yet provided true 
competition in accordance with the WTO standard.  
The Trade Policy Review by the World Trade Organisation has clarified 
some points regarding SABIC as a major producer of petrochemicals: 
The government appoints the Chairman of the board, the CEO and three 
other Board members. Two other Board members represent the private 
sector and are nominated and selected by shareholders at a general 
meeting. The Government is represented on the Board, but does not play 
any role in setting company policy or in making operational decisions.
59
  
 
The question that arises here, is how can the Saudi government appoint four out of 
six of the Board of Directors of SABIC and avoid playing an active role. At present 
SABIC reflects government strategy, and the votes and Board of Directors are 
largely intending to benefit and advantage the government, since 4 out of 6 are 
appointed by the government and the CEO is also from the government. 
Furthermore, the CEO is also head of the Director of the Royal Commission for 
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Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY), which is the government department responsible for 
industrial government strategy in two important industrial cities, where the 
petrochemicals industries dominate.
60
 Therefore, it can be seen that SABIC is 
managed by the RCJY, it is not a separate company; this supports the idea of 
managing SABIC through the government.  
It is essential that the Saudi government continue to relinquish its shares in 
these companies and privatise them, to create a truly competitive atmosphere, 
especially since the Council of Ministry has approved a privatisation programme for 
SABIC.
61
 The first step should be to prevent any privileges afforded to this sector, to 
support competition on equal terms. The second step is to sell all or most of the 
Saudi government shares in these companies on the stock market and to allow them 
to function without interference from the Saudi government. This change would then 
also be reflected on the stock market, because the value of Saudi government shares 
in the sector at present would have direct effect and influence. Thus, the market 
would then be wholly independent from Saudi government influence. The next step 
after this could be to deal equally with all petrochemicals companies, whether owned 
by SABIC or by new investors, foreign or Saudi, with regard to establishing future 
privileges and the legal process. This could be achieved in two steps: first, by selling 
raw materials to the investors at a global price for all industries; and second, by 
taking the same amount of taxes, fees and any other payments due to the government 
from these companies.
62
 These two steps would bring more benefit to the 
government than if they continued to run these industries, and, as a result, the issues 
related to AD would then gradually decrease.  
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The intention behind privatisation is to reduce the attention directed by the 
government toward enterprises. Chang states “…that government has grown to 
unmanageable proportions was premised on the need to reduce the constrictions to 
economic growth and to provide opportunities for the private sector within state”.63 
Therefore, privatisation offers many advantages within national economic systems. It 
can help to introduce investment by offering a high rate for domestic funds. Since 
Chang considers that “… keeping interest rates for domestic funds higher than they 
would have been had the government …”.64 It will also improve the efficiency for 
those sectors that have been privatised.
65
 In addition, privatisation will create a 
competitive environment, impacting positively on products in the marketplace.
66
 All 
these advantages will be beneficial in improving product quality, and achieving a fair 
market price, which will be to the advantage of consumers and national revenue.  
Were the government to privatise the petrochemicals sector in Saudi Arabia, 
this would have many advantages for the petrochemicals sector. First, it would be 
one reason to reduce AD cases against the Saudi Arabian petrochemicals products 
abroad. Second, it would help to increase opportunities to build more industries. At 
present, most investors do not want to invest because the government controls the 
majority of the local petrochemical industries. Therefore, it has become difficult for 
anyone else to invest in the sector, as unequal competition makes the situation 
impossible. This means that, although all the regulations related to the competition 
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are at the standard of the WTO provisions,
67
 the sector remains government owned, 
which makes competition difficult. Third, this will improve petrochemicals 
production, which will help to create more jobs for Saudi people. Fourth, as more 
industries are built by foreign investors new technology from outside Saudi Arabia 
will be introduced. There will then be no costs associated with this to the Saudi 
government as the technology moves with new investors.  
5.2.5 Developing Coordination and Cooperation among Saudi Governmental 
Departments  
With regard to the trade and export processes in Saudi Arabia, many government 
departments share the same responsibilities and duties. These departments require a 
very high level of cooperation and coordination to export products without an effect 
on the legal issues associated with dumping. This does not mean there is a lack of 
coordination among them at present. Nevertheless, such coordination has not yet 
achieved the level required to counter legal issues fully, whether in Saudi Arabia or 
abroad. If there were good coordination and cooperation, cases like the AD case 
against Saudi petrochemicals products would continue to emerge.
68
 Were the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce effectively coordinated with Saudi Customs, 
there would be better avoidance of conflict or overlap effecting Trade and Industry.
69
 
This will be discussed in greater depth toward the end of this section. 
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Coordination and cooperation should be put in place from the outset of the 
establishment of industries and trade, and should be encouraged. This would help to 
minimise cases against the Saudi petrochemicals products in relation to AD. Then 
government departments would filter out legal issues pursued against products, 
whether in Saudi Arabia or abroad.  
At present, there are many conflicts between different government 
departments in Saudi Arabia, and such conflicts are anticipated to be likely to affect 
trade, industry, and production eventually. There is a conflict of responsibilities 
between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and other departments such as the 
Saudi General Investment Authority, especially abroad. Both of these have their own 
offices outside Saudi Arabia, which attract foreign investment to Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, there is a conflict between, on the one side, the Saudi Industrial Property 
Authority and the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, and on the other side, 
new economic cities in Saudi Arabia, which are governed by the Saudi Investment 
Authority. The conflict between these parties is very clear and there is a need to 
reorganise them in order to achieve a higher standard of coordination and 
cooperation without conflict. Furthermore, this will help to achieve the aim of 
promoting diversity in terms of economic revenue streams and to improve the trade 
and industry sectors.  
5.2.6 Promoting legal awareness of the AD legal system 
Legal awareness has a direct impact on the kind of trade treatment imposed, as it 
targets people directly involved in exporting products abroad. It describes AD and 
anti-subsidy legislation and related processes, as well as other relevant regulations, 
                                                                                                                                          
extensive reorganisation in Saudi Arabia in order to reach the aims of the WTO as well as to benefit 
the Saudi market.  
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established to help those involved to attain a clear understanding of all the legal 
processes required to breach regulations. However, a country like Saudi Arabia has 
limited experience with such cases or legal dealings under the WTO provisions. 
Based on van den Bossche and Zdouc views “Many developing country Members do 
not have the specialised ‘in-house’ legal expertise to participate in the most effective 
manner in WTO dispute settlement”.70 Thus, Saudi Arabia as a developing country 
requires additional legal skills in order to address cases under the WTO agreement. 
According to Papa,  
Particularly developing countries. The system’s legalization or the 
increasing precision of rules and their binding effect has brought about 
the need for greater legal skills, expertise and sophistication in 
institutional engagement.
71
 
 
Nonetheless, this description must include all other processes for a claim to be filed 
in relation to regulations, whether inside Saudi Arabia or abroad, and concerning 
exports in order to protect Saudi products. This should include all legal techniques in 
reference to AD and anti-subsidy cases, as these may lead to issues being face raised 
abroad. For example, Brazil has become a prominent member of the WTO 
agreement engaging in many steps, which have all been performed by the Saudi 
government as well; “Brazil's aspirations for successful WTO participation led to the 
mobilisation of interest in WTO expertise, new institutes, courses and research 
groups, private sector engagement with the WTO and civil society engagement”.72 
All government employees and lawyers involved in export and trade 
procedures inside Saudi Arabia are included in this description, and so will be ready 
                                                 
70
 Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law And Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 300. 
71
 Mihaela Papa, ‘Emerging Power in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity 
Building to A Level Playing Field?’ 2012, Journal of International Disputes Settlement, 83, 85. 
(Footnote Omitted). 
72
 Mihaela Papa, ‘Emerging Power in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity 
Building to A Level Playing Field?’ 2012, Journal of International Disputes Settlement, 83, 93. 
174 
 
to address any legal issues. They will be able to take preventative action before the 
export process starts, in order to avoid potential legal action being brought against 
Saudi products abroad, especially that targeting petrochemicals. For example, if 
customs in Saudi Arabia have sufficient legal knowledge and are in receipt of advice 
from their legal departments, they will be able to evaluate whether exported products 
are in danger of facing AD duty better. If so, then the legal department could make 
exporters and any implicated departments aware of this, to minimise the probability 
of legal action. Customs departments in Saudi Arabia should be regarded as the final 
line of defence for Saudi exported products. Certainly, government departments 
require a highly efficient and up-to-date database detailing the trade environment of 
importing countries; this means they also require good cooperation and coordination 
with other government departments, as mentioned above, to collate these databases. 
They might also employ a questionnaire to obtain a clear view of the exported 
products, in order to find a way to protect them from AD and anti-subsidy legal 
processes in importing countries.  
It is necessary to train Saudi lawyers who are capable of handling these cases 
at any stage. This can be achieved through legal training and participation in 
conferences, highlighting the best methods for dealing with AD and anti-subsidy 
cases. In addition, Saudi lawyers should build strong relationships with well-known 
international law firms who specialise in AD cases; so that they can exchange 
experiences, and attain access to well-qualified local lawyers who can handle cases 
both within Saudi Arabia or abroad. An example of this approach applies to Brazil, 
which has pursued it thus:  
Parallel to the use of foreign law firms, the government helped develop 
the domestic legal sector (e.g. through association of law firms Law Firm 
Study Centre/CESA’s technical group on trade) and 53 young lawyers 
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from 38 Brazilian law firms 2003-07 went to Brazil’s Mission in Geneva 
for training.
73
 
 
It is true that many training programmes and conferences have been provided by the 
private sector, but there are still too few establishing in depth understanding of the 
legal requirements for all legal issues in order to deal with cases professionally 
inside or outside Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government needs to take a more emphatic 
approach to this issue as it has a direct effect on Saudi industries as well as on the 
entire Saudi domestic economy. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia must consider a potential role as a member in the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL),
74
 which is an intergovernmental centre 
with a long history of handling WTO dispute settlements. As assured by van den 
Bossche and Zdouc: “Since its establishment, the ACWL has become a major player 
in WTO dispute settlement...”,75 which provides help free of charge to its members. 
Were Saudi Arabia to join the ACWL and support it financially it would have access 
to a broader understanding of dispute settlement practices under WTO provisions. 
The centre will also differ when taking advice from law firms, as it has a vast 
experience of dealing with WTO dispute settlement systems on the one hand, and 
aims to support its members on the other. In contrast, the aim of law firms is 
typically to make more money from clients; thereby limiting clients’ understanding 
of how to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, it would be 
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beneficial for Saudi Arabia to join this centre to improve its ability to handle WTO 
provisions in relation to dispute settlement. India exemplifies a country that has 
benefitted from such involvement, i.e.: 
As a result, India first became one of the founders of the ACWL in 2001 
and then one of its most frequent users. Even as India developed 
domestic in-house capacity, it would still occasionally seek legal opinion 
from the ACWL and also from outside law firms before initiation a 
WTO disputes.
76
 
 
It is important for Saudi Arabia to participate in dispute settlements as a third party, 
as this will further understanding of the scope of the WTO agreement. Papa clarifies 
that “Being a third party allowed them to monitor the proceedings and express their 
views on the interpretation of WTO rules”.77 It will also help Saudi Arabia acquire a 
larger knowledge base regarding the AD and anti-subsidy agreement,
78
 and will keep 
Saudi Arabia up to date with new techniques to manage AD and anti-subsidy cases, 
which will be beneficial when seeking to defend Saudi petrochemicals products 
against such cases in future.  
5.2.7 Reviewing the GCC AD law and related domestic regulations  
Saudi Arabia is tied to the GCC with regard to AD and anti-subsidy legislation and 
processes.
79
 The GCC AD committee usually undertakes the entire process. 
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However, AD legislation includes a defect, formulated in some articles of this 
legislation. For example, in Article 2 of the Union Legislation for AD and 
Countervailing Measures for GCC countries, which concerns definitions, the 
legislator has defined dumping as “exporting to any of the GCC members a product 
with an export price lower than the normal price in the normal trade”.80 In this 
definition, there is no need to include the term “normal trade”, as normal price under 
the WTO does not distinguish between different trade circumstances. Thus, there is 
no concept of “normal trade” under the WTO. However, this definition does not tie 
this product to similar products from the exporting country. In the author’s view, the 
definition of dumping should therefore be: Exporting to any of the GCC members a 
product similar to GCC products with an export price lower than the normal price. 
Moreover, GCC AD legislation considers dumping, subsidy and 
countervailing measures combined and identifiable as either temporary or final 
measures.
81
 The AD and anti-subsidy regulations are expressed in a number of 
different articles and implementations under the WTO agreement,
82
 and should be in 
separate pieces of legislation under the GCC. However, GCC legislation does not 
focus on the AD process, rather it refers to the AD committee under the GCC, 
discussing how it can cooperate with GCC government sectors. Nevertheless, the 
GCC has issued an implementation law to support AD legislation, which covers and 
amends most of these legal and technical issues.  
                                                 
80
 GCC Common Law of Anti-dumping Countervailing Measures and Safeguards available at 
<http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/index-eng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=190> accessed 1 June 2014.  
81
 GCC Common Law of Anti-dumping Countervailing Measures and Safeguards available at 
<http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/index-eng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=190> accessed 1 June 2014. 
82
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
178 
 
Conversely, Saudi Arabia has had to make a huge change to its legislation in 
relation to other industries and the trade sector. At present, it is still increasing 
subsidy programmes to these sectors, despite the GCC issuing union legislation 
regarding trade and industry, stating they are illegal and in breach of WTO 
provisions. This legislation needs further revision to make it compatible with the 
WTO. Furthermore, additional Saudi legislation requires updating in relation to these 
sectors, as some of the legislation is very old; meanwhile, other pieces of legislation, 
such as competition law, need to be activated.  
An example of the above is the priority given in Saudi regulations to 
companies wholly owned by the Saudi government, by not applying competition law 
against them. Article 3 of the implementation of Saudi Competition Law states,  
A. The provisions of the “Law” and the “Regulation” shall apply to all 
entities operating in the Saudi markets and various activities thereof. 
They shall also apply to any activity taking place abroad that leads to 
consequences contrary to fair competition within the Kingdom. B. The 
following shall be exempted from the provisions of Paragraph (a) above: 
1) any company or establishment fully owned by the state…83 
 
The Saudi regulations give public institutions and government-controlled 
companies’ priority by not applying competition law against them, facilitating 
breaches of the WTO provisions. These regulations must therefore be re-regulated to 
insure compliance with the WTO provisions and to give the private sector priority to 
enter the Saudi market and compete without exception against companies who offer 
products inside the Saudi market.  
Finally, Saudi Arabia must issue regulations to legalise the process of 
exporting from Saudi Arabia to abroad. A legal framework for these processes will 
                                                 
83
 The Implementation of the Saudi Competition Law issued by a Royal Decree No. M/1 date 10 April 
2000, article 3. See this law in the Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministries, available at 
<http://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=60&VersionID=73> accessed 1 
June 2014. 
179 
 
enable reduction of the proportion of AD and anti-subsidy cases against Saudi 
petrochemicals products. Another legal framework that it is important to establish 
relates to organising Saudi investments abroad, in order to establish a link between 
Saudi industries and those abroad about prices, for example. It is anticipated that 
they might have less authority over investments abroad, as they fall outside Saudi 
jurisdiction. However, as the roots of these investments are inside Saudi Arabia, they 
will still have some influence, as is evident with regard to SABIC, which has 
investments outside Saudi Arabia.  
5.2.8 Protecting Transparency in the Saudi Arabian Petrochemicals sector  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, in reference to the WTO, the Saudi government must do 
more if it is to fulfil all requirements to insure transparency, whether inside the 
country or outside when exporting products abroad. The Saudi Arabian government 
should make transparent all data about subsidising programmes associated with the 
petrochemicals sector 
Regarding this principle of transparency, Saudi Arabia must work harder to 
achieve this. It is evident that there is limited transparency in relation to WTO 
provisions, especially concerning AD and subsidy agreements. For example, it has 
not been an easy process, for this researcher to obtain a copy of AD cases between 
Saudi Arabia and others, whereas it was easy to obtain such information from other 
countries.
84
 There is still no clear understanding regarding why such matters must be 
confidential.  
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Saudi Arabia must present clear information about the relationship between 
the government and the petrochemicals sector. The government supports the sector 
financially, and the public should have access to data describing the precise scope of 
this support. This information will help to identify legal matters with regard to this 
sector to resolve problems. With regard to AD cases against the Saudi 
petrochemicals products,
85
 and during AD investigations, Saudi petrochemicals 
industries were not given sufficiently clear information and did not critically observe 
the investigation.  
It is emphasised here, that the Saudi Arabian government should stop any 
type of privilege to this sector, whether offering additional facilities, cheap power or 
raw materials. The Saudi Arabian AD authority must employ and present annual AD 
statistics for all sectors. It should endeavour to publish all details about AD cases, 
both inside Saudi Arabia and abroad. It is a requirement within the WTO agreement 
that there should be transparency in such cases, with all information made available 
to the public.  
5.2.9 Saudi Arabia should work under the GCC in AD cases 
The GCC countries play a major role in the AD cases against Saudi Arabia and other 
GCC members. As the GCC is now responsible for handling these cases when 
brought against any GCC countries,
86
 it has more power to push forward and end 
these cases quickly. As a result, this should have a positive effect on the Saudi 
petrochemical industries and on all the GCC countries as a group. 
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In cases brought abroad, the GCC countries have faced a number of issues; 
for example, when Saudi Arabia acted alone when negotiating its case with India
87
 to 
bring about an end to AD duty levied against Saudi petrochemicals products.
88
 
However, Oman, another GCC country, was also involved, and its interests were not 
represented by either Saudi Arabia, or the GCC; this lack of coordination or 
cooperation between the GCC countries in the legal processes is a matter for 
concern.  
In order to avoid the bringing of AD cases against GCC products in the 
future, a number of points must be agreed upon by the GCC countries before they 
unite to challenge AD cases: 
1. The GCC countries must have a legal framework clarifying a range of AD 
cases and processes. The GCC should establish close coordination and 
cooperation by establishing a strong core. This will benefit GCC when 
working and moving together in cases brought against them abroad and when 
defending products inside their home countries against illegal action by the 
producers of similar competitive products.  
2. The GCC countries must act as a GCC- conglomerate when negotiating with 
non-GCC countries to resolve AD disputes. This conglomerate must also be 
present to support exported products; for example, through including a label 
‘Made in GCC’, which would help avoid illegal AD movement against them.  
3. Where these products are exported by one conglomerate, all GCC countries 
would be considered when legal cases are brought against them on this issue. 
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For example, competition will exist between domestic products, as there are 
many companies in the GCC countries, all competing against one another.  
This would involve a similar resolution to disputes as that pursued in EU countries. 
EU countries usually deal with cases as a single body, showing a united and strong 
presence.
89
 This is clearly seen in the following statement by van den Bossche and 
Zdouc: 
Measures by EU Members States can, and have been, challenged in 
dispute settlement proceedings brought: (1) against the EU Member 
States concerned; (2) against the European Union and the EU Member 
State(s) concerned; or (3) against the European Union alone. In all 
disputes involving measures of EU Member States, it was always the 
European Union which made the submissions and defended the EU 
Member State measure(s) concerned.
90
  
 
This clearly shows that when resolving cases under WTO provisions, EU members 
act together and defend their products as a conglomerate not individually. This 
process gives EU member industries more strength and power in the international 
marketplace as well as affording them greater protection and legal support.  
Such a conglomerate would be helpful in supporting all GCC countries when 
exporting petrochemicals products, especially when looking to resolve and reduce 
AD cases. Such a conglomerate could then be considered active in resolving cases 
against Saudi Arabia and against other GCC countries in the case of disputes related 
to AD provisions.  
However, GCC members must also establish a clear legal framework with 
regard to the relationship between themselves and third parties in any legal treatment 
or disputes. All the GCC members are also in the WTO; therefore, agreements 
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between both the GCC and WTO must be clear and uniformly applied. This applies 
to NAFTA members, when they experience conflicts between themselves or with 
third parties. Article 2005 section two states:  
Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATT 
against another Party on grounds that are substantially equivalent to 
those available to that Party under this Agreement, that Party shall notify 
any third Party of its intention. If a third Party wishes to have recourse to 
dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement regarding the matter, 
it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and those Parties shall 
consult with a view to agreement on a single forum. If those Parties 
cannot agree, the dispute normally shall be settled under this 
Agreement.
91
  
 
Under this article, the relationship between the parties, third parties, NAFTA and 
finally the GATT is well organised, so that the parties have appropriate free trade 
movement between them and clear legislation pertaining to this.  
Finally, the GCC acting as a conglomerate will insure a robust legal 
framework with which to defend petrochemicals products against future disputes, 
clarify the price inside the market, and smooth competition between domestic parties 
inside GCC countries. It will also provide a strong legal agency to represent GCC 
members when facing AD provisions abroad, and to protect them from dumping.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia needs to deal with contracting parties in the WTO in good faith, 
whether internally or internationally. In order to act in good faith, Saudi Arabia 
needs to consider changes to its internal economic and trade legal system, in 
particular to introduce a truly competitive investment atmosphere between all 
parties, whether Saudi or foreign, especially in the petrochemicals sector. A truly 
competitive atmosphere will help to create more jobs for Saudis and improve the 
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economic capability of the country in the long term. It will also be of benefit by 
generating a greater national income for Saudi Arabia and encouraging new 
technology to produce products to improve Saudi economic diversity.  
The measures discussed in this chapter would help to resolve and reduce AD 
cases against Saudi petrochemicals products in the future. Authentic competition 
between Saudi petrochemicals products can be achieved by privatising the sector and 
ending government involvement in it. Moreover, the Saudi government should treat 
all investors in petrochemicals, whether Saudi or foreign, equally. This can be 
achieved by selling the raw materials to the petrochemical industries at global prices. 
Although Saudi Arabia has proportionally more resources in terms of raw materials 
than elsewhere, it must treat all industries equally under the law. It should not 
subsidise any sector, unless this type of subsidising is legally acceptable under the 
WTO provisions.
92
 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia should end its current plans for 
additional subsidies of this sector, to avoid facing AD cases against the 
petrochemicals products it exports abroad.  
The major issue regarding the Saudi petrochemical industries is the 
government’s share in these sectors and SABIC’s ownership of the other 
petrochemical industries inside Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia needs to address this 
issue seriously to privatise the entire petrochemicals sector and open the door to 
foreign investment. Such precautionary measures can protect the Saudi 
petrochemicals products from AD cases, and help to increase the quantity of exports 
without breach of the WTO provisions.  
Finally, exporting products under the umbrella of the GCC would help to 
avoid cases being brought against them. Exporting products under the GCC will 
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create an environment of domestic competition, as exports will be treated as if from 
a single nation. However, the relationship between these countries, third parties and 
the WTO must be clarified, as all are members of the WTO. A framework of dispute 
resolution between GCC members must be introduced to resolve any legal issues to 
avoid the need to consult the WTO to manage legal issues between them. 
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CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION 
OF AD AND ANTI-SUBSIDY DISPUTES: ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE NEED FOR AN ITC 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
1
 to demonstrate the effectiveness and weaknesses of 
these procedures in practice. It will also include additional proposals that could be 
applied to resolve legal disputes between parties in cases of AD and anti-subsidy.  
The DSU is described and legislated for in the WTO agreement,
2
 which has 
many articles relating to the procedures for dispute resolution in cases of 
international trade conflicts between contracting parties or companies. van den 
Bossche and Zdouc discuss “The WTO has a remarkable system to settle disputes 
between WTO Members concerning their rights and obligations under the WTO 
agreement”.3 There are several options available for resolving legal disputes between 
parties under the WTO.
4
 Yet, the dispute settlement mechanism has not yet been 
utilised successfully to resolve conflicts in a straightforward manner, affording 
advantages to all parties; indeed, article 3.7 of the DSU mandates that “the aim of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms is to secure a positive solution to a dispute”.5  
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It can also be seen that the majority of contracting parties prefer to resolve 
legal matters relating to the WTO by initiating judicial processes at the national 
level, as seen in Chapter 3,
6
 resulting in a high number of cases between its 
contracting parties in relation to AD.
7
 However, the DSU prefers to resolve legal 
matters between the contracting parties out of court:  
…the DSU prefers parties not to go to court, but to settle their dispute 
amicably out of court. Accordingly, each dispute settlement process must 
start with consultations (or an attempt to have consultations) between the 
parties to the dispute.
8
  
 
The chief factors involved in these alternative dispute resolutions will be discussed 
in this chapter. Introducing alternative methods to resolve disputes could have a 
directly positive effect on all parties, enabling them to resolve legal conflicts 
involving international trade relations between nations quickly and smoothly.  
This chapter will address the topics of dispute resolution relative to AD and 
anti-subsidy under the WTO agreement, as it is essential to effect dispute resolution 
swiftly when legal matters arise between parties. It will consider the weaknesses 
present in current dispute resolution mechanisms to avoid these weaknesses in 
future, and support development. The next stage will be to introduce alternative 
means of dispute resolution, offering a full explanation of all relevant articles and 
explaining why contracting parties currently avoid using dispute resolution 
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mechanisms. It will also discuss the advantages and disadvantages of employing 
alternative resolutions and ways of developing legislation in order to utilise these 
articles more effectively, rather than using traditional judicial approaches to resolve 
WTO conflicts between parties. Such approaches also offer new ideas for resolving 
disputes between parties, establishing new centres for dispute resolution under the 
WTO DRC and an International Trade Court (ITC) to gain more control and further 
reduce incidents leading to disputes.  
6.2 AD and anti-subsidy dispute resolution under the WTO 
agreement  
This section addresses the dispute resolution mechanisms under the DSU,
9
 to support 
the reader’s understanding of the mechanisms informing the rules. This section will 
be divided in two subsections; the first will provide an overview of dispute 
settlement mechanisms under the WTO agreement, particularly regarding AD and 
anti-subsidy legal matters. The second will address the weaknesses of these dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  
6.2.1 Overview  
This section, addresses the formal processes of Consultation, Panels and the 
Appellate Body under the DSU. This overview will help to clarify the mechanisms 
available for resolving disputes, and help introduce the associated weaknesses 
referenced in the following section.  
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6.2.1.1 Consultation  
Conflicting parties in any legal dispute related to the WTO can resolve legal issues 
through consultation. Jackson analyses “The hope is that the parties will resolve their 
dispute without having to invoke the formal dispute settlement procedures”.10 It is 
the responsibility of the disputants to determine which level the consultation 
requires: “The manner in which the consultation is conducted is up to the disputing 
parties”.11 Once the conflicting parties are engaged in consultation the first stage is 
for each to gain a clearer understanding of the facts “During the consultation both 
parties try to learn more about the facts and about the legal arguments of the other 
party”.12 The conflicting party must reply to the DSU within 10 days of receiving the 
consultation request, and has must enter the consultation process within 30 days.
13
 
Conflicting parties must enter the consultation process acting in a good faith;
14
 i.e. 
“The DSU only requires that consultations are to be entered into a good faith…”15 
However, the consultation must end within sixty days of the request being made; if 
this requirement is not met, the parties may request a panel to be established to 
resolve the dispute.
16
 A consultation often fails to reach conciliation within the sixty 
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day time limit, and there is an option to extend the consultation rather than calling 
for a panel; Jackson notes, “In fact, consultations often go on for more than sixty 
days”.17  
Typically, consultation has a positive effect in terms of resolving the disputes 
between parties; up “until the end of 2011, almost 42% of the 427 consultation 
requests were resolved at the consultation stage”.18 However, these numbers have 
since reduced. As stated by Ahn, Lee and Park “…the role of consultation in settling 
the disputes has been significantly weakened in recent years”.19 Moreover, it can be 
seen that the terms of consultation are not always clear to members: “In fact, what 
substantive requirements are in terms of consultation is not clear”.20 In addition, it 
can be seen that conflicting parties often prefer action under judicial systems, such as 
panels or the Appellate Body, in order to resolve conflicts.  
6.2.1.2 Panels  
Under the DSU, instructions for the establishment of panels are set out in several 
articles in detail.
21
 All articles afford panels an important role in the termination of 
disputes between conflicting parties.  
In order to establish a panel, the desire to do so must be presented in writing 
at the relevant Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meeting.
22
 This written request 
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should include information regarding whether consultations have been held, the 
scope of the legal issue, and any other relevant details. There is a period related to 
preparation of the terms of reference made by such a panel, unless the parties to the 
dispute agree otherwise, within 20 days of the panel’s establishment.23 The panel 
must be composed of:  
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, 
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, 
served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to 
GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any 
covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, 
taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a 
senior trade policy official of a Member.
24
  
 
The members of panels must be independent; in particular referring to their opinion 
and output; and must not be affected by any other factors, such as their citizenship.
25
 
However, if there is no agreement between members of the panel within 20 days of 
its establishment, the Director-General, the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman 
of related Councils or Committees shall determine the composition of the panel by 
appointing it applying a selection process.
26
 Regardless of the means of its 
establishment, the panel should include at least one member from a developing 
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country, if a developing country requests this, in a case where the conflict is between 
a developing and developed country.
27
  
Once established, these panels take on two roles: supervision and legislative. 
Regarding the supervisory role, this can be clearly illustrated be referring to an AD 
case considered by a panel. In a case between the United States and Japan, there was 
specific mention of the panel’s supervisory role. “[t]he Panel recommended that the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) request that the United States bring its measures 
into conformity with the AD Agreement”.28  
In this case, it was recommended by the panel that the United States change 
its regulations to make them compatible with the AD Agreement, making the panel’s 
role legislative. The panel’s findings and conclusions were: 
[t]he Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the United 
States to bring its measures found in this Report, and in the Panel Report 
[…], to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement and the [WTO 
Agreement], into conformity with its obligations under those 
Agreements.
29
  
 
In this section, it can be seen that the panel’s mechanisms under DSU rules can 
resolve conflict between parties. However, there are some weak points that will be 
addressed in this research after the overview section.  
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6.2.1.3 The Appellate Body 
The Appellate Body is a unique system, referred to for the resolution of disputes 
between parties; “Thus was born another one of the extraordinary and unique 
features of the WTO DS process, namely the appeal procedure”.30 It is the highest 
level to which disputing parties can take a case; it is similar to a supreme court, and 
considers the issue of law only; i.e. “An appeal shall be limited to issue of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel”.31 The 
Appellate Body differs different from panels and consultations with regard to 
processes by which its rules have been developed. John argues, “The Appellate 
Body, unlike panels, is explicitly given the authority to develop (in consultation) its 
own rules, and this can be an important power”.32 However, third parties are not 
permitted to join at the Appellate Body level; it is stated, “Only parties to the 
dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel…”33 However, the Appellate Body is 
usually composed of seven persons who are engaged to serve in the Appellate Body 
for a period of four years.
34
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As mentioned in article 17.5 of the DSU,
35
 the Appellate Body is expected to 
consider legal matters within 60 days: As defined by Jackson: 
the appeal process is designed to be very speedy, so the normal timetable 
calls for a final report within sixty days of the appeal; although, this is 
sometimes extended to ninety days or more. This imposes enormous 
pressure on the Appellate Body members, so very heavy work weeks 
(including working in the evenings and at weekends) are not unknown.
36
  
6.2.2 Weaknesses within the DSU 
This section considers those weaknesses in the DSU that require more consideration 
from contracting parties. There are many points to be discussed in this section; for 
example, the absence of an ability to resolve disputes using alternative measures, the 
failure to assist developing countries, transparency, political effects and errors in 
drafting. However, primarily it will concentrate on the rights of the private sector 
concerning the dispute settlement.  
6.2.2.1 The failure to resolve disputes using alternative measures  
Evidence shows no serious movement with regard to resolving the disputes between 
contracting parties under the WTO using alternative approaches, such as 
negotiations, mediations or arbitration. Thus, consultation is not progressing in a 
direction that will reduce the high number of cases between conflicting parties. As 
illustrated by Ahn, Lee and Park “In fact, consultation is supposed to serve 
conflicting roles: bilateral settlement oriented process on the one hand and a 
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mandatory pre-litigation procedure on the other hand”.37 Contracting parties are less 
likely to resolve legal matters about the WTO in consultation. In addition, they state, 
“…the WTO members bring less consultation requests but at the same time they are 
less likely to settle by consultation”.38  
Such an example offers no means to resolve legal matters in relation to AD 
legislation using alternative measures: Bourgeios explains “The WTO AD code does 
no longer provide for a mandatory conciliation stage, which is also absent under the 
DSU”.39 Contracting parties to the WTO agreement must seek to resolve legal 
concerns under the WTO using alternative means if they are to halt the increase in 
the number of legal issues between them under the DSU. There should be greater 
engorgement for conflicting parties under the WTO agreement, to resolve disputes 
by applying alternative dispute resolution tactics.  
6.2.2.2 Lack of assistance for developing countries  
Although some articles under the DSU extend support to developing countries, these 
countries require more attention and assistance from developed countries and the 
WTO itself. It is unfair for developing countries to attend dispute resolution 
proceedings without first being given access to full knowledge and understanding of 
the legal techniques applied under the DSU and the WTO agreement. Many 
developing countries require greater legal assistance on how to resolve disputes 
under the WTO, and to reduce the number of claims brought against them. At 
present, Papa states, “there is no WTO-like centre offering assistance to developing 
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countries despites the increasing number of claims against them”.40 Were one 
instituted, a centre might still be unable to offer adequate support to countries with a 
low understanding of the terms of the WTO agreement. Fairness between developing 
and developed countries with regard to legal skills and ability to deal with legal 
matters remains something that must be achieved.  
6.2.2.3 Transparency  
The level of transparency is not adequate, especially with regard to panels. Panel 
data is not available to the public; Jackson explains, “As at September 2005 all 
proceedings have been closed to the public, and indeed portions are closed even to 
WTO members that are not parties”.41 Transparency will demonstrate to the public 
that procedures are being conducted properly and legally.  
In addition, transparency can prevent the corruption of the dispute process 
between conflicting parties. However, transparency should not affect judicial 
procedures, or breach confidentiality.  
6.2.2.4 The political effect  
There is a political effect on governments proceeding from dispute resolution 
policies. There is pressure in such cases between countries, whether from Panels or 
Appellate Body members, and even within the conflicting countries, to resolve legal 
matters between them: Jackson observes,  
Any such proposal would reintroduce a fundamental weakness that was 
present in the GATT DS producers, politicizing the DS process and 
encouraging diplomatic and their governments to divert their attention 
away from the reasoned argumentation and process of a juridical 
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procedure towards lobbying and diplomatic bargaining that would lead to 
the ultimate decision in a particular case.
42
 
 
However, political and diplomatic pressure can have a negative impact on the 
dispute settlement process. However, it is acceptable to engage in political 
negotiations between conflicting parties, in order to resolve legal matters without 
burdening one or other party in a more emphatic way, particularly if that party is a 
developing country.  
There have been some criticisms that the Appellate Body has been 
overreaching its mandate as set out under the DSU: “Others have criticized the 
Appellate Body as “overreaching its mandate” and engaging in “judicial activism” 
outside its competence and transgressing the allocated powers of the diplomatic 
process”.43 This occurs when the DSU’s aim to resolve disputes between parties, 
extends beyond that acceptable under regulations. Some legal scholars have 
mentioned that the GATT is a legal system that is separate from international law, 
and which can support the notion of differences between international law and 
international commercial law. Shany considers,  
some advocates supported the view that GATT was a separate regime, 
and therefore had a totally stand-alone jurisprudence and legal structure. 
Many others, including this author, opposed that view, and there are 
relatively numerous examples throughout the history of GATT that 
would oppose the “separate regime” theory.44  
 
There is combining of the rules of international law and political treatment and the 
international commercial law. Nevertheless, the style of diplomatic and political 
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pressure used under the DSU to resolve legal matters between parties does not apply 
at this stage.  
The political pressure resulting from international law is evident when parties 
seek to agreed or amend rules under the WTO agreement regarding DSU. 
International Law differs in the treatment of parties when compared to International 
Commercial Law. Practitioners in the field of dispute settlement need avoid 
confusing these two types of regulations when resolving disputes between 
conflicting parties.  
6.2.2.5 Faults in the drafting of DSU  
Faults are present in the draft of the DSU; Jackson observes, “A well- known fault in 
the drafting of the DSU has been perplexing”,45 this can be seen in article 21 (5). 
This fault refers to promulgation of a DSU report to challenge whether the "losing" 
party is sufficiently implementing the obligations that the report noted as formerly 
neglected. Conversely, provision of Article 22 presents "the wining” party with a 
short period in which to propose near-automatically approved relationship measures, 
which are termed "compensatory". DSU Article 22 (6) provides procedures 
to challenge these measures. However, both sets of procedures 
are practically impossible to combine within the timeframes of the other procedures 
set out. This has been termed a "sequencing" difficulty; and it would seem more 
sensible to introduce a third-party panel to determine the appropriateness of 
the proposed measures prior to adoption. Several disputing parties have agreed in 
particular cases to an ad hoc understanding of how to resolve this problem by 
instituting changes to the rules of the DSU for specific cases only. Others contend 
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that no additional reform is necessary. Meanwhile, others have noted 
that the instability of ad hoc measures, and risk when one party might find some 
advantage to refusing to agree to a sensible understanding. Furthermore, some 
suggest that the procedures of ad hoc agreements can raise additional 
diplomatic considerations or bargaining processed which are not transparent, because 
the DSU rules are misleading. Most observers consider that this situation is an 
example of consensus paralysis, as the method to resolve the matter through changes 
in the DSU language is apparent. 
6.2.2.6 Private sector involvement in dispute settlement 
The Vienna Convention
46
 includes reference to at the level at which the WTO can be 
considered to comprise part of International Law. Jackson states “Consequently, it is 
still not easy to judge how the customary international law principle of treaty 
interpretation related to preparatory work will be utilised in the WTO jurisprudential 
system”.47 As the WTO agreement is an agreement made between states, the private 
sector in general is not implicated in it; “From the very first case, the appellate Body 
has made it quite clear the WTO is part of the general international legal landscape 
for world affairs”.48 Consequently, private sector representatives cannot attend 
alternative dispute resolution unless they do so as a third party under the auspices of 
                                                 
46
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
47
 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, (1st 
edition, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 166. 
48
 The World Trade Organization, The future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the 
New Millennium, Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi 
2004, 52. 
200 
 
their governments. This idea relates to a principle in public international law,
49
 
which positions the WTO as a component in international law.  
The limitations on the attendance of private sector representatives at dispute 
settlement proceedings under the DSU can be seen as one of its weakness; i.e. it 
requires the involvement of governments to resolve legal issues: Peter states  
Companies, industry associations or NGOs cannot have recourse to 
WTO dispute settlement, nor can they join consultations or be a third 
party or third participant in panel or Appellate proceedings. Yet it would 
be incorrect to state that companies, industry associations and NGOs are 
not ‘involved’ in WTO dispute settlement.50 
 
The limitations affecting the private sector in such disputes under the DSU arise 
because the agreement itself does not support methods to resolve disputes in the 
private sector at the international level. Even though, trade disputes between the 
private sector usually relate to trade agreements without any involvement from WTO 
members. The DSU in article two mentioned that only certain parties are allowed to 
attend the disputes mechanism under the DSU: 
...With respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a 
Plurilateral Trade Agreement, the term “Member” as used herein shall refer 
only to those Members that are parties to the relevant Plurilateral Trade 
Agreement. Where the DSB administers the dispute settlement provisions of a 
Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that 
Agreement may participate in decision or actions taken by the DSB with 
respect to that dispute...
51
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It is seen as a problem that disputes between private sector companies must be 
handled by governments, as those who are affected are often not well-represented by 
their governments, who have no interest in the legal matters affecting them. This 
provision requires reformulation, to allow private sector companies to resolve legal 
issues related to the WTO agreement under the umbrella of the WTO, without 
government involvement.  
This governmental involvement in the WTO conflicts at the DSU level can 
be summarised by two points:  
1. It is necessary for the government to become involved in the conflict, 
because of the types of cases that arise between parties. To clarify; a conflict 
between parties might relate to the implementation of any of the WTO 
provisions, where the other party to the conflict has suffered as a result of the 
implementation of the provisions(s) and disagreement exists over the 
understanding of the WTO agreement, as was the case between the USA and 
Japan.
52
 In this particular case, the government was involved in the conflict 
as well as other companies, as they will be the first to be affected by the 
results of the resolution processes. Another example is that when the 
government is involved in the case itself, problems are introduced, as in the 
anti-subsidy cases between Saudi Arabia and others.
53
 In anti-subsidy cases, 
the government subsidises the industries, and therefore it is by definition 
involved in the case.  
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2. Cases take place between private sector companies themselves, and so there 
may be no reason for the government to become involved. In this situation, 
the private sector can become involved in the DSU autonomously without the 
involvement of government, unless it is necessarily for the case to proceed. 
AD cases affecting Saudi Arabia, typically related to Saudi products that 
have been sold at less than the normal price. Producers of these products are 
responsible for defending their pricing to the domestic authorities as well as at the 
DSU level. Therefore, it would be preferable for private sector individuals to have 
the option to defend their products without involvement from governments, 
especially when there has been no government involvement in the production, 
development or exporting of the product. 
Those countries, which have signed the WTO agreement, have expressed an 
interest in communicating trade discussions among themselves. Shany argues, 
Although WTO agreement are negotiated and signed by governments, 
their objection is not only to sustain governments’ international 
cooperation efforts, but also to help “economic operators”- that is, 
producers, importers, and exporters- to conduct their business.
54
  
 
However, their interests should also be compatible with the interests of the private 
sector. This is why the WTO agreement is to be applied to the private sector and why 
there is no need for governments to become involved and participate in dispute 
settlement concerning products from the private sector.  
Because of this, contracting parties under the WTO must consider affording 
more access to the private sector, allowing them to apply their cases under the DSU 
directly and without cover from governments. The majority of the private sector 
companies involved in disputes tends to be major players in a globalised field, and 
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not under the guardianship of their governments. In truth, some of these companies 
have as much access to wealth as some developing countries, and consequently are 
well equipped to represent their own interests in legal matters related to DSU.  
An additional issue of concern is that foreign investors, operating within the 
state under investigation, may own a majority share in the companies involved in the 
disputes. In this case, the question arises: how would the government represent such 
investors in a dispute with another country in the DSU? Typically, the illegal 
processes of the trading parties damage the private sector. Although the government 
might suffer in some cases, private sector companies are those most affected, 
therefore it is reasonable that they receive the right to self-representation.  
 At present, representation is only granted on appeal to their domestic legal 
systems. Because private sector companies operate within member states, they are 
responsible for conducting their business disputes first within the domestic legal 
framework and in accordance WTO provisions. AD, for example, has a direct effect 
on the private sector and industries and can therefore affect national economic 
systems in the long term. However, in such cases, the private sector and industry 
must apply to achieve a dispute settlement through their governments; even though, 
Bourgeois argues “AD relates to conduct of parties rather than conduct of 
countries”.55 As argued in this section, the contracting parties should adopt an option 
for the private sector to have access to the DSU to resolve disputes and take 
advantage of AD and anti-subsidy rules.  
However, under the DSU it will now be impossible for the private sector to 
attend to disputes, as in article 2 the DSU limited the raising of cases under this 
agreement to members. For that reason, there is a need to amend the DSU agreement 
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to give the private sector “their right” to go through the DSU mechanism and defend 
their international trade interests under the WTO agreement in the future.   
6.3 Alternative dispute resolution in cases of AD and anti-subsidy  
This section concerns DSU rules from different angles in order to identify non-
conventional ways to resolve AD and anti-subsidy cases in particular, and conflicts 
related to the WTO agreement in general. Resolutions should be afforded more 
attention from contracting parties to avoid a lengthy legal process to resolve AD and 
anti-subsidy cases. This will reduce the time spent on pursuing cases, and reduce 
costs to the disputing parties. Collins states, “Furthermore, ADR [alternative dispute 
resolution] processes are likely to be less expensive than domestic courts and 
international arbitration...”.56 Moreover, dispute resolution steps will help to 
terminate the conflict between the parties satisfactorily: van den Bossche and Zdouc 
explain:  
Between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2012, a total of 454 disputes 
[were] brought to the WTO, [….] the parties were able to reach an 
amicable solution through consultations, or the dispute was otherwise 
resolved without recourse to adjudication...
57
 
 
This statement shows that a great number of disputes were being brought to panels 
because they could not be resolved elsewhere. Thereby demonstrating how important 
it is for contracting parties to use alternative means to resolve conflicts between 
them, to insure disputes can be resolved simply.  
However, a question arises here as to the meaning of the phrase ‘alternative 
dispute resolution’. Use of the word ‘alternative’, distinguishes proposals from the 
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‘traditional’. Nonetheless, some argue over the accuracy of using the word. 
Alternative in this section is understood to describe the methods applied when 
resolving disputes between parties. Ackerman explains,  
The word ‘alternative’ suggests a deviation from methods of resolving 
disputes outside the courtroom. Thus, some have suggested that the term 
‘appropriate dispute resolution’ better describes the array of devices 
available for the resolution of conflict.
58
  
 
Arguably, there may not be much difference in terminology when deciding to use 
‘alternative’ or ‘appropriate’ to describe dispute resolution between parties. 
However, the best way to describe this is by using the expression ‘different methods 
of dispute resolution’, as these methods can be applied at any time in the process 
even when parties are engaged in judicial action. Although ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’ is one option, it might accurately describe this method of dispute 
resolution.  
Alternative dispute resolution is required between contracting parties to 
develop an ability to address issues like AD and anti-subsidy. Taking such steps will 
help to avoid government involvement in such cases “…there has to be a certain 
level of government involvement in the private action…”,59 and this could 
potentially reduce the large number of cases between contracting parties.
60
 However, 
involvement is considerable in each case “Each case will have to be examined on its 
facts to determine whether the level of government involvement in the actions of 
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private parties is such that these actions can be properly attributed to a Member”.61 
Moreover, it will help to accelerate trade exchange between nations without 
encountering obstacles, such as legal issues or processes; as such cases have 
increased considerably since the 1980s, threatening free trade between nations. 
Some means of resolution were mentioned in the DSU, while others 
suggested a more logical way of dealing with issues by developing legal methods. 
Peter analyses that,  
Of these methods, arbitration under article 25 and good offices, 
conciliation and mediation under article 5 have only played a marginal 
role; in almost all WTO disputes, Members had recourse to 
consultations, and, if those were unsuccessfully, adjudication.
62
  
 
These methods need to be applied more with regard to AD and anti-subsidy cases, in 
order to reduce the large number of disputes affecting these types of cases. 
Nonetheless, WTO AD provisions do not compel parties to resolve disputes using 
alternative actions, such as mediation and arbitration.  
However, article 5 of the DSU
63
 states that conflicting parties can undertake 
the procedures of good office, conciliation and mediation voluntarily. On this point, 
it can be seen that the agreement itself gives conflicting parties the option to either 
pursue alternative options, or abide by the judicial process. Moreover, these articles 
do not encourage contracting parties to resolve and terminate conflicts by using 
alternative methods, but instead compel conflicting parties to embark on a period of 
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mediation or conciliation. In reference to this point, contracting parties do not 
prioritise alternative approaches, but instead prefer traditional methods for ending 
conflicts under the DSU.  
The positive significant effect of alternative methods of dispute resolution 
mentioned by the DSU (i.e. good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration) 
should be analysed here. Encouraging contracting parties to resolve any legal issues 
by promoting alternative dispute resolution in the agreement itself as a way of 
starting the process of AD and anti-subsidy will help in a number of different ways:  
1. It will lower the cost of continuing a claim between the conflicting parties 
by: reducing the cost to the government sector, the need to prepare 
qualified people (i.e. lawyers and economists) to follow up on cases and 
undertake investigations, interviews, and other elements of the process. 
Beginning with a negotiation could help reduce the cost cases, which 
cause expense to all parties. 
2.  It will save time for anyone dealing with cases when they are involved in 
the judicial process, and will allow them to focus on the most serious 
cases. Moreover, the time required for processing issues will be shortened 
if they can be resolved without recourse to litigation.  
3. It will limit the total number of cases, because many would be resolved 
without recourse to the AD authorities. Perhaps the process might need to 
come under the supervision of domestic AD and anti-subsidy authorities, 
for alternative approaches to meet WTO agreement standards and avoid 
illegalities arising. Any decrease in the number of cases would enable 
authorities to concentrate on other cases and collect information for a 
database that would be useful to authorities in the future.  
208 
 
4. It would help to avoid a reduction in the quantities of exported products 
and limits export until completion of negotiations or location of strong 
evidence of serious damage to either or both the domestic industries 
concerned. By regulating these processes, it will be easy to acquire a 
definition of AD and anti-subsidy techniques and terms in practice, so 
that such processes become better regulated between the contracting and 
conflicting parties.  
5. It will help to increase the export and exchange of goods between 
contracting parties in general, without raising new legal issues or barriers, 
which might otherwise affect the process of exporting.  
6.3.1 Good offices, conciliation and mediation 
Article 5 of the DSU refers to good offices, conciliation and mediation in relation to 
the termination of conflict between contracting parties,
64
 whether it is an AD and 
anti-subsidy conflict or another international trade-related conflict. It is true that 
good offices, conciliation and mediation differ entirely from negotiation. Negotiation 
can be considered a part of good offices; however, conciliation and mediation are 
unlike negotiation, because a third party often handles them. Mediation involves a 
third party in the dispute, in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. 
Malkawi considers “Mediation is the process by which a neutral third party assists 
dispute parties in reaching a voluntary resolution of their disputes”.65  
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Article 5 does not include these approaches to ending conflicts as part of the 
legal processes involved in disputes under the WTO, in order to avoid any negative 
impact resulting from the misapplication of regulations. It only mentions the process 
as it affects this way of ending the conflict, as it is an optional method for conflicting 
parties to choose. Jackson states “The DSU also provides for voluntary mediation at 
any time (an option which is rarely used)…”.66 Article 5 requires conflicting parties 
to agree to perform good offices, conciliation and mediation.
67
  
The DSU needs to be reformed to encourage conflicting parties to follow 
procedures set out before embarking on a judicial process. This is similar to most 
domestic judicial systems, where one party files a case against another, especially in 
a trade conflict; the court gives the parties time to try to resolve legal issues between 
them without taking any further action. Encouraging conflicting parties to resolve 
issues by allowing a period in which to utilise this article in conflicts between parties 
would therefore help to reduce the number of cases related to WTO provisions 
(especially AD and anti-subsidy cases). Conversely, it would also reduce costs and 
save time for all involved.  
However, the most important benefit of alternative methods is the limitation 
placed on government involvement in international trade cases related to the WTO 
agreement, as well as a reduction in the number of cases. The cases related to the 
WTO agreement, especially AD and anti-subsidy, are increasing in number rapidly, 
which might hitherto become an obstacle to trade movement and exchange.  
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6.3.2 Arbitration 
Arbitration is one of the possible processes mentioned in Article 25 of the DSU,
68
 as 
appropriate for assisting in the resolution of a trade dispute between contracting 
parties in relation to free trade and the movement of products between parties. 
However, in reality, it is not utilised well in most conflicts, Jackson clarifies “…and 
for alternative procedure of arbitration, also rarely used”.69 Contracting parties 
generally prefer to apply the judicial process to legal issues relating to the WTO, 
particularly in AD and anti-subsidy cases. Using this method to resolve legal issues 
would, however, hastens the process. Malkawi elucidates, “Arbitration and other 
ADR mechanisms tend to provide speedier resolutions of disputes than going 
through litigation in courts”.70 Arbitration would also prevent interference by the 
government. Moreover, it is helpful for reducing the cost of the settlement between 
parties, as noted by Malkawi, “Arbitration and other ADR mechanisms can 
significantly reduce the cost of settlement”.71 However, more clarification is needed 
with regard to AD duty in cases where arbitration decisions permit AD duty to be 
applied to any of the disputants.  
Article 25 of the DSU emphasises that for arbitration to succeed, the issue 
itself has to be clear; it should be “clearly defined by both parties”,72 and understood 
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by both. Moreover, the conflicting parties, who might or might not agree, should 
determine the standard of clarity. In this research, the clarity referred to in this article 
could be specified more broadly, so that it can be applied to all parties, whether they 
are in arbitration or not. At present, an issue might be clear to one party, but without 
agreement, arbitration is not possible. Were this definition removed, the article could 
be broadly applied, thereby eliminating one obstacle to the contracting parties 
choosing arbitration to resolve conflicts.  
Moreover, regarding AD and anti-subsidy regulations, the government 
should not intervene in these cases, unless all alternative means of resolving them 
legally have failed. This will limit state intervention in legal issues, and the process 
will cost less money and save time. 
Article 25 of the DSU mentioned arbitration as one way to resolve the legal 
issues between contracting parties. However, in general, the implementation of AD 
and anti-subsidy measures has not been mentioned as a way to resolve disputes; nor 
does it encourage contracting parties to use it in conflicts related to them. Therefore, 
the only way of resolving legal matters, as mentioned in implementations related to 
AD and anti-subsidy is by filing legal cases through the judicial process.
73
 This 
article clarifies arbitration by referring all processes to articles 21 and 22.
74
 These 
articles are, however, poorly organised regarding arbitration; especially as regards 
the matter of applying duties or charges. They deal with arbitration as a government 
panel and do not mention the results of that arbitration, or how it will affect the 
involved parties. 
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The normal rules of arbitration cannot be applied in AD and anti-subsidy 
conflicts because there is generally no agreement between exporting and importing 
countries on AD and anti-subsidy rules. It is only when conflicts arise, that the need 
to establish agreements emerges. Thus, a slight change in the requirement in article 
25 (i.e. that “[the parties] shall agree on procedures to be followed”75) is needed in 
this area. The arbitration here should be recognised as based, not on the agreement 
between the parties, but on the dispute settlement agreement as a method of 
resolving these issues.  
The assumption of this research is that arbitration would take place between 
conflicting parties in relation to AD and anti-subsidy legal issues; those industries 
that have been injured or threatened by a dumped imported similar product should 
first send a letter informing the export company of this issue. The exporting industry 
should take advantage of the opportunity for negotiation and initiate this 
immediately. However, a copy of the letter, which is sent to the exporting industry, 
should also be sent to the exporting and importing countries, as well as the WTO, in 
order to make them aware of the conflict. After a limited period is allowed for 
negotiation, both parties should enter arbitration, rather than filing a case and 
involving their governments. The arbitration decision should conclude the conflict, 
and copies of the decision made should be sent to both countries concerned, as well 
as to the WTO: “Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council or 
Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point 
relating thereto”.76 With regard to the duty applied by this arbitration, it should be 
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paid to the domestic industries as compensation not to the governments, as noted in 
the preceding chapters of this thesis.  
It is recommended that arbitration decisions should be retained in a database 
to be accessible to all contracting parties, for use resolving any future legal issues 
swiftly. Furthermore, this will help to identify any legal issues in the agreement itself 
and outline the legal process to support changes to faulty legislation to develop them. 
Arbitration has a proven history in resolving conflicts affecting international 
commercial relationships; it has been used in this context for some time. The 
contracting parties to the WTO agreement should reconsider using it as an important 
means to resolve issues related to this agreement, as it will assist in ending conflict 
without interference from state parties.  
As an example of use of arbitration as a method to resolve legal issues related 
to AD law, a case between the United States and the European Community (the EC, 
now the EU) will be analysed.
77
 The EC initially requested consultations regarding 
the calculation of dumping margins known as ‘zeroing’. After many countries joined 
this consultation, the EU decided to request the establishment of a panel because 
there were additional determinations regarding the US obligation under the WTO.
78
 
Many non-EU countries joined as third parties and after many communications 
between parties concerning this issue, the DSB agreed to refer to arbitration, as both 
parties to the case requested arbitration. Arbitration brought a satisfactory resolution 
to the matter, and both conflicting parties accepted the decision made under 
arbitration.  
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However, there may be cases where one of the conflicting parties chooses not 
to accept the decision made under arbitration; this then leads to the question of how 
the issue will then be resolved. The principle of arbitration is that there should be 
agreement regarding the judgment between conflicting parties, in order for a decision 
to be accepted and not appealed. However, any decision can also be reviewed by the 
ITC, the role of which will be discussed later in this chapter. This is the Supreme 
Court overseeing all global international trade judgments. 
6.3.3 The role of AD committees as alternative means of resolving cases 
Under Article 16 of the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, there is a 
committee established to deal with legal issues associated with AD.
79
 A report must 
be made to this committee outlining any preliminary and final AD actions, as well as 
presenting a bi-annual report about AD actions taken by members. The committee 
should be notified of all domestic procedures central to the initiation and 
investigation of any action.  
However, a question arises here regarding whether or not this committee 
should intervene in illegal processes or actions affecting AD cases at the domestic 
level. As mentioned in article 16,
80
 the committee only requires that it be informed of 
AD actions or investigations; therefore, it has no power to deal with overflow caused 
by AD performed by the domestic authorities. Article 16 does not mention other 
related functions to this committee.  
However, as has been seen, contracting parties can complain to the 
committee about any AD action that they consider illegal. The committee should 
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play a major role at the international level in relation to AD to prevent an increase in 
such cases, as they could become an obstacle to the free movement of international 
goods between nations. When cases arise, contracting parties should submit a copy 
of each initial AD case or related decisions to the committee, to enable it to play a 
more active role, by checking on whether every individual AD initiation or decision 
and process and implementation of AD regulations is compatible with the AD 
Agreement or not. This process would help to reduce the numbers of this type of 
case and lead to amendment of the necessary articles through recommendations for a 
legal change.  
6.3.4 The role of more research into the DSU 
Research can be an effective way to develop new ideas and approaches in any field; 
this is especially true in connection with laws and regulations. Governments 
normally use the best researchers from universities and centres (relevant to certain 
topics) to guide them in making necessary reforms. These researchers typically 
examine laws or regulations theoretically and analyse all the ideas related to them.  
However, contracting parties should be encouraged to direct more attention 
toward research related to AD and anti-subsidy measures to develop former policies, 
to address price discrimination better. The first AD regulation was established in 
1904 in Canada;
81
 it was further developed to become part of the WTO Agreement.
82
 
However, this regulation requires reform to deal with the relevant issues effectively, 
as noted in the previous chapters.  
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Research typically requires considerable time to prove new ideas or develop 
them. However, it is not an easy process to conduct reform of the WTO agreement, 
as it differs from other international agreements in relation to the number of WTO 
members, making it the largest and most complicated international organisation.  
A great deal of research has been conducted regarding the WTO agreement in 
general, and AD and anti-subsidy in particular. However, changes from the roots 
upwards have not yet been fully realised as free trade between contracting parties. 
One of the most important ideas thus far, has been to establish a research centre to 
deal with AD and anti-subsidy issues more actively; in particular, producing 
additional regulations, so that positive changes can result from cases brought. The 
body of research relating to the WTO, and AD and anti-subsidy in particular require 
greater consideration by the WTO and contracting parties, including extending 
values to assist them in developing to the agreement.  
6.4 The need for a DRC 
The WTO should create a centre for dispute resolution to act as a channel for all 
disputes related to international trade around the world under the WTO. There are 
many reasons for establishing a centre as follows:  
1.  To minimise the high number of disputes related to the WTO agreement, 
particularly AD and anti-subsidy disputes.  
2.  To understand the practical application of the WTO and the difficulties arising 
from the WTO agreement; this will help the contracting parties to make the 
required changes to the WTO agreement.  
3. To reduce the time needed to resolve disputes between parties.  
4. To reduce the interference by the government in disputes.  
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5. To be run by the WTO to insure complete neutrality when settling disputes.  
6. To reduce the cost of the dispute resolution between parties; it will be paid for 
by fees paid by disputants and so be financially independent.  
7. To run the dispute process in line with the WTO agreement, even in cases of 
alternative dispute resolutions, so that the parties do not have to deal with 
different departments or panels to resolve legal issues.  
 
The centre would offer considerable benefit to contracting parties in general and 
conflicting parties in particular. All disputes under the WTO would be sent 
immediately to the centre and it would then seek a way to resolve disputes, using the 
methods mentioned in the previous sections, such as arbitration, mediation etc. The 
centre may also work on cases, creating committees to oversee each kind of dispute. 
These committees would be concentrating mainly on strategies related to the WTO, 
such as trying to reduce the number of conflicts and the WTO mechanism. However, 
as mentioned above regarding the AD committee, such committees can become 
involved with this centre to resolve legal issues between; that role can be undertaken 
before or after the involvement of such a centre in a conflict. This would help to 
resolve issues more smoothly and at a lower financial cost to parties. 
The centre would have other benefits too; for instance, insuring government 
involvement in international trade cases is limited. Moreover, the centre would bring 
in modest revenue for the WTO, as the conflicting parties would be required to pay 
fees directly to it. This would support engagement in more activities related to 
international trade in general.  
Another positive point when establishing a centre of this kind is to resolve 
the legal conflicts related to international trade between those parties who are not 
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members of the WTO, and who are in the process of becoming members under this 
agreement. Such a centre would, on the one hand, help parties to reform their 
domestic regulations in order for them to conform to the WTO, and on the other, 
give them a clearer breadth of understanding of the WTO and its dispute settlement 
procedures. Moreover, such a centre would be able to establish a section for 
resolving disputes between parties who are not members of the WTO and who have 
not applied for membership. However, there would be no legal obligation placed on 
these parties to attend the centre, although if they agree to resolve a dispute through 
it, this would mean they accept the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the 
method for attaining a resolution. This could facilitate international trade, even for 
parties who are not members, by making agreements align more closely with WTO 
principles, to improve the mechanisms required for the globalisation of trade 
between states.  
There are already similar centres, which have been established, and function 
well worldwide to resolve disputes between parties, for instance, the International 
Court of Arbitration and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
83
 as well as 
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).
84
 There is also the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
85
 These centres 
all serve to resolve the disputes between parties, and the WTO could establish a 
similar centre to handle disputes related specifically to the WTO and international 
trade. 
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At present, a centre exists to assist in dispute settlement between members. 
This centre is the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL); it is an independent 
organisation established under the WTO,
86
 which provides some services to 
developing countries to understand how they can resolve disputes brought under the 
WTO. The centre could be merged with the proposed centre and work within it. The 
suggested centre would then provide a complete service, resolving disputes between 
parties, and advising disputants on procedures, or means to resolve disputes, by 
applying WTO guidelines.  
However, contracting parties may not believe there is a need for such a 
centre, as there are other methods for resolving legal matters. However, it is argued 
here that the centre would assist in the smoother resolution of legal matters between 
parties. It could provide valuable support to all parties, thereby shortening conflict 
durations and reducing costs. Were the proposal for such a centre adopted, it would 
be a place for resolving all WTO-related conflicts between parties, offer information 
on how legal issues can be resolved, and develop up-to-date WTO articles to meet 
the needs of contemporary trade. Thus, it is a valid and reasonable proposal, with 
many attendant advantages, for contracting parties to consider.  
6.5 The need for an ITC 
An ITC, under the control of the WTO, would be another beneficial innovation, 
based on the research findings reported in this thesis. At present, there are no 
controls in place to assist in ending trade conflicts and supervising trade courts 
worldwide. Therefore, this proposed international court would both help to terminate 
and reduce international trade conflict under the WTO agreement simultaneously. 
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Meanwhile, it would be able to supervise all international legal trade issues or 
misinterpretations of the WTO agreement worldwide (overseeing national trade 
courts); thereby, functioning as the Supreme Court for International Trade. The court 
will have many advantages for the international trade mechanism under the WTO 
agreement, but it will require a change to the current WTO and DSU agreements.
87
 
In addition, it will not be an easy step to convince contracting parties, as a long 
period of negotiation between them will be required to reach an agreement for the 
establishment of an ITC. Yet, the contracting parties must work towards a successful 
International Trade Agreement by preventing any governmental interference that 
affects the efficacy of the WTO, and giving full rights to international companies to 
enable them to deal with their international trade matters themselves. This can be 
done, by providing a fully separate jurisdictional process at the international level to 
confirm independence in international trade legal conflict between international 
business entities, such as would be achieved with the creation of an ITC.      
6.5.1 Why the establishing of this court is important and the advantage?  
The establishment of an ITC must be based on logic and a strong argument. It would 
not be an easy step to take as there may be many disagreements regarding its 
efficacy and the necessity for it. Reasons for establishing an ITC are given in the 
following subsections:  
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 DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, The Legal 
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
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6.5.1.1 Protecting enterprise and the world economy 
The idea of establishing this court is clearly based on major international trade issues 
between international companies having an effect on the international economic 
market. International trade cases brought by such companies involve complicated 
legal issues, and action can cost billions of dollars, and so necessitate speedy and 
independent resolutions. At present, companies typically resolve their legal 
differences by resorting to the domestic judicial system of one of the parties.  
Many international companies have investments and assets worth billions of 
dollars, and are engaged in trade with other public or government sectors involving 
similar sums. Thus, the court’s judgment has to be very careful and clear. This care 
relates to the effect of judgments against companies, as such judgment can 
immediately affect them, the countries where those companies have their head 
offices, and potentially also the international marketplace. International trade at the 
time when the WTO and DSU Agreements were established differed considerably 
from the current context. There has been a huge change in the extent of international 
trade and the regularity of movement of products worldwide. With this change in 
international trade, a change to the WTO agreement and the DSU mechanism is also 
required in order to achieve dispute resolution.  
The current DSU agreement does not apply in cases of international trade 
between international companies who protect themselves independently. However, 
these international companies remain under the guardianship of their governments, 
and so can access the DSU mechanism under the WTO.   
Therefore, the establishment of an ITC could be considered similar to the 
International Criminal Court, which was established to deal with cases and crimes 
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affecting the entire international community.
88
 The ITC would deal with important 
cases that affect companies with a negative impact on the international community. 
Often the initial consequences of disputes are job losses, which affect domestic 
economies worldwide. By avoiding the negative consequences of prolonged action, 
the court will offer strong protection to both individual enterprises and the entire 
global economy.  
6.5.1.2 The ITC will be stronger than the Appellate Body 
The Appellate Body is run under the auspices of politicians and diplomats, as shown 
in this research. The procedures undertaken by the Appellate Body blend 
International Law and International Trade Law, thereby making a sound decision, 
but one of those procedures is not necessarily. The ITC, proposed in this research 
would make sound judicial decisions without the need for political or diplomatic 
input from either party. This ITC would therefore by stronger in terms of 
independence, power, effectiveness and influence over contracting parties.  
         The ITC would be stronger than the current Appellate Body, as it would not be 
involved in any type of political process, or influence such a process. In addition, 
government interfere in international trade conflicts will be minimised. The current 
mechanism under the DSU does not give the full legal rights to primary conflict 
parties, private companies, to obtain their rights and go through the dispute process 
without any interference from their governments. As a result, the influence of the 
current DSU agreement mechanism from political and governmental interference is 
evident; under this will be reduced and removed. This court will be protected from 
the power of politicians or governments, as they will not have any access to decision 
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 For more information about the International Criminal Court, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/> 
accessed 1 June 2014. 
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making concerning choice of judges, or giving private entities their rights to a full 
process in court without government interference.  
6.5.1.3 Neutrality 
When contracting parties experience conflicts under the WTO agreement, they 
typically begin proceedings at the national level. Resorting to the domestic legal 
systems of conflicting parties does not offer disputants the necessary neutrality, 
prescribed in International law.  
To clarify this, we can consider the case of Apple and Samsung as retailers of 
smart phones, dealing in billions of dollars.
89
 Apple filed a case against Samsung in 
the United States regarding certain legal issues related to Intellectual Property code 
and other legal matters.
90
 As a result, Samsung was required to pay huge damages to 
Apple and was prohibited from selling Samsung smart phones in the United States 
for a specified period.
91
 This judgment had a direct negative impact on Samsung 
itself, as well as on competitiveness in the marketplace in the United States. 
Meanwhile, Apple benefitted greatly, because of the reduced competition.  
This was a very complicated case, especially given the reputation of both 
companies as top manufacturers of smart phones. However, although the judgment 
affected the companies themselves, consumers in the United States felt the greatest 
effects, as the judgment risked creating a monopoly. Therefore, in such cases, 
involving complex international trade legal matters and compensation running into 
billions of dollars a high level of neutrality is essential to proving a legal guarantee 
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 Annual Report of the Securities Exchange of Apple for 2012 available at 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312512444068/d411355d10k.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2014. For Samsung, available at 
<http://www.samsung.co.kr/samsung/outcome/perfomance.do> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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 See BBC, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19425051> accessed 1 June 2014.  
91
 See BBC, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19425051> accessed 1 June 2014. 
224 
 
to all interested parties. The outcomes of such cases can have a huge effect on the 
national revenue of countries and the international economic system itself.  
Thus far, the allowances made for resolving disputes do not support the 
principle of neutrality sufficiently, and the issue of which law should be applied to 
support neutrality could be better addressed by establishing an independent ITC with 
highly qualified staff focused on managing legal matters affecting international 
trade.  
6.5.1.4 The advantages of an ITC to International Trade 
The ITC is expected to have many advantages over the International trade 
mechanism. The most important one being to minimise government interference in 
the international trade conflicts between parties. Minimisation can be achieved by 
giving the right to private companies and other conflicting parties to access the DUS 
regulation and go through the dispute process without any interference from their 
governments. It can be seen that interference from government does not hasten 
conflict resolution, as political issues interfere. No political dimensions or pressures 
will apply under the structure of the ITC to save time and limit costs.  
The main idea aim of the new structure is to reduce the level of international 
trade conflict between parties. The ITC will have the ability to guide other 
jurisdictions worldwide, placing them on the right path toward understanding the 
world trade agreement and the DSU. It will be such a supreme court, and will 
improve access to interoperate WTO and DSU agreements in a practical way, as it 
will be considered the highest international trade court in the world.    
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6.5.2 The relationship between the ITC, enterprises and contracting parties 
As mentioned previously, individuals and private sectors have no access directly to 
the WTO disputes resolution system. As clarified by van den Bossche and Zdouc, 
“Individuals, companies, industry associations, labour unions, international 
organisations and NGOs have no direct access to the WTO dispute settlement 
system…”.92 As also discussed above, even if they are the party directly affected, 
when involved in disputes under the WTO private sector actors must be represented 
by governments and panels. In this researcher’s view, it is essential that companies 
who are influential within the global economy, should be able to file their cases 
directly with the WTO without any interference from governments; that is, they 
should not be seen as a third party.  
The ITC would be set up to extend this right to private sector actors, to allow 
them to apply directly to the court, after exhausting all other methods for resolving 
legal issues, and without any interference from government. However, as the ITC 
will be a supreme court (overseeing trade matters related to the WTO), it should also 
honour the contracting parties (the countries themselves) as part of its obligation to 
the WTO responsible for its establishment.  
As the contracting parties to the WTO are responsible for insuring their 
domestic trade legal system is compatible with WTO agreements, there is also a 
legal obligation form contracting parties to participate in such an agreement. 
Moreover, the legal obligation regarding this ITC will be the same as the WTO 
obligation, which is ultimately an obligation to the international community to 
support good international relations between all the states in the world.  
                                                 
92
 Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 
(3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 263. 
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6.5.3 The relationship between ITC and ADRC 
The relationship between the ITC and ADRC will be strong; they would be 
complementary bodies, and there would not be any type of conflict in the duties of 
each. The ADRC and its methods will aim to reduce the number of cases and issues 
related to the WTO between conflicting parties. However, the ITC will give more 
power to the ADRC to resolve conflicts between parties without any interference 
from their governments; which will help to resolve issues more quickly and easily. 
Conflict between parties will be resolved under the ADCR using ADR methods, by 
trying these methods with conflicting parties and pushing them to find middle 
ground to resolve issues between them. Conflicting parties will have the support of 
the ITC in order to ensure quicker resolution of issues in less time. This would also 
reduce the number of international trade conflicts between parties without any 
interference from governments.    
 
6.5.4 The relationship between the ITC and the Current Appellate Body 
There is a similar arrangement to this suggested court, under the WTO, and the 
Appellate Body. Ehlermann, who used to work there as a judge, referred to it as the 
“World Trade Court”,93 Article 17 of the Dispute Settlement sets out the work of this 
Appellate Body.
94
  
However, it is arguable that this body does not have much effect on resolving 
conflicts between parties, and so there remains a need to establish an ITC. The 
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 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, “Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body”, Texas International Law 
Journal, 2003, 38, 469. 
94
 DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, The Legal 
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). Article 17. 
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Appellate Body considers the cases referred from panels only as stated in article 17, 
section 1 “…The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases…”.95 This 
means that no cases can be brought directly by a conflicting party to the Appellate 
Body for consideration, as cases have to be filtered before going to a higher level, in 
order to resolve the legal matters between parties. Another point to consider 
regarding the Appellate Body relates to who can appeal to it.  
The only parties who can do so are those stated in article 17, section 4 “Only 
parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report…”.96 Nonetheless, 
a third party who has an interest in the cases heard by the Appellate Body, may be 
allowed to submit a written opinion and may be heard by this body. As discussed by 
van den Bossche and Zdouc,  
Third Parties which [have] notified the DSB of a substantial interest in 
the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 10 may make a written 
submission to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate 
Body.
97
  
 
If this court could be established, there would be no reason to continue 
resolving legal matters through the Appellate Body, and its functions could all be 
transferred immediately to the newly established court. The Appellate Body would 
merge with the new court, requiring a changing in the DSU and the WTO agreement 
itself as detailed in the next section.  
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6.5.5 Is there a need to amend the DSU and WTO to establish the ITC? 
The ITC would be run by the WTO agreement, and judges with high qualifications 
would be selected by the contracting parties to insure the highest standard of dealing 
with these trade-related legal issues. This could then support a higher level of 
judgment, which would offer a greater legal guarantee to the conflicting parties. The 
court would also help to apply many of the WTO articles with greater neutrality than 
can be guaranteed through other avenues of resolution. As mentioned above, the 
Appellate Body could then be merged with the ITC, requiring amendment to the 
WTO agreement and DSU, to establish the court quickly. The new ITC would 
support the globalisation of trade and be the only option for a final judicial step to 
resolve trade conflict worldwide.  
6.6 Conclusion  
Significant effects on time, costs and the smooth movement of goods internationally 
would be the most important elements for encouraging conflicting parties to resolve 
disputes through alternative resolution. These alternative dispute resolutions include 
good offices, mediation and arbitration. 
By enacting these resolutions, conflict can easily be terminated via the 
suggested dispute resolution centre. While dispute resolution has been defined under 
the WTO agreement, there remains a need to incorporate more inclusive and 
thorough articles to encourage contracting parties to resolve conflicts efficiently.  
The dispute settlement process needs to be reformed, even though it is 
already working well, as the Consultative Board to the Director-General states,  
First, while there are some grounds for criticism and reform of the 
dispute settlement system, on the whole, there exists much satisfaction 
with its practices and performance. Second, in appraising ideas for 
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reform or improvement, the most important principle is to ‘do no harm’. 
Caution and experience are needed before any dramatic changes are 
undertaken.
98
 
 
Nonetheless, these changes to the WTO will require consensus from all the 
members: “Thus, amendment of the DSU will be needed, and this requires 
consensus, which can be blocked by any WTO Member”,99 and this might be not 
easy to achieve.  
However, this research recommends that it is important to establish both a 
DRC and the ITC. Through the suggested steps and models, disputes could then be 
resolved through the Centre as an initial step. The centre would handle a number of 
different methods for achieving a legal resolution. However, when the centre would 
be unsuccessful, the dispute could then be transferred immediately to the ITC to 
make a final decision. 
These changes would represent dramatic improvements under the WTO 
agreement regarding international trade between parties; helping to unify the 
regulations of international trade, to support globalisation, to unify laws at the 
domestic and international levels, and to hasten the resolution of disputes in a 
manner that provides justice to the companies and stakeholders involved.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Main findings and conclusion  
The previous chapters have explained the importance of the petrochemicals sector 
and its products globally in general, and in Saudi Arabia in particular. Many 
countries worldwide consider this sector as comprising key industries, which create 
employment opportunities and generate profits, thereby increasing national revenue 
through taxation. The contracting parties to the WTO need to consider this sector 
more carefully, in view of the increasing numbers of AD cases brought against it 
worldwide.
1
 More focused attention would assist international producers to increase 
the quantity of exports, while also decreasing the number of AD cases brought 
against them. Each state must also be encouraged to take additional action to open its 
domestic market to fair competition among petrochemicals companies.  
In Saudi Arabia, the petrochemicals sector is one of the most crucial sources 
of national revenue, after the oil industry. It is critical in supporting the Saudi 
government’s plans to diversify the national economy to reduce reliance on the 
petroleum sector. Saudi Arabia has strong and ambitious strategic plans for the 
future of its industries, especially the petrochemicals sector.
2
 Despite its recognition 
of the importance of the success of this sector, the Saudi government is currently 
endangering it by failing to direct adequate legal and economic resources to 
compliance with WTO, resulting in difficulties associated with AD.  
                                                 
1
 As mentioned in chapter 3 and according to two sources: 1- World Trade Organisation’s website, 
figures for anti-dumping measures, available at < 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm>, accessed 1 June 2014 and, 2- The Global 
Anti-dumping Database under the World Bank, available at 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:225
74930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014. 
2
 The National Industrial Strategic 2020. See the Saudi Industrial Development Funds website, 
http://www.sidf.gov.sa/, accessed 1 June 2014. 
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Through the analysis of AD cases brought against Saudi petrochemicals 
products by India, Turkey and EU countries,
3
 a number of legal problems have been 
identified. Saudi Arabia needs to examine the factors that have caused cases to be 
brought in the past, to fill in the legal gaps in its legal processes and avoid cases 
threatening future exports. Resolution of these issues, will improve the level of 
success experienced by the Saudi Strategic Plan for Industry.
4
  
This thesis has considered the ramifications of Saudi Arabia’s application of 
Islamic Law in its domestic legal system, to identify any potential conflict with 
WTO law. In fact, no essential differences were founded between the provisions of 
AD and anti-subsidy law under the WTO agreement
5
 and Islamic law. Islamic law 
encourages competition between products, and has similar rules to the rest of the 
international community, regarding AD and anti-subsidy law. Therefore, it is 
determined here, that there is adequate compatibility between Islamic law and AD 
and anti-subsidy law under the WTO agreement.  
The most important concern raised is the direct subsidising by the Saudi 
government of the petrochemicals sector. The Saudi government has stated that it 
plans to contribute around 24 billion UK Pounds into this sector in order to develop 
it.
6
 However, the WTO provisions classify this as a prohibited subsidy. In fact, Saudi 
Arabia is a developing country and the Saudi government employs multiple 
                                                 
3
 Indian case: 14/5/2009-DGAD, India v Oman, Saudi Arabia and Singapore [2009], available at 
<www.commerce.nic.in> accessed 1 June 2014. Turkish case: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569. EU case: 2011/c 49/10, EU v 
Oman and Saudi Arabia [2011], Official Journal of European Union c 49/16. 
4
 The National Industrial Strategic 2020. See the Saudi Industrial Development Funds website, 
http://www.sidf.gov.sa/, accessed 1 June 2014. 
5
 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S., 201. 
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 This was a TV interview on a famous official economic Arabian channel (CNBC Arabic TV), 
available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZmk49du3LU> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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subsidising programmes, including those for fuel, gas and electricity.
7
 All 
subsidising at the domestic level has a direct effect on prices, leading to dumping, 
when products are exported for sale in international markets. Saudi Arabia’s 
subsidising programmes, are not in themselves a problem, the problem arises from 
the failure to control pricing when they are sold on the international market in 
competition with other countries’ products.8 It is how subsidies effect the pricing of 
petrochemicals products when exported abroad, which leads them to be classified as 
prohibited under the WTO provisions. 
In addition to subsidy, the Saudi government supplies SABIC with low-
priced raw materials for manufacturing petrochemicals products.
9
 Thus, the price to 
SABIC of raw materials does not match global market prices,
10
 ultimately resulting 
in differences in the pricing of the products from those of other nations when 
exported. Saudi Arabia could resolve this issue by supplying SABIC with raw 
materials at prices in line with global pricing.  
An additional concern is raised in reference to the level of government shares 
in the petrochemicals sector. Saudi Arabia dominates petrochemical industries 
through its holdings in SABIC and other petrochemicals companies. The Saudi 
government shareholdings total 70% of SABIC’s shares,11 which makes it difficult 
for other investors to enter this industry and compete.  
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 See report by Reuters Arabic news, available at 
<http://ara.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idARACAE9B2FFP20131110> accessed 1 June 2014, 
Also see the Trade Policy Review, prepared by the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, 
Report no. WT/TPR/256, 21 December 2011, vii.  
8
 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 4. 
9
 The Turkish Anti-dumping case against Saudi Arabia: 2008/40 and 2010/11, Turkey v Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bulgaria [2008] Turkish Gazette 27 092 – 27 569, 4. 
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 See the Saudi American Bank report (SAMBA), Report Series August 2009, available at 
<http://www.samba.com/>, accessed on 1 June 2014. 
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 SABIC, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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Through analysis of AD cases brought against Saudi Arabian petrochemicals 
products, the impact of such cases has been found to be discussed in the following 
section.  
7.1.1 The impact of these cases on Saudi Arabia 
The impact of the AD cases against Saudi petrochemicals products can be divided 
into three categories, to clarify the relevance of this problem long term; i.e. legal, 
economic and political impact. 
7.1.1.1 Legal impact 
An increasing number of AD cases around the world, whether against Saudi 
petrochemicals products or other products, will have a negative impact on the use of 
AD legislation. According to WTO statistics regarding AD cases,
12
 there were just 
879 AD initiations out of 4358 cases on products from chemical and allied 
industries;
13
 this represents 20.16% of total AD initiations. Moreover, some AD 
cases could be deemed false allegations, as they themselves negatively affected the 
legislation, enabling domestic producers to increase their prices of similar products, 
as mentioned in chapter four. The purpose of AD legislation is to ensure avoidance 
of unfair competition between domestic and the international products. However, the 
frequency of false allegations with regard to regulations could also result in unfair 
competition, which is considered as a negative legal impact of the AD regulation. 
The function of AD regulations is to prevent injury by the imported product to 
domestic industry; however, the frequent use or misuse of regulations has 
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 These cases arose between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 2013. 
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 The Anti-dumping Initiations by the sector, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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established additional barriers against imported products, ultimately creating unfair 
competition. 
However, there is a legal impact on Saudi Arabia from AD cases against its 
petrochemicals products. The Saudi Arabian government firs became involved in 
such a case in order to protect its petrochemicals products from the AD duty. One of 
the Saudi Royal family members led a negotiation team regarding these cases, in 
order to give more strength to the negotiations to find a solution to AD cases brought 
against petrochemicals products. However, Saudi Arabia has issued a new 
amendment to AD duty, which has been approved by the Saudi government and 
shows the level of legal knowledge of the Saudi government reached concerning AD 
cases, both internally and externally.    
7.1.1.2 Economic impact 
The economic impact of AD allegations on Saudi petrochemicals products will be 
separated into five points as follows:  
7.1.1.2.1 Price and profit 
As seen in the SABIC figures presented between 2008 and 2009
14
, It has appeared 
that the decreased of income could be correlated with AD cases. However, after 
termination of the cases, following negotiations by a Saudi committee, profits 
increased in subsequent years. This reveals a relationship between the AD cases 
against SABIC products and decreases and increases in profits and income. Without 
the Saudi government’s intervention in the termination of cases, these products 
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 SABIC official website, available at <http://www.sabic.com/> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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would still suffer from AD duty, which might mean lower profits with higher 
product pricing in the international market.  
7.1.1.2.2 Competition 
If AD duty were to continue to be applied against the Saudi petrochemicals products, 
it would affect Saudi’s petrochemicals ability to compete with other similar products 
in the international market. The loss of the ability to compete would be reflected in a 
loss of consumers, which would then mean that Saudi products would need more 
time to recover its consumer base, which could be costly.  
7.1.1.2.3 Sales quantities 
The effects already mentioned in terms of profit and price and ability to compete 
directly affect the sales volume of Saudi petrochemicals products. Following cases, 
sales were measurably lower in the overseas markets, due to the AD duty imposed 
against Saudi petrochemicals products.  
7.1.1.2.4 Development of the petrochemicals sector and products 
There is no evidence that AD cases have affected the development of this sector and 
products until now. However, if the imposition of AD duty were to continue, it 
would be expected to affect the sector and products in the long term. Nonetheless, 
the development of this sector in Saudi Arabia has not yet stopped and new 
industries are being established in Saudi Arabia and other countries, as companies’ 
annual reports show. The reason for this is that the Saudi government has been 
subsidising the sector, both directly and indirectly. Moreover, the period of time over 
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which AD duty was imposed in previous cases has been short, thus the effects were 
minimal.  
7.1.1.2.5 Employment 
The figures
15
 did not report any job losses during the periods in which actions were 
taken. However, one of the known side effects of both dumping actions and AD duty 
is job losses for both affected parties. Due to the situations tested in this study, the 
period of time during which AD duty was applied was not sufficiently long to judge 
whether it was a factor in job losses. This is why it is unclear whether AD had any 
impact on job losses related to AD duty against Saudi petrochemicals products.  
7.1.1.3 Political impact 
AD cases could result in negative political consequences for parties, if action 
prompted other issues to be raised. The cases that took place were addressed 
negatively in the Saudi media, which was one of reasons prompting this research. 
However, Saudi Arabia was extraordinary in its application of political pressure to 
terminate cases against Saudi petrochemicals products. This political influence can 
be seen as significant in ending disputes, even after the AD measures have been 
applied against its products. It is difficult to know what the negotiations included, as 
evidence was not available to the researcher, but diplomatic actions by the Saudi 
government were involved. Thus, the positive effect of political pressure on the AD 
cases is apparent.  
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 The Saudi Ministry of Labour and Central Department of Statistics and information, reveals no 
such losses in jobs in the Saudi’s petrochemicals sector. Moreover, it is difficult under Saudi labour 
law for employees to lose their jobs unless the company becomes bankrupt. Check Saudi Labour law 
on the official website of the Ministry of Labour, available at <https://www.mol.gov.sa/> accessed 31 
December 2014. Also, see the official website of the Saudi Central Department of Statistics and 
information<http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/> accessed 31 December 2014. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
Having conducted this research, recommendations have been prepared and can be 
divided into four categories: recommendations for the Saudi Arabian’s economic 
system; recommendations for amendments to the AD and anti-subsidy provisions 
under the WTO; recommendations for the dispute resolutions mechanism under the 
DSU; and finally new models for the petrochemicals sector globally beyond the 
WTO framework.  
7.2.1 Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian economic system  
Saudi Arabia could employ the following to avoid the frequent AD cases brought 
against its petrochemicals products:  
1. Saudi Arabia should stop direct subsidising of its petrochemicals sector, such 
as subsidising the development of the petrochemicals sector, as mentioned in 
the research. The petrochemicals sector should be left to develop 
independently without any intervention from government.  
2. Saudi Arabia should sell raw materials to its petrochemicals sector at the 
global price, to avoid negative effects on pricing when the end product is 
exported. This would avoid the majority of the AD cases brought against the 
Saudi petrochemicals sector.  
3. The Saudi government departments that deal with export, trade and industrial 
sectors should be given more capability to monitor domestic prices, in order 
to protect the industries inside the country. By monitoring pricing, 
government departments are able to build a large volume of data about 
pricing, both inside and outside the country, which can be applied to the 
relevant products, in order to protect them from AD actions.  
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4. The Saudi Arabian government has to reconsider its programme subsidising 
fuel and electricity. This programme has a direct impact on product pricing, 
whether in the domestic market or when exported abroad. The Saudi 
government should redirect its subsidising programme toward people who 
need it, by directing subsidy programmes to them.  
5. The Saudi government has to create fair competition between petrochemicals 
products domestically; ideally, by selling its shareholdings in the private 
sector. Moreover, it will also help the private sector to become involved in 
investment in the petrochemicals sector, as it is hard to manage government 
shares in this sector.  
6. The Saudi government has to encourage foreign and local investors to invest 
in the petrochemicals industries in Saudi Arabia. This will promote genuine 
competition inside the Saudi domestic market between different producers, 
which will then reduce the AD allegations against Saudi petrochemicals 
products abroad. Moreover, it will help to develop this sector and the Saudi 
petrochemicals products in general, in order to compete domestically and 
internationally.  
7. Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries must consider the export of all types of 
goods in general and petrochemicals products in particular under the GCC 
umbrella, rather than exporting their products individually. Made in the GCC 
will be function as a stronger and more competitive mark, also reducing AD 
allegations, because of the authentic competition inside the GCC market. 
8. GCC members should ideally face AD allegations against their 
petrochemicals products together. One body could address legal issues 
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against all these countries. This would require a very high level of 
cooperation and coordination.  
9. The Saudi government must play a greater role in protecting its products by 
developing a greater awareness of the legal issues, their effects and how 
actions can be avoided. This will also help to implement a national strategy 
concerning the entire industrial sector.  
7.2.2 Recommendations for amendments to the AD and anti-subsidy’s 
provisions under the WTO  
Throughout this research, it has been evident that there are many weaknesses 
associated with AD and anti-subsidy provisions and their implementation. This 
section therefore focuses on these weaknesses, and on changes that might need to be 
made to develop and improve the WTO agreement so that it becomes more flexible 
and enables the smooth and free movement of trade between nations. Thus, there are 
five important points that require careful consideration by the contracting parties as 
follows:  
1. AD duty decisions include only the imposition of this duty on exported 
products, proven to have caused an injury to the domestic similar products. 
However, these decisions should include a fixed amount of compensation to 
the domestic industries injured by this action in order for them to recover 
from that injury. Yet, the formula of this change must be worded very 
carefully to avoid encouraging the brining of more cases to generate more 
income from the imported products, especially if some articles regarding AD 
remain unclear.  
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2. At present, there is no legal guarantee for parties under the AD provisions. 
As discussed in this research, most contracting parties use the same methods 
for applying AD processes. It is common for authorities working under the 
same domestic legal system to perform all legal processes of before imposing 
AD duties. Yet this should not be the case. The authorities should collect all 
the required information, complete all investigations and then transfer all 
cases to the commercial court in the domestic legal system. This would 
enable all parties to impose a legal guarantee and apply these regulations 
equitably.  
3. In this research, the AD regulation was found to be outdated, and in need of 
replacement by a competition law. This law would then cover all aspects of 
trade and apply the principle of fair competition between products, whether 
domestically or internationally. Fairness can be applied through 
circumstances inside the national market only, without checking other 
markets, in order to apply duty as in AD processes. This would be one way to 
reduce the high number of AD cases around the world.  
4. The idea of subsidy has to be reconsidered by all contracting parties, 
especially since the developed countries pumped billions of US dollars into 
their markets following the recent economic crisis. However, developing 
countries still need more time and regulations that are more flexible in order 
to support their industries, so that they can attain equality with the developed 
countries and have the ability to compete. This would enable developing 
countries to become more stable in terms of quality of life, and therefore 
discourage people from immigrating to developed countries to find a better 
life. Furthermore, it would provide fair treatment between all contracting 
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parties, as developed countries require time to develop products and already 
had capacity to compete in the international marketplace, even before the 
WTO agreement.  
5. The final point concerns the ability of the private sector to enter disputes 
directly without any support from governments. This is a very important 
allowance to consider, as it would make it easier for conflicting parties to 
resolve any legal issues and would provide greater and immediate justice to 
injured companies. The legal arguments in favour of this have been discussed 
in this research, and can be applied together with additional changes 
suggested later in this chapter in reference to the generation of new models 
under the WTO.  
7.2.3 Recommendations for Dispute Resolution Mechanism under DSU  
In this section, the recommendations will be divided into two subsections. The first 
discusses the importance of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts related to the WTO agreement between parties. The second section 
illustrates the new models under the WTO provisions, to ensure disputes resolutions 
between parties are easier and better organised.  
7.2.3.1 Alternative dispute resolutions  
With regard to the WTO agreement, there has been no emphasis placed by 
contracting parties on activating alternative ways to solve the AD and anti-subsidy 
disputes. Consequently, investigation is considered, and then duty applied by the AD 
or anti-subsidy authorities, which is legal. However, as the number of cases is 
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increasing, the parties need to consider other ways to make the process easier and 
faster at lower cost and without any obstacles to trade movement and exchange.  
The contracting parties should activate and employ other means, such as 
arbitration, mediation and good offices to resolve cases. By using these methods, the 
cost of cases will reduce, and the number of cases will decrease, especially those 
brought against petrochemicals products. As shown in this research, more than 20% 
of AD cases involve petrochemicals products,
16
 and therefore the contracting parties 
should apply alternative methods to reduce these cases.  
7.2.3.2 New models under the WTO provisions 
There are two models that will help to reduce AD and anti-subsidy cases globally, as 
well as any other disputes under the WTO agreement. These two models are the 
establishment of a DRC and an ITC.  
The DRC, would help the private sector to directly access decisions made by 
any of the contracting parties. It is strongly recommended, that this centre should be 
established under the WTO umbrella, to bring together all cases in a single centre to 
address international commercial and legal issues there, rather than matters brought 
elsewhere in the world.  
Moreover, an ITC would act as a Supreme Trade Court to cover all the cases 
around the world. Furthermore, this could be an important step towards establishing 
judgments between parties in circumstances crucial to the functioning of the global 
market and the economy. The court would control excesses by domestic authorities 
and courts in order to apply the spirit of the WTO agreement.  
                                                 
16
 The Anti-dumping Initiations by the sector, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. The Anti-dumping 
Initiations by measures, World Trade Organisation, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> accessed 1 June 2014. 
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7.2.4 New models for the petrochemicals sector globally beyond the WTO 
framework  
As seen in this research, many AD cases are brought against petrochemicals products 
globally. Thus, it is important for the contracting parties to consider protection 
mechanisms for these products. The parties should establish an agreement regarding 
petrochemicals products, similar to that applied to agriculture, in order to reduce the 
large number of disputes against these products. Reducing the number of such cases 
would help the world to recover economically from financial crisis, in particular by 
bringing stability to the pricing of petrochemicals products, of which there are 
thousands being produced around the world. Moreover, it would help this sector to 
make greater improvements to products, rather than having to expend energy 
resolving legal disputes.  
Furthermore, the establishment of an international petrochemicals 
organisation would emphasise the importance of this sector in supporting the 
development of industry. It would bring about more stability in the pricing of 
petrochemicals worldwide and the pricing mechanism could be conducted formally 
through this organisation after coordination with all parties, whether producers or 
consumers. The prices would be determined in the same way as oil pricing, under the 
control of this organisation and reflecting the international stock markets. In this 
way, all issues related to AD and anti-subsidy would end, as all parties would be able 
to agree on prices and production processes.  
7.3 The future of the WTO  
The increases in AD cases threaten the future of the WTO agreement. This increase 
affects the entire mechanism by which the WTO agreement functions. The 
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increasing number of cases not only affects free trade between contracting parties, 
but also has the potential to result in economic warfare. Moreover, although dispute 
resolution is an important component of the WTO agreement, intentions to improve 
it might limit worldwide trade. 
By implementing the changes to the WTO agreement, proposed here, trade 
between nations would benefit and AD actions between contracting parties would 
reduce, positively affecting the petrochemicals sector in all countries. The improved 
trade in petrochemicals products would reflect positively on the world economy, 
supporting recovery from crisis. 
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